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Abstract      
 
Since the end of the Cold War; wide spread political, economic, social and 
technological changes have enabled organised criminal groups to develop 
transnational activities. Encouraged by the United States, the world has 
conceived transnational organised crime as a ‗new‘ and serious security threat. 
The international community has acknowledged the inherent incapability of 
national strategies, alone, to combat transnational organised crime. Therefore, 
concerted efforts have been taken to develop a global and uniformed response.  
 
Efforts to combat transnational organised crime have been underpinned by a 
perceived necessity to protect national borders. This reaction is based on 
traditional, inaccurate, conceptions of organised crime, which focuses on 
structured, ethnically defined ‗outsider‘ groups as a serious threat to security 
and the very fabric of society. This concept of organised crime is overly 
simplistic and fails to grasp the complexity of modern organised crime and its 
interaction with legal and illegal markets. Organise crime is a multifaceted 
phenomenon, characterised by loose networks of criminals, who are primarily 
motivated by profit and operate based on particular ‗opportunities‘. 
 
Strategies to combat organised crime have been preoccupied with traditional, 
repressive, criminal justice measures; at the expense of developing a 
comprehensive understanding of the root problems that allow illicit markets 
and organised crime to flourish, in communities and society in general. It is 
essential that the international community, through the United Nations, 
realistically assess the effectiveness of its current approach, to aid the 
development of comprehensive strategies for the future. 
 
New Zealand has taken promising steps to combat transnational organised 
crime. Although in its infancy, NZ has developed a comprehensive strategy 
which not only utilises traditional criminal justice tools, but also seeks to 
engage with communities to develop effective prevention measures. 
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Chapter One 
 Introduction 
 
 
Background  
Organised crime is a notoriously difficult concept to define and measure.
1
 
Michael Levi likens it to a psychiatrist‘s Rorschach blot, “its attraction as well 
as its weakness is that anyone can read almost anything into it.‖2 The lack of 
precise definition has not impeded world leaders, and officials, from making 
confident statements regarding the scale of the problem, which is invariably 
described as ‗growing‘.3 Transnational organised crime (TNOC) has, 
increasingly, been perceived as a serious security threat by the international 
community.
4
 TNOC has become, and will continue to be, a defining security 
theme of the twenty-first century.
5
 Since the end of the Cold War; wide spread 
political, economic, social and technological changes have enabled organised 
criminal groups to develop transnational activities. Crime is no longer bound 
by the constraints of national borders.
6
  
 
Organised criminal groups cross borders to exploit lucrative, foreign, illicit 
markets. In addition, they take advantage of national borders, as a defence 
mechanism; exploiting weak legal systems to evade law enforcement.
7
 
Criminal groups have proved adept at crossing borders to suit their purposes. 
Governments, by contrast, have been hindered by national borders and notions 
                                                 
1
 Levi M and Maguire M, ―Reducing and Preventing Organised Crime: an Evidence Based 
Approach‖ (2004) 41Crime Law and Social Change at 397. 
2
 Levi M, The Organisation of Serious Crimes in Maguire M, Morgan R and Reiner, R Oxford 
Handbook of Criminology (3
rd
 ed, 2002) at 887. 
3
 Ibid 
4
 Kendall R, Responding to Transnational Crime in Williams, P and Vlassis, D (eds.), 
Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses (2001) at 269. 
5
 Galeotti M, Global Crime today: the Changing face of Organised Crime (2006) at 1. 
6
 Di Gennaro G, Strengthening the International Legal System in order to Combat 
Transnational Crime, in Williams, P and Vlassis, D (eds.), Combating Transnational Crime: 
Concepts, Activities and Responses (2001) at 259. 
7
 Goodson R, and Williams P, Strengthening Cooperation against Transnational Crime: A 
New Security Imperative in Williams, P and Vlassis, D (eds.), Combating Transnational 
Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses (2001) at 321 
2 
 
of sovereignty, in their efforts to combat TNOC.
8
 Because national strategies 
are inherently inadequate to respond to criminal activity that crosses multiple 
borders, involving multiple jurisdictions
9
, the international community has 
sought to build closer cooperation and a uniformed response, to combat TNOC. 
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) 
is, to date, the pinnacle of these efforts. It represents years of intense 
negotiation between States and has resulted in a near universally accepted 
convention.  
 
Research questions 
 
What measures have the international community (and specifically New 
Zealand) deemed necessary to combat transnational organised crime and 
how effective have these measures been?  
 
Understanding the nature, characteristics and activities of transnational 
organised crime is an essential first step towards answering this question. 
Accordingly, chapter two is concerned with developing an accurate conception 
of transnational organised crime and a working definition for the purpose of 
this thesis. This chapter will sift through the overly simplistic traditional 
conceptions of organised crime. The chapter will contrast traditional 
conceptions with the far more complex reality, illustrating their inability to 
encompass the multifaceted nature of modern organised crime. Finally, this 
chapter will outline measures that are needed to comprehensively respond to 
TNOC; ranging from traditional criminal justice tools, to non-traditional 
measures, such as, community engagement.    
 
Chapter three will focus on how States have sought to cooperate on 
transnational criminal issues. This chapter will outline important legal 
instruments, which States have utilised to foster cooperation, and describe the 
growing trend toward developing multilateral treaties to deal with transnational 
                                                 
8
 Ibid 
9
 Ibid 
3 
 
crime. A key aspect of this chapter concerns discussion and analysis of 
important international conventions, in particular the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. As the preeminent 
international legal tool to fight TNOC; it is important to understand what 
conception of TNOC underpins it and what measures it obliges States to take. 
This chapter will illustrate that the convention is based on aspects of traditional 
conceptions of TNOC. In particular, the convention propagates a perception of 
TNOC as an alien criminal conspiracy, threatening, otherwise morally sound, 
citizens and institutions.
10
 The measures it advocates are heavily focused on 
traditional criminal justice, primarily focusing on criminalising ‗outsiders‘. In 
addition, it provides little in the way of mechanisms for measuring the success 
of the convention. While representing an important step towards international 
cooperation; the convention essentially represents a redoubling of traditional 
measures to combat organised crime, without adequate knowledge of its 
potential or effectiveness.
11
 
 
A key purpose of this thesis is to analyse New Zealand‘s efforts to combat 
TNOC and provide recommendations for the future. New Zealand is in its 
infancy in regards to developing measures to combat TNOC. For this reason 
chapter four contains two case studies, the United States and United Kingdom, 
to provide a more detailed understanding of how these countries have 
responded to organised crime. The US is often viewed as an experienced 
benchmark when it comes to dealing with organised crime. However, as the 
case study will illustrate, the US has retained outdated and inaccurate 
conceptions of organised crime, which have impeded their ability to effectively 
understand and respond to the problem.  
 
NZ has been able to gain insights from experiences in the UK and has adopted 
a number of the measures which the UK deemed necessary to effectively 
combat organised crime. For instance, the Organised and Financial Crime 
                                                 
10
 Woodiwiss M, Transnational Organised Crime: The Global reach of an American concept 
in Edwards A, and Gill P Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security 
(2003) at 1-25 and Edwards A, Transnational organised Crime in Sheptycki J and Wardak A 
(eds.), Transnational and Comparative Criminology (2005) at 213 
11
 Ibid 
4 
 
Agency New Zealand, in many ways, mirrors the UK‘s Serious Organised 
Crime Agency.
12
 Both agencies have been created to centralise law 
enforcement responses to organised crime and are tasked with developing an 
intelligence led approach. Moreover, New Zealand has recently introduced two 
pieces of important legislation; the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 
and the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 
2009. The UK case study will discuss the effectiveness of the UK equivalent, 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.  
 
The UK approach also contains an important contrast to NZ. Rather than 
criminalise membership, or participation, in an organised criminal group, the 
UK takes a sector based approach. Within its legal system the UK targets 
particular activities, associated with organised crime, rather than confront 
organised crime in all its aspects.
13
 New Zealand on the other hand has 
criminalised participation in an organised criminal group under s 98A of the 
Crimes Act 1961. The case study will discuss how this aspect of the UK 
approach is some what confused, and contradictory to the aims of its own 
strategy. 
 
Based on the discussion and analysis of international measures to combat 
TNOC, the two case studies, and New Zealand‘s response; chapter six will 
outline ways forward for the international community and for New Zealand 
specifically. This chapter will emphasise the need for a future focus on non-
traditional measures to combat TNOC and the development of effective 
mechanisms to assess the impact of TNOC and the effectiveness of measures 
taken to combat it. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Edwards, A and Levi, M. Supra n. 1 at 381. See also, Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis, which 
discuss the Serious Organsied Crime Agency (UK) and the Organsied and Financial Crime 
Agency New Zealand, respectively. 
13
 Home Office, One Step Ahead: A 21
st
 Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime, March 
2004, at 12. See also Cabinet Office and Home Office, Extending Our Reach:  A 
Comprehensive Approach to Tackling Serious Organised Crime, July 2009 at 12-13.  
5 
 
Chapter Two 
 Conceptions of organised crime 
 
 
Introduction 
Finding a consensus on what constitutes transnational crime or organised crime 
has been notoriously difficult to achieve. Angela Leong, writing on this 
subject, concludes that perhaps there is no need for an exact definition, because 
organised crime and its transnational variation are a constantly changing 
phenomenon requiring “different approaches... adopted at different times in 
different societies”.14 However, James Finckenauer argues that definition is of 
great importance; because how the problem of organised crime is defined is 
significant in determining how laws are framed, how investigations and 
prosecutions are conducted, how research studies are done, and, increasingly, 
how mutual legal assistance across national borders is or is not rendered.
15
  
 
It is a presumption for the purpose of this thesis, that in order to have any 
meaningful analyses and discussion on measures to effectively combat TNOC, 
it is important to know what is in need of being ‗combated‘. The construction 
of transnational organised crime is crucial in deciding what measures should be 
taken to confront it.
16
 The purpose of this chapter is to develop an accurate 
conception and definition of transnational organised crime (TNOC), how it 
operates, what activities are associated with it, and what can be done to 
confront it. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Leong, V M A. The Disruption of International organised Crime: An Analysis of Legal and 
Non-Legal Structures. (2008) at 25. 
15
 Finckenauer J, Problems of Definition: What is Organised Crime? Trends in Organized 
Crime/Vol. 8, No. 3, Spring (2005) at 68. 
16
Adam E and P Gill, The politics of „transnational organized crime‟: discourse, reflexivity and 
the narration of „threat‟ British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, (June 2002) at 259. 
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2.1 Transnational Crime 
 
Transnational crime is a term initially coined to identify certain criminal 
activities that transcended international borders and, which transgressed the 
laws of several states.
17
 The term seems to have originated in the 1975 report 
of the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, in Geneva.
18
 In this report a number of categories of 
transnational crime are identified; such as organised crime, corruption and 
offences involving works of art and other cultural property.
19
 Interest in 
transnational crime, amongst scholars and policy makers, did not intensify until 
the 1990s, during a time of significant political and economic development, as 
the Soviet Union dramatically collapsed.
20
 The comparatively stable and 
predictable Cold War system gave way to uncertainty, and transnational crime 
was perceived as a developing new threat. The eventual breakup of the Soviet 
Union combined with significant technological developments, and an 
increasingly integrated globalised world, heightened concerns amongst the 
international community regarding the potential for cross-border criminal 
activity that could threaten State security.
21
  
 
Classification debate  
Initially, little consensus was found on what constitutes transnational crime and 
how it should be defined. Due to the conflicting views, efforts were made, 
during the 1994 Fourth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, to create a more precise conception. 
This early attempt to assess the prevalence of transnational crime was fraught 
with difficulties.
22
 The survey results showed that two States were unable to 
respond because no distinction was made, in their criminal justice system, 
                                                 
17
 Mueller G, Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts in Williams P and Vlassis D 
(eds), Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses (2001) at 13. 
18
 Ibid and in Reichel P (ed), Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice (2005) at 5. 
19
 Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(1975). 
20
 Reichel P (ed), Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice (2005) at 3 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Mueller G, supra n. 17 at 14 
7 
 
between national or transnational crime and almost all countries, of the 193 
responding, encountered some form of classification problems.
23
 However, for 
the purpose of the survey transnational crime was defined as; „Offences whose 
inception, prevention and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one 
country‟.24  
 
Transnational crime is a term that has become widely used by criminologists, 
policy makers, law enforcement officials and the wider public.
25
 It has 
gradually come to mean, broadly speaking, “criminal activities extending into 
and violating the laws of several countries”.26 Critics of this conception have 
noted that the term ‗transnational crime‘ can be confused with ‗international 
crime‘, arguing that any distinction is a blurred one.27 International crime is 
generally conceived as those crimes prohibited by international laws, norms, 
treaties and customs.
28
 Philip Reichel and other contributors in the Handbook 
of Transnational Crime and Justice faced this difficulty in determining whether 
to use ‗transnational‘ or ‗international‘ crime in the title. They settled on using 
‗transnational‘, reasoning that international crimes are those recognised, as 
such, by international law and include acts that threaten world order and 
security, for example, crimes against humanity or war crimes.
29
  Whereas, 
transnational crime is specifically concerned with acts criminalised by more 
than one State and which affect the interests of more than one state, but not 
necessarily the security of States and the world order.
30
  
 
However, some suggest that transnational crime does affect the security of 
States, particularly in developing nations. For instance, Antonio Maria Costa, 
executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), declared in a recent press release that “organised crime poses a 
                                                 
23
 Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, 
A.CONF. 169/15/Add, (April 1995)  page 5, paragraph 13. 
24
 Ibid at page 4, paragraph 9 
25
 Reichel P, supra n. 20 at 5. 
26
 Mueller G, supra n. 17 at  61. 
27
 Reichel P, supra n. 20 at 6.  
28
 Ibid 
29
 Mueller G, supra n. 17 at  xiv. 
30
 Ibid at 6. 
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threat to the security of cities, States, and even entire regions”.31 Furthermore, 
it has been argued that many ‗transnational crimes‘ have achieved the status of 
‗international crimes‘ by way of international treaties and conventions.32 They 
also argue that, just like recognised international crimes such as genocide and 
war crimes, many other crimes, of transnational character, should be included 
under the jurisdiction of the Permanent International Criminal Court.
33
  
 
The United Nations, in 1994, tried to clarify the concept of transnational crime 
by establishing 18 categories of transnational crime.
34
 A more succinct 
categorisation of the principal transnational criminal activities has been 
formulated by Reuter and Petrie
35
 as shown below; 
1. Smuggling- commodities, drugs, protected species 
2. Contraband (goods subject to tariffs or quotas)- stolen cars, tobacco products 
3. Services- immigrants, prostitution, indentured servitude, money laundering and 
fraud. 
 
More recent, internationally agreed upon, definitions of transnational crime 
have continued to emphasise; as its distinguishing characteristic, the notion that 
it involves cross border criminal activity, violating the laws of more than one 
country. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime (2000) (Palermo Convention)
36
 states, in Article 3(2), that an offence 
will be transnational if: 
(a) It is committed in more than one State; 
                                                 
31
 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Media Advisory Press Release, (9, April 2009) 
Crime Commission Meets to Confront "Global Crime Wave" Retrieved from 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2009-09.04.html>  20 April 2009. 
32
 Mueller G, supra n. 17 at 21. 
33
 Ibid, and in Scholenhardt A, ‗Transnational Organised Crime and the international Criminal 
Court: Developments and Debates‘ (2005) 24(1) University of Queensland Law Journals at 93. 
34
 Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, 
A.CONF. 169/15/Add, page 9. 1, 4 April 1995. The list includes; money laundering, terrorist 
activities, theft of art and cultural objects, theft on intellectual property, illicit trafficking in 
arms, aircraft hijacking, sea piracy, land hijacking, insurance fraud, computer crime, 
environmental crime, trafficking in persons, trade in human body parts, illicit drug trafficking, 
fraudulent bankruptcy, infiltration of legal business, corruption and bribery of public officials, 
corruption and bribery of party officials and elected representatives and a 19
th
 category of 
‗other offences committed by organised criminal groups‘. 
35
 Reuter, P and Petrie C (Eds.) Transnational Organised crime: Summary of a Workshop 
Washington DC: National Research Council, Committee on Law and Justice (1999) referenced 
in Reichel P (ed), Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice (2005) at 19. 
36
 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime is often referred to 
as the ‗Palermo Convention because it was first opened for signature by member States in 
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(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, 
direction or control takes place in another State; 
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organised criminal group that engages 
in criminal activities in more than one state; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.37 
 
This convention re-emphasises that a transnational crime is one where some 
element of the crime will occur in, or affect, more than one State.  
 
Meaning for the Purpose of this Thesis 
The concept of transnational crime, used for the purpose of this thesis, will 
follow the simple notion that; it is a crime that involves cross border criminal 
activity, which violates the laws of more than one State. The definition from 
the Palermo Convention clarifies this as including the commission, preparation, 
planning, direction or effects of the crime occurring in more than one State. 
This definition of transnational crime covers a lot of criminal activity ranging 
from smuggling of illicit drugs to electronic crime, it is almost impossible to 
create a catch all list due to its evolving nature. This paper distinguishes 
‗international crimes‘ from transnational criminal activities on the basis that the 
former are egregious crimes prohibited by international law, including treaties 
and custom, whereas transnational crimes are those acts occurring in, or 
affecting, more than one State, and which are criminalised by the domestic 
laws of more than one State.
38
 
 
2.2. Organised Crime 
 
Organised crime and its transnational variation have been around since national 
governments began to form and the existence of international trade began to 
grow. Piracy, cross-border brigandage, smuggling, fraud and trading in stolen 
goods are ancient occupations, which have increased in significance as nation 
States took prominence in the world system.
39
 However, organised crime did 
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38
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not become the subject of academic and professional study until the 1920‘s,40 
but since then it has steadily grown in prominence. Early academic studies 
conceptualised organised crime literally, as ‗systematic criminal activity‘ and 
not necessarily associated with specific criminal groups.
41
 More recently, 
however, notorious organised criminal groups such as the ‗the mafia‘ or 
‗triads‘ are often perceived as synonymous with ‗organised crime‘.  
 
Despite the increased focus on organised crime in recent years, particularly 
transnational organised crime, a consensus on definition has proved 
particularly difficult to achieve. During negotiations for the Palermo 
convention the subject of definition was vigorously debated, with a clear 
tension between those who wished to create a broad definition, to encapsulate 
many criminal groups, and those who wished to formulate a narrower 
definition. Those opting for a narrow definition wished to avoid an 
overreaching of powers, which may occur, if the definition encapsulated less 
organised, and less harmful criminals.
42
 Eventually a consensus was 
achieved.
43
 However, while not down-playing this remarkable feat, in practise 
the term still causes much confusion and debate.
44
 What exactly constitutes 
‗organised crime‘ varies significantly among scholars and amongst the 
domestic laws of many States, with some States refusing to include a statutory 
definition of organised crime in their domestic legal system.
45
  
 
2.2.1.  Traditional concepts of organised crime 
Traditional concepts of organised crime have been heavily influenced by 
perceptions of, and reactions to, organised crime in the United States. Concerns 
in the US regarding organised crime can be traced back to the 1800s but began 
                                                 
40
 Ibid. 
41
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43
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to increase with earnest in the early 1950s.
46
 Perceptions of organised crime 
were that of an ‗alien conspiracy‘, a view attributing organised criminal 
activity with foreign or immigrant criminal groups.
47
 No other group was 
singled out more for vilification than the ‗mafia‘. Italian-American groups have 
attracted public and government attention for organised crime since the late 
1800s during a large immigration wave from Italy.
48
 This unsubstantiated 
suspicion leads to what is termed the ‗ethnicity trap‘ where organised crime is 
explained in terms of its ethnicity rather than the conduct of the criminal 
activity itself.
49
  
 
The concept of organised crime as an Italian conspiracy, dominating organised 
crime in the US, was endorsed by a Senate investigating committee in 1950 
and 1951. The mafia was depicted, and sensationalised, as a “coherent, 
centralised international conspiracy of evil”.50 The committee‘s third interim 
report asserted that America‘s organised crime problem was of a Sicilian origin 
and that a „nation wide syndicate, known as the mafia‟, dominated organised 
criminal activity.
51
 The mafia was viewed as a; structured, highly organised, 
well disciplined and overtly dangerous criminal group, which undermined the 
very security of the United States. This ‗moral panic‘, as Michael Woodiwiss 
and Dick Hobbs describe it,
52
 was neatly illustrated in Robert Kennedy‘s book 
called The Enemy Within, where he declares “If we do not on a national scale 
                                                 
46
 Woodiwiss M, supra n. 10 and Hobbs, D and Woodiwiss M,  ‗Organized Evil and the 
Atlantic Alliance: Moral Panics and the Rhetoric‘ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology of 
Organized Crime Policing in America and Britain. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Albanese J, North American Organised Crime in Mark Galeotti(ed) Global Crime today: the 
Changing face of Organised Crime (2006) at 11. 
49
 Ibid. Ethnicity and organised crime is discussed in more detail under section 2.2.1, of this 
thesis, at page 18. 
50
 Woodiwiss M, supra n. 10 at 15. 
51
 Hobbs, D and Woodiwiss M,  ‗Organized Evil and the Atlantic Alliance: Moral Panics and 
the Rhetoric‘ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology of Organized Crime Policing in 
America and Britain at 111 and in Fijnaut C and Letizia P, ‗Organised Crime and its control 
Strategies‘ (2006) 14(3) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice at 309. 
52
 Hobbs, D and Woodiwiss M,  ‗Organized Evil and the Atlantic Alliance: Moral Panics and 
the Rhetoric‘ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology of Organized Crime Policing in 
America and Britain at 106. 
12 
 
attack organized criminals with weapons and techniques as effective as their 
own, they will destroy us”.53  
 
By the end of the 1960s organised crime was understood, with little dispute, to 
be controlled by nationwide, hierarchical, centrally organised and rationally 
designed criminal organisations.
54
 President Johnson‘s Crime Commission 
defined organised crime in 1967 as: 
...a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their 
governments. It involves thousands of criminals, working within structures as complex 
as those of any large corporation... Its actions are not impulsive but rather the result of 
intricate conspiracies carried out over many years and aimed at gaining control over 
whole fields of activity in order to amass huge profits...
55
 
 
Often there was little or no evidence, supporting the claims of the alleged 
extensive mafia power and often the evidence was to the contrary. FBI 
investigations revealed, undoubtedly, the existence of some twenty-plus 
Italian-American crime syndicates who exhibited well organised hierarchical 
characteristics, and a willingness to engage in violence and intimidation to 
protect illegal business.
56
 However, these same investigations also revealed 
that the ‗mafia‘ groups could not direct, nor control, criminal activity in New 
York, let alone nationally.
57
  
 
Spread of the US inspired concept of organised crime 
A significant factor in the spread of the US concept of organised crime was 
‗America‘s war on drugs‘.58 The prevalence of drug trafficking as an activity 
associated with organised crime, resulted in illicit drugs being identified as the 
most profitable and perhaps most damaging organised criminal activity. 
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Subsequently, to meet this perceived threat, the United States implemented a 
‗war on drugs‘. This now infamous ‗war‘ was announced by President Nixon 
in 1971.
59
 This was partly to fulfil Nixon‘s election promises, of restoring law 
and order, but also was required because narcotics were considered ―a modern 
curse of American youth‖.60 The perception, by this time, acknowledged the 
mafia was no longer alone as the dominant force in organised crime. Organised 
criminal groups had emerged amongst Asian, Latin American and other ethnic 
groups to become major players in organised criminal activity. Despite adding 
more groups to the mix the premise remained the same; focus on an alien 
conspiracy, which threatens to destabilise otherwise morally sound American 
institutions.
61
  
 
It was through this ‗war on drugs‘ that the US began to spread its concept of 
organised crime to other parts of the world.  In an effort to destroy the supply 
of drugs the US needed to enlist ‗drug producing nations‘ to co-operate in the 
‗war‘. They achieved this by putting pressure on nations considered to be drug 
producers to co-operate on US terms, particularly in the case of its hemispheric 
neighbours.
62
 This evolved into a major international supply-side ‗offensive‘, 
which has become an integral part of US policy.
63
 The war on drugs eventually 
evolved into an international war on drugs, with the world following the US‘s 
lead.
64
 
 
During a 1994 Washington conference, of high level American law 
enforcement official‘s, organised crime was described as a risk to the very 
fabric of democratic society and believed to be affecting critical national 
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security interests.
65
 Organised criminal groups were considered to be forging 
world wide alliances to achieve their goals.
66
 Shortly after this conference the 
United Nations held the World Ministerial Conference on Organised 
Transnational Crime in Naples, where the message and analysis was a near 
replica of the Washington conference, illustrating how the US concept of 
organised crime was being adopted into a global setting. The former United 
Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, painted a grim picture to 
attending delegates: 
Organised crime has ... become a world phenomenon. In Europe, in Asia, in Africa 
and in America, the forces of darkness are at work and no society is spared.
67
 
 
Godfather Delusion: The ‘Mafia Model’ of organised crime 
The traditional view of organised crime has long conceived that large, 
structured, hierarchical, ethnically based, criminal groups dominate and control 
the majority of organised criminal activity. These groups are perceived as 
having; defined leaders, a clear chain of command, and continuity beyond the 
life, or participation, of any individual member of the group.
68
 A small number 
of powerful groups, comparable to multi-national corporations, are alleged to 
dominate certain activities of organised crime or, in some cases, certain 
regions. They are thought to have achieved a quasi-superpower status operating 
with a significant amount of sophistication and an equal amount of 
ruthlessness.
69
   
 
The Mafia was the original ‗culprit‘ of organised crime, but, gradually more 
ethnically defined groups have been included. CarrieLyn Donigan Guymon 
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identifies five major ‗international criminal organisations‘ as; the ‗Russian 
mafia‘, the Italian mafia families, Colombian cartels, the Chinese Triads and 
the Japanese Yakuza.
70
 These groups are viewed as the preeminent criminal 
corporations, dominating transnational organised criminal activity. They are 
perceived to have developed sophisticated regional and world-wide operations, 
involving thousands of people and billions of dollars worth of business.
71
 
Guymon declare that;  
...leaders of the largest international criminal organizations have formalized their 
collaborative relationships so that they rival strategic arrangements of legitimate heads 
of state or multinational corporations.
72
  
 
In Guymon‘s view these groups began to form alliances and hold ‗world 
summits‘ going back as far as the end of WWII.73 Guymon sites meetings in 
1990 (apparently timed to co-inside with the Dublin EC summit) between 
international (Italian) mafia groups and Russian ‗mafia‘ leaders, operating 
outside the Soviet Union.
74
 Furthermore, in 1992, Guymon believes the 
Sicilian mafia had achieved a secret agreement with the Russians in Prague. 
The purpose was alleged to be: 
...to protect their new illicit trade throughout Central Europe, establish a global 
network for the drug trade and marketing of nuclear components, and create a lethal 
squad of killers' made of ex-KGB agents.
75
 
  
Guymon concludes that just as the Group of Eight industrialised nations meet 
frequently, to discuss international cooperation, so too the five major criminal 
organisations meet, in order to discuss their own global operations.
76
 Guymon 
cites supporting evidence as: 
French intelligence reports revealed that a 1994 gathering in Burgundy of Russian, 
Chinese, Japanese, Italian, and Colombian ―businessmen‖ was really a summit of 
―representatives of the world's leading organized crime syndicates‖ in an effort ―to 
discuss carving up western Europe for drugs, prostitution, smuggling and extortion 
rackets.
77
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The intelligence reports indicate up to 12 organised criminal groups met in 
Beaune in 1994, including groups from Russia, Italy, China and Colombia.
78
 
However, there is no evidence to suggest this correlates to a grand coalition of 
criminals, seeking to dominate the worlds criminal activity. It is extremely 
unlikely that the various criminals can speak for all Russian, Chinese, Italian or 
Colombian crime.
79
 
 
Guymon is not alone in her views. For example, Claire Sterling described the 
mafia as a ‗multinational heroin cartel‘ and estimated they were the twentieth 
richest ‗nation‘ in the world.80 Sterling popularised the notion of a ‗Pax 
Mafiosa‘; the idea that major criminal organisations were working together, 
with an intent to dominate illegal activity around the globe.
81
 Her claims were 
regarded highly enough to prompt an invitation to attend the (above 
mentioned) Washington DC conference of high-level American law 
enforcement and intelligence community personnel, in September 1994.
82
 An 
ominous conclusion of the conference was that organised crime provided a far 
bigger threat than anything the world faced during the cold war. Furthermore, 
worldwide alliances were being forged in every criminal pursuit, and organised 
crime was the world‘s fastest growing ‗business‘, with profits estimated at $1 
trillion.
83
  
 
Criticism of traditional conceptions  
More recently, the traditional model of organised crime has begun to attract 
criticism from scholars, as an over simplification of organised crime. Michael 
Levi firstly points out that; even if accurate anywhere, one cannot assume this 
model will apply everywhere else in the world. If this model of organised 
crime can be applied accurately in parts of Italy, or America, in a particular 
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historical period, that does not mean it is safe to assume it would apply in other 
parts of the world with completely different conditions.
84
  
 
Moreover, in Italy, the ‗home‘ of the mafia, even though powerful mafia 
fraternities do exist, they have not acquired a monopoly on any sector of 
organised crime nationally, let alone internationally.
85
 For instance, in the 
transnational heroin trade, Cosa Nostra families initially played a large role, 
particularly in routes from Asia to the US via Sicily; however, they never 
achieved total market domination. Today a multitude of groups, ranging from 
Mexican, Chinese and Colombian nationality, amongst others, participate in 
this market.
86
 In the case of the Italian Cosa Nostra, its power is not 
unchallenged even in its own geographical headquarters, where its main 
‗stronghold‘ exists. Cosa Nostra families are often in a minority position, with 
their local competitors, and are thus unable to assert control over the local 
underworld let alone globally.
87
   
 
Critics of the ‗mafia model‘, or ‗global pluralist‘ theory of organised crime as 
Woodiwiss describes it, do not dispute that criminal groups exist all over the 
world; as there is ample evidence showing this to be the case.
88
 The main 
criticism towards the mafia model is that it over simplifies the problem of 
organised crime. The mafia type groups, while exhibiting a degree of power, 
only participate in illegal markets, they rarely if ever control them. Illegal 
markets such as illicit drugs are not characterised by monopolisation but rather 
fragmentation and competition.
89
 Michael Levi states: 
...there is a tendency in media, political and even policing debates to conflate the risk 
of, or the opportunities for, organized crime domination with the current levels of 
organized crime activity. It would be surprising if many crime groups had any serious 
wish to ‗dominate‘ any particular country, let alone the world, and even among those 
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with such lofty ambitions, this aim would arouse competition from rivals and would 
motivate law enforcement and governments to deal more vigorously with the threat.
90
 
 
Woodiwiss also notes that if organised crime was really dominated by a small 
number of ‗super criminal‘ organisations, it would be relatively simple to deal 
with them. Eliminate the leadership of these groups and that would be the end 
of the organised crime problem.
91
 This concept has been popular amongst law 
enforcement officials around the world and is referred to as ‗dismantling‘, 
where the leadership of a particular group is arrested, in the hope that this will 
cripple the group, leaving them without direction, and therefore, unable to 
continue any significant criminal activity.
92
 However, experiences in the US 
have shown that this approach does not work; disposing of crime ‗bosses‘ such 
as Al Capone, Lucky Luciano, Tony Salerno and John Gotti has not put an end 
to the reality of organised crime in the US.
93
  
 
As academic researchers have begun to examine the traditional conception of 
organised crime, they have found it to be too simplistic and have begun to sift 
through the overly homogenised imagery of this perceived threat.
94
 Rather than 
conceiving organised crime in rigid terms of stable criminal structures with 
powerful ‗bosses‘ at the helm, researchers have observed mostly 
“improvisation, fluid networks and ad hoc coalitions, opportunistic and very 
flexible individual entrepreneurs, criminal omnivores and organisational 
chaos”95   
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Outsider Threat – Ethnicity and Organised Crime 
The traditional view of organised crime has also created an ‗outsider‘ 
conspiracy responsible for and central to most organised criminal activity. In 
popular media, law enforcement circles and in policy announcements, 
organised crime is often described in terms of ethnicity with reference to such 
groups such as; the Italian mafia, Colombian drug barons, Albanian traffickers 
and so on. Following the US inspired thinking regarding causes, dynamics and 
appropriate policy responses to organised crime, the United Nation‘s 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime was launched, in 
December 2000.
96
 With over 100 countries involved there was a remarkable 
degree of consensus on the existence and character of transnational organised 
crime. Central to this consensus is a belief in the ethnic basis to organised 
crime and a desire for States to protect their borders from ‗outsiders‘.97  
 
The link between ethnicity and organised crime has raised much debate, both 
in regards to its accuracy, and its usefulness, as a model for constructing a 
conception of organised crime. Those who support research into the link 
between ethnicity and organised crime, such as Frank Bovenkerk, believe there 
are good theoretical grounds for assuming that such a link exists in reality. 
Political and geographical factors make such a linkage possible and under 
certain conditions some minorities run a heightened risk of being involved in 
organised crime, because illegal organisations can sometimes thrive within the 
seclusion of ethnic minority communities.
98
 Law enforcement officials and 
agencies are also quick to describe organised criminal groups in terms of their 
ethnicity.
99
 The New Zealand police, for example, state that:  
Identifying organised crime by ethnicity or activity remain useful aids for Police when 
dealing with the day-to-day activities of overt organised groups.
100
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Countering the ethnic based conception of organised crime, is the conclusions 
of studies, completed in 1995 in the Netherlands, by the ‗Fijnaut group‘ (later 
confirmed by the Dutch Ministry of Justice Research Centre) which noted that 
the supposed homogeneity of criminal groups were a thing of the past. Rather, 
opportunism, ad hoc coalitions and relationships based on friendship, now 
much more than before, form the basis for criminal projects.
101
 Karim Murji 
notes that there is no reason to assume ethnic minorities will not be involved in 
organised crime. What must be stressed, however, is that the appearance of 
ethnic differentiation, in organised crime, is not the same as proving ethnicity 
is key to the particular operation of organised crime.
102
 Suggesting that 
organised crime is dependent on the ethnicity, or even cultural values, of its 
members would imply that criminal groups of different ethnicity operate in 
significantly different ways.
103
 For ethnicity to be a useful tool, in 
understanding organised crime, then there must be something compellingly 
unique about, for instance, Chinese crime compared, to say, Russian crime.  
 
Jay Albanese, despite writing in a book broken down into ethnically defined 
chapters, is sharply critical of the ‗ethnicity approach‘ describing organised 
crime. 
This narrow view leads to unwarranted stereotypes of ethnic groups, ignores the fact 
that organised crime is committed by groups of many different ethnicities, and that the 
public demand for illicit goods and services drives most organised crime activity 
regardless of time and place... Thus ethnicity does not help explain the presence or 
absence of organised crime.
104
 
 
This is not to suggest that ethnicity has no role in organised crime. Ethnicity 
clearly provides a key resource for the organisation of serious crimes in 
unfamiliar environments; where trust is vital and familial or broader kinship 
networks provide protection against policing and intelligence operations.
105
 
Moreover, advantages that common ethnicity provide, such as common 
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language or contacts amongst communities, can enable groups to organise 
efficiently. However, the problem with viewing organised crime as an ‗outsider 
threat‘, characterised solely by specific ethnic groups threatening the otherwise 
stable institutions of a State, is that it assumes it is a necessary feature and 
ignores issues and factors such as the demand for illicit goods in societies and 
the reality of network relationships between criminal‘s of different ethnicities. 
Adam Edwards describes this short fall as follows: 
A problem...with the external threat narrative in official discourse on transnational 
organised crime is that it reifies ethnicity, mistaking this as a necessary organising 
feature of serious crime... it is but one, contingent, determinant of organised 
criminality. This is not to suggest that criminal organisations cannot employ ethnicity 
as a resource in the trafficking of illicit goods and services, but even here such 
organisations are unlikely to control the entire operation from production through to 
distribution to end consumers.
106
 
 
Focusing on ethnicity obscures the importance of other kinds of actors, such as 
intermediary facilitators or ‗criminal contract brokers‘ as well as other episodic 
associations.
107
 Moreover, the ‗ethnicity trap‘ which shifts blame for organised 
crime onto ethnic minorities or migrants has, in some countries, provoked, or 
further stirred, significant persecution of these minority populations.
108
 
 
Where once an organised criminal group might be based on a single ethnic 
group, there is now little reason to assume this is an exclusive approach. 
Instead organised crime is becoming increasingly inclusive; people and groups 
with the right skills, contacts, resources or territory, may be accepted into the 
network as long as they can prove usefulness, or an ability to operate within the 
dominant culture.
109
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2.2.2 Organised Crime today – The Complicated Reality  
Network Paradigm 
Recent analyses of the trends and composition of criminal groups has led to an 
awareness that organised crime is increasingly operating through fluid network 
structures, rather than the traditionally conceived more-formal hierarchies.
110
 
The over homogenised and simplistic view of a small number of large 
organised, ethnically defined, criminal groups dominating transnational 
criminal activity has been found unsuitable to reflect modern day transnational 
organised crime. While structured, hierarchical criminal groups, with clear 
leaders and chain of command do exist, they are considered the exception 
rather than the norm.
111
  
 
What are networks? 
Phil Williams describes networks, in a paper titled Networks, Markets and 
Hierarchies, as:
112
 
A network can be understood simply as a series of nodes that, in one way or another, 
are connected together. The nodes can be individuals, organisations, firms or even 
computers, but the critical point is that there are significant linkages among them. 
 
Networks vary in size, may be local or global, domestic or transnational and 
their structure may range from centrally directed to highly decentralised.
113
 A 
certain network may be specifically focused on one goal or operating towards 
many goals; and its membership may be exclusive or broadly encompassing.
114
 
The network concept can be an elusive one, due to the great variability in their 
make up and structure. On a practical level, when applied to organised crime, 
this variability can make criminal networks very difficult to combat.
115
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Traditionally conceived ‗conspiracies‘ and ‗mega hierarchies‘; identified by 
law enforcement officials in the past, have been revealed as “constructions that 
cannot stand up to close scrutiny”.116 After examining the dossiers of over a 
hundred organised crime cases and investigations between 1995 and 1998 
research groups from the Netherlands determined that what seemed like large, 
super-criminal organisations, were in fact strings of interlinked smaller groups. 
These groups did not have a central leader, rather they co-ordinated their 
activities along episodic lines. They formed ad hoc relationships, based on 
opportunity, or bonds of close friendship, and these relationships were not 
necessarily maintained for long periods.
117
 A joint report from the European 
Commission and Europol also supports the view that organised criminal groups 
are rarely hierarchical, more often they show an opportunistic character. The 
groups are often seen to be entrepreneurial, flexible and established for specific 
short operations, or activities, and are able to respond quickly to changing 
markets.
118
  
 
Edwards and Levi, when explaining how criminals organise and operate within 
the ‗network‘ paradigm, note there are a number ways the term ‗network‘ is 
used. They opt for the following meaning, as research completed for the United 
Kingdom Home Office
119
 best supports it. 
As a way of describing the structure and/or everyday workings of the market as a 
whole, in the sense that the market can be regarded as a complex social network 
(singular noun), within which different participants have to network (verb) (to 
carefully seek out and interact with traffickers who may be like or unlike themselves. 
In other words, through networking, traffickers [and other offenders] construct the 
market.
120
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This perception of networking explains how, by networking, criminals 
construct the illicit market they are operating in. 
 
Networking: A superior model for „organised crime‟ 
The traditional conception of organised crime is not only oversimplified, it also 
severely underestimates the challenge posed by organised crime. A national or 
even global organised crime ‗conspiracy‘ run by a small number of large, rigid, 
strictly hierarchical criminal groups who maintain a long association, would be 
relatively easy targets vulnerable to ‗dismantling‘.121 The reality is much more 
complicated. Loose, less formal network structures make criminal groups 
highly resilient to dismantling tactics focused on taking out leadership.
122
 
Networks of criminals are able to adapt more easily to law enforcement 
‗interruptions‘ than rigid hierarchical groups, who rely heavily on established 
leadership. When someone, who was assumed vitally important, is arrested 
they are either replaced or the loss is adjusted to quickly. Often after a short 
time frame the original operational potential is able to be rebuilt.
123
  
 
Transnational criminal networks have, as one of their core strengths, great 
ability to get around physical barriers and across legal or geographical 
boundaries.
124
 Networks have been described as the perfect means of 
conducting business, both legal and illegal, in a globalised world.
125
 
...there is a natural congruence between transnational or cross-border activities and 
networks structures, irrespective of whether the networks operate exclusively in the 
legitimate sector or in supplying illicit...goods and services. In this connection, the 
capacity of individual criminals or groups in one country to extend their network 
through linkages with their counterparts in other countries gives organized crime and 
drug trafficking a transnational character that makes it difficult to combat.
126
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Emphasising that the majority of organised crime is network based does not 
suggest that it is undirected.
127
 Rather, it highlights that traditional concepts of 
organised crime have overlooked important features evident in criminal 
networks, such as ‗criminal contact brokers‘.128 Organised criminal activity is 
enabled predominately through the episodic co-operation of criminal actors, 
who may offer a wide range of skills or resources. Therefore, successful 
criminal activity is facilitated by intermediaries, or ‗criminal contact brokers‘, 
who supply criminal entrepreneurs for the purpose of accomplishing particular 
‗jobs‘.129 These intermediaries, in putting people and skills together, have 
proved central to the success of criminal operations.
130
 Various law 
enforcement officials have had success in disrupting organised criminal 
operations by targeting the small number of ‗brokers‘ who brought together 
suppliers, financiers, skilled traffickers and street distributers.
131
 The traditional 
focus on crime ‗bosses‘ and leadership, has obscured the vital service that 
intermediaries play in enabling criminals to organise for particular operations.  
 
Contemporary law enforcement agencies have also begun to re-assess the 
traditional views of organised crime, acknowledging the importance of 
networks.
132
 The 2008/09 United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organised 
Crime compiled by the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency acknowledges 
that while some criminals may belong to “established groups with clear 
hierarchies and defined roles” a wide range of other structures exist where 
criminals ―are part of looser criminal networks and collaborate as necessary 
to carry out particular criminal ventures. Such contacts are reinforced by links 
of kinship, ethnicity, or long association”.133 The 2008/09 New Zealand 
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Organised Crime Strategy has described organised crime in New Zealand as 
being “characterised by loose networks between groups and individuals”.134  
 
Illegal Markets – Enterprise crime 
It is widely agreed that the primary motivation of organised crime, whether 
local or transnational, is the pursuit of profit.
135
 Organised criminal activity is 
facilitated by criminal networks that organise, supply and traffic illicit goods 
and services.
136
 While the core of the activity is directed at the supply of illegal 
goods and services, successful criminal groups may also be involved 
extensively in legitimate business, allowing the groups to launder money and 
appear respectable.
137
 This fact has led a number of criminologists to refer to 
organised crime as ‗enterprise crime‘.138  
 
Organised criminals satisfy a demand for illegal goods and services within 
illegal markets. An illegal market is a place or principle within which there is 
an exchange of goods and services. The production, selling and consumption of 
these goods and services are either forbidden or strictly regulated by the 
majority of States and/or by international law.
139
 In some respects illegal 
markets are governed by normal economic forces for instance, there are buyers 
and sellers, importers and distributors. Pino Arlacchi‘s analysis of illegal 
markets concludes that they are composed of numerous small and medium 
sized, semi-independent firms supplying goods and services to final 
consumers.
140
 The composition of illegal markets reflects the network 
paradigm, where there are numerous groups, ranging in size, who construct the 
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market. Illegal markets are not typically dominated by large monopolies or 
oligopolies.  
 
While illegal markets exhibit some similarities to legal ones, Arlacchi notes the 
dynamics of criminal markets significantly differ from those that drive legal 
markets. For instance, criminal groups can resort to violence and intimidation 
against competitors to increase market share or establish local monopolies.
141
 
Organised criminal groups also have to factor in law enforcement and, 
therefore, spend vast amounts on avoiding or corrupting law enforcement and 
other public officials.
142
 One activity essential to avoiding law enforcement is 
money laundering, criminals must hide or disguise the illegal source of their, 
sometimes obvious, wealth.
143
 These extra costs are passed on to consumers 
resulting in higher prices for the final products or service. 
 
Criminal groups often begin transnational operations because they are attracted 
to particular markets, in host countries, where there is significant demand for 
the products and services they supply.
144
 Illicit markets, whether domestic or 
transnational, tend to be composed of a variety of actors with criminal 
organisations, of various sizes and structures, playing a large but not always 
exclusive role.
145
 
Characteristics of organised crime – narrow or broad approach? 
Attempting to create a ‗catch all list‘ of crimes associated with organised 
crime, or a set of defining characteristics of organised criminal groups, is 
difficult and not entirely useful. Defining or explaining organised crime 
through a list of crimes does not help to decisively clarify what ‗organised 
crime‘ is. As Finckenauer asserts;  
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This "thing," this phenomenon known as organized crime, cannot be defined by crimes 
alone. Any definition must address and account for the elusive modifying term 
organized.
146
 
 
Early work completed by Michael Maltz proposed that four characteristics 
were essential to be identified as ‗organised crime‘; violence, corruption, 
continuity and variety in types of crimes engaged in.
147
 However, there are 
serious questions regarding the wisdom of trying to pin down an exclusive set 
of characteristics to define organised crime. Not only does organised crime 
vary in different periods of history and in different locations, but the crimes 
committed are continually evolving, and expanding, as factors such as 
technology and demand change. 
 
 Both the United Nation‘s and European Union have struggled with the concept 
of organised crime, while drawing up conventions designed to combat it. EU 
States negotiated for a long time to find a common concept of organised crime. 
The careful deliberations were deemed necessary to avoid a definition that was: 
a. too expansive, thus running the risk of including criminal groups that approach 
organised crime without in fact belonging to it, 
b. too narrow, therefore running the risk of adopting only a partial approach to the 
phenomenon by not including criminal organisations that, nevertheless, have all 
the characteristics of organised crime (such as groups using legal fronts to launder 
money from their criminal activities).
148 
 
In 2001 a joint report from Europol and the European Commission established 
a list of characteristics associated with organised crime.
149
 A minimum of 6 
must be present with 4 of the list mandatory. 
Mandatory criteria 
1. Collaboration among more than two people 
2. Extending over a prolonged of indefinite period (referring to stability and 
(potential) durability) 
3. Suspected of committing serious criminal offences, punishable by imprisonment 
for at least four years or a more serious penalty 
4. The central goal of profit and/or power 
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Optional criteria 
5. Specialised division of labour among participants 
6. Exercising measures of discipline and control 
7. Employing violence or other means of intimidation 
8. Employing commercial or business-like structures 
9. Participating in money-laundering 
10. Operational across national borders 
11. Exerting influence over legitimate social institutions (polity, government, justice, 
economy) 
 
Similarly, the problematic concept of organised crime was highlighted during 
negotiations for the Palermo Convention. Debate over how to best define 
organised crime was vigorous, time consuming and one of the most 
significantly contested parts of the Convention.
150
 The resulting definition to be 
used is, therefore, very broad. 
Article 2. Use of Terms 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
(a) ―Organized criminal group‖ shall mean a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing 
one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this 
Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit; 
(b) ―Serious crime‖ shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a 
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty; 
(c) ―Structured group‖ shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the 
immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined 
roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure;
151
 
 
The definition is somewhat vague and slightly confusing. For instance; firstly 
an organised criminal group is to be a structured group, however, ‗structured 
group‘ is given a very loose meaning that seems to stray far away from the 
ordinary meaning of ‗structured‘. The official interpretative notes indicate that 
Article 2 should be interpreted broadly, outlining that ‗structured group‘ should 
be given an all encompassing meaning;
 152
  
...so as to include both groups with hierarchical or other elaborate structure and non-
hierarchical groups where the roles of the members of the group need not be formally 
defined.  
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As States negotiated for the definition there was a clear tension between those 
who wanted a wide definition, to avoid the risk of any major criminal being 
overlooked, and others who want to avoid an overreach of powers, which may 
result in too much focus on groups who are only a small or modest threat.
153
 
 
Both the EU and UN efforts to define organised crime illustrate the typically 
contradictory approach taken by many governments and international 
organisations, when addressing organised crime. On the one hand they will 
emphasise the growing threat of organised crime, on the other they adopt very 
broad, all encompassing, legal definitions of organised crime, which do not 
include strict criteria in terms of numbers or group structure.
154
 Levi and 
Maguire believe this broad definitional approach has achieved a wide spread 
consensus in Europe and, generally, amongst the wide spread signatories of the 
Palermo Convention. This consensus can be summarised as follows; 
- two or more people are involved in continuing significant illegal activities, 
irrespective of national boundaries; 
- such a group is capable of defending its members, enterprises or profits and to this 
end, may use violence, coercion or corruption; and 
- Criminal proceeds have been generated by a grouping which has both core and 
peripheral members. 
155
 
 
This broad concept has been adopted in New Zealand with very few minor 
differences.
156
  
 
2.3 Working definition for the purpose of this thesis 
 
For the purpose of this thesis transnational organised crime will be defined as 
transnational criminal activity carried out by organised criminal groups and 
will contain these elements; 
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(a) Transnational crime involves cross border criminal activity, violating 
the laws of more than one State, and occurring in or affecting more than 
one State. For this paper, criminal activity will be considered cross 
border criminal activity; even if the offence was carried out in one State 
but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control 
took place in another State.
157
  
(b) This thesis will employ a broad definition of ‗organised crime‘ as used 
by many governments and international organisations. Organised crime 
will be understood to mean; the commission of a serious offence 
involving a group (of 3 or more people), who formed with a common 
purpose of obtaining financial or other material benefit.
158
 The group 
may have continuity, or permanent membership or they may have 
formed for the commission of a single serious offence. 
 
The rationale behind a broad definition is to ensure it covers both larger 
organised criminal groups as well as those smaller networking groups who 
account for much organised criminal activity, particularly in New Zealand.
159
 It 
is not just large mafia type groups who are committing serious transnational 
crime, this chapter has shown the importance of smaller loose networks and 
thus a broad definition reflects the need to encompass the wide variety of 
organised groups committing serious organised crime. 
 
2.4 Activities associated with Transnational Organised Crime 
 
Organised criminal activity, including criminal activity carried out across 
borders, encompasses many diverse crimes. It is difficult to determine the exact 
extent of organised criminal activity world wide due to the secretive nature of 
its activities. Some estimates have speculated that organised criminal activity is 
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worth as much as US $2 Trillion.
160
 Likewise, it is fruitless to try and list all of 
the crimes that organised criminal groups carry out across borders. The list is 
vast, varies between regions and always continues to evolve and grow. 
However, this section will describe some of the most prevalent criminal 
activities, associated with organised crime. 
 
Illicit Drugs  
Illicit drugs provide criminal groups with an extremely profitable business due 
to large consumer demand around the world. The UN estimates 208 million 
people world wide are drug users
161
 and 28 million of those people are 
considered problem drugs users. Cannabis is the most commonly used illicit 
drug with 165.6 million user‘s world wide. Amphetamine use is estimated 
having around 24.7 million users in 2008. Other prevalent drugs include 
Cocaine (16 million users), Opiates (16.5 million users, of which heroin 
accounts for 12 million) and Ecstasy (around 9 million users).
162
 This 
worldwide demand encourages a global drug trade that is estimated annually at 
US $320 billion.
163
  
 
Drug production, in some categories of drugs, is dominated by a relatively few 
countries. For instance in 2007 Afghanistan accounted for 92% of the world‘s 
opium production and Colombia, Bolivia and Peru dominate coca cultivation 
for supply to the world.
164
 The majority of demand for drugs comes from 
developed nations particularly in the US and Europe.
165
 The demand for drugs 
produced in foreign States creates the transnational nature of the illicit drug 
trade. Drugs must cross borders to get from producing countries to those 
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countries with high demand for the final products, and often they will travel 
through multiple jurisdictions before reaching their final destination.  
 
Organised crime and the illicit drug trade 
Using a broad definition of organised crime, such as in the Palermo 
Convention, much of transnational drug trafficking would be classified as 
organised criminal activity. However, the degree of organisation, sophistication 
and extent of their operations obviously varies, to a great extent.
166
 Drug 
trafficking includes both large scale, continuing, operations as well as small 
time operations; carried out by criminals, acting based on a particular 
‗opportunity‘, who wouldn‘t consider themselves ‗career criminals‘. The World 
Drug Report (2007) also states that most known organised criminal groups are 
involved in drug trafficking but, rarely limit their criminal activity to just 
drugs.
167
  
 
Drug trafficking in New Zealand 
The illicit drug market in New Zealand, reflecting world trends, is considered 
very profitable attracting local gangs as well as overseas based groups who 
wish to exploit the NZ market, particularly the amphetamine market.
168
  
Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking is defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, that supplements the 
Palermo Convention Crime: 
Article 3. Use of terms 
For the purposes of this Protocol: 
(a) ―Trafficking in persons‖ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits 
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation 
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
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services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs;
169
 
 
This crime has been met with strong condemnation and revulsion around the 
world, former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan described trafficking in 
persons as;  
...one of the most egregious violations of human rights that the United Nations now 
confronts... facilitated by practices that discriminate against women and driven by 
cruel indifference to human suffering on the part of those who exploit the services that 
the victims are forced to provide.
170
 
 
Human trafficking is big business with the global trade estimated at around 
$US32 Billion.
171
 Estimates on the scope of human trafficking vary widely, the 
International Labour Organisation estimates 12.3 million people are in forced 
labour, bonded labour, forced child labour and sexual servitude at any given 
time. Other estimates range from 4 million-27 million.
172
 The US government 
estimates that 800,000 people are trafficked across national borders every 
year.
173
 Approximately 80 percent of trafficking victims are women and girls 
and up to 50 percent are minors (under 18 years of age).
174
 Sexual exploitation 
is the most common form of enslavement (79%) followed by forced labour 
(18%).
175
 
 
Transnational Organised Crime and Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking is often national or regional and carried out by people of the 
same nationality as the victims. However, there is still a significant 
transnational trade in human beings. Europe for instance, is the destination for 
victims of the widest range of origins and Asian victims are the most likely to 
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be trafficked to the widest range of destinations.
176
 There is a well established 
nexus between organised crime and human trafficking. Trafficking in persons 
is very profitable and criminal groups involved in the trade range from small to 
large. Furthermore, those groups involved in human trafficking, usually do not 
limit themselves exclusively to this criminal activity, often involving 
themselves in a range of other illegal activities.
177
  
 
Human Trafficking in New Zealand 
The specific offence of trafficking was made illegal in NZ in 2002.
178
 Section 
98D of the Crimes Act 1961 outlines the offence and penalty for trafficking in 
people by means of coercion and deception. Thus far no offences of human 
trafficking have been investigated, prosecuted or resulted in a conviction in 
NZ.
179
 The US Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report (2008) lists 
NZ as a tier one country; deemed to be fully complying with minimum 
standards to eliminate human trafficking.
180
 The report also states that NZ is a 
destination country for women from Malaysia, Hong Kong, the People‘s 
Republic of China and other countries in Asia, trafficked for the purpose of 
commercial sexual exploitation.
181
 However, both the United Nations report 
and the US State Report conclude that, estimations of trafficking in New 
Zealand are modest.
182
 
 
Immigration Offences/Migrant smuggling 
The key difference between smuggled migrants and victims of human 
trafficking, relates to consent. Smuggled migrants usually consent to the 
process whereas trafficking victims provide no consent, or their consent is 
rendered meaningless by the actions of the traffickers.
183
 Furthermore, migrant 
smuggling always involves crossing borders; trafficking victims may be 
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trafficked internally in their own country. The relationship between smuggler 
and migrant involves a commercial transaction, which will usually finish after 
the border crossing operation. Human traffickers and their victims often have 
an ongoing relationship of abuse and exploitation motivated by the generation 
of profits for the trafficker.
184
 It should be noted, however, that often smuggled 
migrants become victims of human trafficking. Moreover, traffickers may act 
dually as smugglers, using the same routes for both sets of operations.
185
 
 
Migrant smuggling/Immigration Offences in New Zealand 
The main types of immigration offences, as identified by immigration New 
Zealand, are visa applications supported by fraudulent documentation, 
document forgery and people smuggling.
186
 Organised criminal groups have 
displayed a high level of creativity in producing and obtaining identity 
documents to facilitate the entry of immigrants into the country. The primary 
motivation for organised criminals, participating in this activity, is profit.
187
 
Arms Smuggling 
The illegal arms trade is believed to be worth around $US1 Billion annually.
188
 
It is estimated that over 600 million small arms and light weapons are in 
circulation world wide; contributing to around 300,000 deaths annually, of 
which, 100,000 occur in conflict zones and 200,000 outside of conflict 
zones.
189
 The wide spread existence of arms and the sheer volume creates an 
enormous challenge to states trying to curb the illicit trade in arms. Kofi Annan 
described the arms trade as a; 
...complex and multifaceted challenge to international peace and security, social and 
economic development, human security, public health and human rights, among 
others.
190
 
 
The UN has adopted a Protocol against arms trafficking.
191
 The purpose of the 
Protocol is to promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States 
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Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of 
and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.
192
 
Organised criminal groups are known to be involved in illegal arms trafficking, 
for instance, in the UK criminal groups notably from Albania, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria and Croatia have brought weapons or sent weapons into the UK. 
These weapons may be for private use or for use by criminals.
193
  
 
Arms Trafficking in New Zealand 
Little is known about arms trafficking in New Zealand, a fact admitted by the 
Ministry of Justice despite their concern that NZ organised criminal groups are 
becoming involved in this offence.
194
  
Corruption  
Corruption is a widespread problem, particularly in countries with weak State 
institutions and weak implementation of the law. There are close connections 
between transnational organised crime and corruption; often the success of 
cross-border criminal operations depends on the corruption of customs or 
migration officials.
195
 The United Nations recognised the link between TNOC 
and corruption of public officials in the Palermo Convention. Article 8 of this 
convention requires State Parties to criminalise corruption. In addition to this in 
UN resolution 55/61 of 4 December 2000, the General Assembly recognized 
that an effective international legal instrument against corruption, independent 
of other conventions was needed. Corruption was described in particularly 
strong language by the Secretary-General in 2003; 
Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on 
societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human 
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rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organized crime, 
terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish.
196
  
 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/4 of 2003 adopted the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption; its main aims are preventing and 
criminalising corruption, international co-operation and asset recovery.
197
 
 
Corruption in New Zealand 
New Zealand is generally considered to have very low levels of domestic 
corruption, ranking first in the world (alongside Finland and Iceland), of 163 
countries, as being perceived to have the least levels of corruption, according to 
the 2006 Corruption Perception Index.
198
  
 
Money Laundering
199
 
Money laundering is vital in facilitating organised criminal activity. As profit is 
the primary motivation for most criminal activities, criminals must find a way 
to disguise their ill-gotten gains. The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime defines money laundering as: 
...the method by which criminals disguise the illegal origins of their wealth and protect 
their asset bases, so as to avoid suspicion of law enforcement and to prevent leaving a 
trail of incriminating evidence.
200
  
 
Levi describes money laundering simply as; “...the cleansing of funds so that 
they can be used in a way indistinguishable from legitimate money.”201  
 
Effective money laundering enables criminals to remove any possibility of 
their criminal activities being traced back to them. This makes it more difficult 
to prosecute criminals and confiscate their proceeds. Laundering money also 
enables criminals to enjoy the benefits of their crimes including investing their 
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profits for future criminal activity.
202
 The New Zealand Ministry of Justice 
identifies three stages to a money laundering operation
203
: 
1. Placement: placing cash proceeds from crime into the financial system. For 
example, depositing the cash proceeds in a bank.  
2. Layering: splitting the criminal funds into various deposit accounts to hide their 
origin.  
3. Integration: withdrawing the layered funds and bringing them back together in 
one account or multiple accounts so that they appear legitimate.  
 
There are also many different methods used to launder money, ranging from 
the sophisticated to the very basic. The most common examples include
204
:  
- "Smurfing" (or structuring): depositing cash at various institutions in amounts less 
that the amount that must be reported to government, and subsequently 
transferring them to a central account.  
- Currency smuggling: moving funds across borders to disguise their source and 
ownership by mail, courier or body packing (often to countries with strict bank 
secrecy laws).  
- Exchanging transactions: buying foreign currency that can be transferred to 
offshore banks.  
- Purchasing assets with bulk cash: purchasing cars, boats and real estate in 
someone else‘s name then selling them and depositing the funds.  
- Gambling: buying gambling chips and after placing a few bets, redeeming the 
chips for a casino cheque.  
 
Money laundering empowers both organised criminals and corrupt officials. 
Just as criminals must disguise their illegal gains so too corrupted officials 
must disguise bribes and other kick-backs.
205
 Estimates of money laundered 
globally range from 2-5% of global GDP; this represents between $US800 
billion-$2 trillion. Despite the huge variation in the estimates, even the lower 
figure highlights the enormity of the challenge facing the international 
community to confront money laundering.
206
  
 
                                                 
202
 Ministry of Justice, The nature of money laundering, September 25, 2009. Online at < 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy-and-consultation/crime/anti-money-laundering-and-
countering-the-financing-of-terrorism/chapter-1>.  
203
 Ibid. 
204
 Ministry of Justice, Methods of money laundering, September 25, 2009. Online at 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy-and-consultation/crime/anti-money-laundering-and-
countering-the-financing-of-terrorism/chapter-2>. 
205
 UNODC, Introduction to money laundering, online at 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/introduction.html>. 
206
 UNODC, Money-laundering and Globalization, online at 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html>. 
40 
 
Wildlife and Fisheries Offences 
Wildlife smuggling is a global and highly profitable business estimated at $US 
6-8 Billion annually.
207
 New Zealand‘s unique wildlife, flora and fauna make it 
particularly susceptible to this illegal trade. Kea, kaka, tuatara and frogs are 
just some of the native New Zealand wildlife involved in international 
smuggling operations. High rewards and a relatively low risk of detection and 
punishment have made the illegal wildlife trade attractive to organised 
criminals.
208
 Apart from robbing New Zealand of its native species organised, 
groups importing illegal wildlife into NZ run a considerable risk of introducing 
pests and disease, which could affect primary industries in the country.
209
 
 
Of particular concern in New Zealand is Paua smuggling, a significant area 
organised criminal groups have found to be lucrative. An investigation into a 
large Paua poaching operation in 2008 resulted in the arrest of 65 people in 
New Zealand.
210
 Organised criminal poaching and distribution impacts 
significantly on the commercial sector and the NZ police believe that Paua 
poaching is often used to fund other criminal activities such as the supply of 
illicit drugs.
211
 
 
Terrorism 
This paper mentions terrorism in order to distinguish it from transnational 
organised crime but acknowledge, at times, they are linked. Since 9/11 
terrorism has received top priority on the international agenda and its links with 
organised crime have become apparent. The General Assembly resolution 
55/25 of 15 November 2000, that adopts the Palermo Convention, notes 
“...with deep concern” a growing link between transnational organised crime 
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and terrorist crimes.
212
 Like organised crime, terrorism has been a notoriously 
difficult concept to define.
213
 It is not in the scope of this section to attempt a 
definition of terrorism. Rather, this section seeks to outline particular features 
that distinguish TNOC from terrorism.  
 
Typically organised criminal groups have been considered non-ideological, in 
the sense that they do not have a political agenda of their own, nor do they 
espouse any particular political ideology of their own.
214
 However, it is feasible 
for criminal organisations to wish to nullify governments, or particular 
members of government. The method used to achieve this may involve actions 
such as corruption, kidnapping or violence; the latter making them, at least in 
the eyes of the media or public, indistinguishable from a terrorist group.
215
 This 
has been evident amongst drug trafficking groups who have engaged in 
violence and extortion against judges, prosecutors, elected officials and law 
enforcement agents. The aim of these actions is the disruption of legitimate 
government to divert attention from drug operations. The existence of this kind 
of activity during the 1980‘s led to the coining of the term narco-terrorism.216 
Terrorism and organised crime can, at times, exhibit such similar 
characteristics that any distinguishing features become blurred. This is 
particularly true when organised criminal groups use violence to achieve their 
goals or co-operate with terrorists. For instance terrorist groups are known to 
work with organised criminal groups, or run their own operations, in order to 
fund their on-going ideological struggle.
217
  
 
Despite this blurring of characteristics, and perhaps an overlapping in 
activities, the key distinguishing feature remains; organised criminal groups are 
primarily motivated by profit, while terrorist groups are primarily motivated by 
a particular ideology or struggle. While terrorism and organised crime may at 
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times display similar characteristics, it is understood, for the purpose of this 
thesis, that their fundamentally different motivations mean they must be 
distinguished. Because of the fundamental differences in motivation, strategies 
to combat terrorism and TNOC will differ substantially. A strategy aimed at 
addressing issues that have fostered the creation of terrorist groups will be, 
obviously, different from a strategy aimed at preventing organised crime. For 
instance, a strategy to prevent drug trafficking offences needs to address those 
factors that give rise to demand for drugs. This has no particular relevance to a 
strategy to prevent the conditions which foster terrorism. It is for this reason 
that terrorism is not included in the definition of ‗organised crime‘ in the 
Palermo Convention, and also why there are a host of specific conventions and 
resolutions aimed directly and solely at terrorism.
218
  
 
2.5 Combating organised crime 
 
Organised crime is perceived as a major contributor to serious crime, and the 
extent of its negative impact is often measured by the amount of ‗harm‘ it 
causes to society. Therefore, measures to combat organised crime are based on 
a desire to reduce the amount of harm it inflicts on society. Organised criminal 
activities affect a wide range of interests including; individuals, households, 
businesses as well as other organisations and institutions.
219
 Other less 
documented criminal activities such as wildlife smuggling also cause 
significant harm to the environment.
220
  
 
Often the most documented measurement of harm, caused to society, relates to 
the economic costs of organised criminal activities. For instance, in the UK 
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preliminary research conducted by the Home Office, regarding the economic 
cost of organised crime, estimated it to be as much as £40 billion a year. The 
report outlined particular costs associated with a number of categories of crime. 
For instance; the abuse of Class A drugs is (conservatively) estimated at £13 
billion a year, indirect tax fraud estimated at £7 billion annually and organised 
immigration crime estimated to be at least £3 billion.
221
 In Australia organised 
crime is, conservatively, estimated to have cost the country $10AUS Billion.
222
 
Illicit drug use is perhaps the most prevalent and serious crime that causes 
enormous harm to societies around the world.
223
 Criminal groups are well 
known to be involved in producing and supplying drugs to consumers.
224
 For 
instance, in New Zealand, 75% of drugs labs have been attributed to known 
organised criminal groups.
225
 Moreover, it is estimated that in 2005/06 illicit 
drug use cost New Zealand $1.31 Billion in social costs.
226
  
 
2.5.1 Traditional measures  
The traditional concept of TNOC has emphasised an external, ethnically based, 
threat, which requires increased crime control based primarily on repressive 
criminal justice measures.
227
 Strategies to combat organised crime have 
typically focused on targeting and immobilising specific criminals or criminal 
groups; utilising traditional criminal justice measures to achieve these goals.
228
 
Traditional, repressive, measures to combat organised crime have not been 
effective, on their own, to effectively investigate, prosecute and prevent 
organised crime.
229
 They do not sufficiently address factors that encourage 
participation in organised crime, nor the issues that give rise to the creation and 
development of illegal markets. Woodiwiss has described traditional criminal 
justice measures, to combat organised crime, as akin to; 
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...the construction of a twenty-first century criminal justice equivalent of those 
labyrinthian traps for rats built by 1930s psychologists to learn whether and how 
quickly the rats can escape from them.
230
 
 
The development of additional, non-traditional, measures is needed to 
complement traditional measures. This is vital in developing a sound 
framework for combating organised crime. 
 
Traditional Legal response 
By conceiving organised crime as an external threat authorities limit 
themselves to a certain strategy of control while, by default, negating other 
possible strategies.
231
 Shifting blame from organised crime on to, often 
ethnically defined, ‗others‘ instigates a repressive, criminal based, control 
strategy focused on enforcing, punishing, containing, disturbing and 
dismantling these outsider groups.
232
 Based on this conception, law makers 
have sought to create legislation aimed at specific offences associated with 
these criminal groups.
233
 In addition to this approach, increasingly, many 
countries have begun to criminalise membership or participation in an 
organised criminal group.
234
  
 
Law enforcement 
Law enforcement has generally been mired in traditional concepts of organised 
crime, failing to accurately understand that which they are attempting to target. 
There has been a tendency amongst law enforcement agencies to treat 
centralised hierarchical criminal groups as synonymous with organised crime, 
while disregarding networks as ‗disorganised‘ crime when, in fact, networks 
are a highly sophisticated and adaptable organisational form.
235
 In addition, 
most criminal intelligence has been directed at traditional conceptions of 
                                                 
230
 Woodiwiss M, supra n. 10 at 25. 
231
 Edwards A, supra n. 96 at 214. 
232
 Ibid. 
233
 Leong A, supra n. 14 at 81 and Levi M supra n. 2 at 896  
234
 Ibid. See also Chapter 4 of this thesis; outlining the UK approach to target specific offences 
associated with organised crime with criminalising participation in an organised criminal 
group. Chapter 5 discusses NZ‘s approach to also criminalise participation in an organised 
criminal group. 
235
 Williams P, supra n. 112 at 73. 
45 
 
organised crime, attempting to work out the pyramid structure of certain 
criminal groups, so as to capture and imprison ‗crime bosses‘.236 Because of 
this false conception, police intelligence has failed to develop an accurate 
picture of organised criminal activity and therefore have often failed to keep up 
with changes in how groups operate, developments in illicit markets, and often 
failed to map out future trends.
237
 
 
Traditional law enforcement, exhibiting a preoccupation with key criminal 
actors and getting them ‗behind bars‘, failed to recognise the importance of 
targeting criminal finances to achieve this purpose.
238
 Legislation targeting 
criminal finances has, until recently, been considered ancillary to the main 
crime being targeted.
239
 Financial investigations were never an integral part of 
criminal investigations until the 21
st
 century.
240
    
 
2.5.2 Comprehensive approach 
Levi and Maguire outline the two, basic, core elements that are needed to 
effectively prevent or reduce organised crime.
241
 
1. the prevention or reduction of particular forms of serious crime (a focus 
on harmful acts); and 
2. a reduction in the growth and development of organized criminal groups 
or formations, and in their involvement in the commission of those serious 
offences (a focus on harmful actors). 
Levi and Maguire acknowledge the need to prioritise and focus on harmful acts 
(serious crime), but also acknowledge that organised groups, often, have the 
greatest ability to cause vast amounts of harm. This view is supported by Chris 
Eades, who states: 
Those most successful in the commission of crimes tend to be the best organised, they 
garner the most profit and they cause the most harm; they are thus most deserving of 
dedicated and concerted law enforcement attention.
242
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It is also clear that traditional measures to combat organised crime are not 
sufficient on their own. An understanding of the context and development of 
certain crime events and illegal markets is needed. Understanding the factors 
that generate increased opportunities for crime will, in turn, help build 
recognition of the social and community issues that give rise to certain criminal 
markets.
243
 This is essential in building comprehensive strategies to combat 
organised criminal groups, who exist to provide illicit goods and services to 
these markets. 
 
Participation Offence
244
 
To both effectively target and prevent organised crime, participation in a 
criminal group should be inherently risky.
245
 Criminalising participation in a 
criminal group is a necessary first step and necessary addition to targeting 
those criminal activities associated with organised crime. Criminal groups have 
proved adept at responding to legislative and law enforcement measures aimed 
at disrupting criminal activity.
246
 A successful prosecution under a ‗sectorial‘ 
approach
247
 often requires that proof that the individuals are involved in the 
commission of the offence.
248
  Organisers and facilitators of criminal groups 
will often refrain from carrying out substantive offences, therefore, under a 
sectorial approach, there is very little risk associated with their role.
249
 
Moreover, traditional conspiracy legislation fails to take into account the 
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activities of a multifaceted criminal group.
250
 Ensuring that criminal groups are 
targeted, effectively, requires the development of an accurate conception of 
organised crime. A broad statutory definition of ‗criminal organisation‘ is 
preferred because it can encompass the wide variety of criminal groups and 
networks that operate in illegal markets.
251
 
 
Targeting criminal finances
252
 
Profit is the primary motivator for criminals and, therefore, any effective 
strategy to combat organised crime must include measures that target money 
laundering and allow for the seizure and forfeiture of criminal assets, to ensure 
that criminals cannot hide or profit from their illegal gains.
253
 Targeting these 
areas also helps to effectively investigate and prosecute criminals, by tracking 
and linking obvious signs of wealth (without an obvious, legal, source of 
income) to illegal activity. Ensuring that criminals will not profit from illegal 
activity can also can act as a deterrent, if criminals realise they won‘t profit 
from their illicit activity.
254
 Criminals often seek to infiltrate the legitimate 
economy to hide their illicit gains. Consequently, engaging the private sector 
and creating regulatory policies and suspicious activity reporting, for financial 
institutions, is necessary to construct an effective framework for targeting 
criminal finances.
255
 Increasingly States are adopting legislation to ensure 
private sector cooperation.
256
 
 
Intelligence led approach
257
 
Organised crime prevention and reduction strategies require an effective 
intelligence led approach.
258
 Policy makers and law enforcement agencies that 
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base decisions and reactions, relating to organised crime, on accurate crime 
pattern analysis, will better  understand organised crime trends and the groups 
operating in certain illicit markets.
259
 Furthermore, the development of sound 
intelligence is vital to predict future trends and patterns in organised criminal 
activities. Understanding future trends will ensure law enforcement keeps up 
with the evolving and fluid nature of criminal networks, and ensure they can 
implement prevention measures, rather than relying on reactionary measures.
260
  
 
Law enforcement agencies are increasingly adopting a more intelligence led 
approach, illustrated by the creation of agencies with the specific purpose of 
targeting and reducing organised crime.
261
 These agencies rely on an 
intelligence led approach to inform their responses to organised crime.
262
 
 
Effective international cooperation
263
 
The transnational nature of organised crime requires that States implement 
effective measures to facilitate cooperation in the investigation, prosecution 
and prevention of organised crime.
264
 Creating a central authority to deal with 
mutual assistance requests is essential to achieving effective cooperation.
265
 
Moreover, States need to implement the provisions of multilateral treaties 
relating to organised crime, such as the Palermo Convention. This will help to 
achieve at least minimum standards, which all States will be expected to adhere 
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to. Wide spread adherence to international conventions will also aid the 
development of a uniformed approach to combating TNOC.
266
 
 
Non-traditional prevention measures
267
 
Traditional approaches have tended to focus only on who is involved (in 
organised crime) rather than understanding why they are involved.
268
 
Conceptualisation of, and research into, the diverse social contexts of organised 
crime and the factors that drive it is in a very infant stage.
269
  
...but ethnographic research into the differential associations that enable or preclude 
the formation and reproduction of criminal co-operatives has identified important 
avenues for comparative research.
270
 
 
A large range of diverse factors, such as shifts in local housing, poverty, drug 
use and labour markets, have been implicated in the development and 
sustainability of criminal networks.
271
 Traditional situational crime prevention 
and repressive measures have neglected other important crime reduction and 
suppression areas, such as community action.
272
 Governments need to engage 
with their communities at a ‗grass roots level‘ to understand why demand for 
particular illegal goods and service exists, why criminal networks develop and 
what attracts people to participate in organised crime.  However, as this thesis 
will illustrate, currently there has been a failure to achieve meaningful 
prevention measures, outside of the traditional criminal justice approach. 
 
Assessing the impact of transnational organised crime 
Law enforcement has traditionally measured disruption based on factors such 
as; quantity of arrests made, warrants executed, quantity of illicit goods seized 
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and reduction in the number of criminal groups.
273
 However, these factors only 
measure the disruption process, not the actual impact of these measures on 
organised crime and serious criminal activity.
274
  
 
It cannot be assumed that any of these particular measures represent more than 
temporary setbacks for criminal networks, and it does not in the least 
demonstrate a reduction in the level of harm to society.
275
 Furthermore, they 
provide very little basis for future policy changes and learning.
276
 For instance, 
countries may have as an objective the reduction of overall harm caused by 
serious crime on society.
277
 However, as Levi remarks;
 278
  
...the impact of anti-organised crime measures on outcomes remains insufficiently 
analysed, since there are little reliable data on the ‗before‘ or ‗after‘ of (a) levels, or (b) 
organization of drugs and people trafficking...etc. 
 
Levi illustrates that the lack of reliable data, relating to the impact of anti-
organised crime measures, extends to all sectors of illegal activities associated 
with organised crime. Therefore, to guide future policies and strategies to 
combat TNOC, the international community and individual States, need to 
realistically assess the extent of transnational organised crime. They must also 
develop measures to accurately assess the impact of current polices and 
responses on organised crime and serious crime in general.  
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Chapter Three 
International efforts to combat transnational organised crime 
 
 
3.1.  Complex transnational challenge 
 
TNOC inevitably leads to unique challenges; the involvement of more than one 
State complicates the investigation, successful prosecution and prevention in 
criminal cases. Any effective solution or strategy to combat TNOC must be 
sought beyond national borders, involving close cooperation amongst the 
States involved or affected.
279
 Cooperation must be achieved on a wide range 
of issues often requiring States to harmonise key provisions of legislation. In 
practise achieving the necessary level of cooperation amongst States has 
proved a problematic issue. Clive Hartfield illustrates the difficulty of 
responding to TNOC:
 280
 
It is a global problem to which any potential or aspirational global solution suffers 
from the political reality of different national priorities and perspectives within the 
diplomatic arena, and different agency priorities and powers within the nationally-
structured, multiple jurisdictional arena. Organized crime is a common menace 
without a common criminal code.  
 
The first obstacle, which often hinders the successful investigation or 
prosecution of transnational cases, is the issue of sovereignty. Protecting 
sovereignty is a primary concern for national governments, often resulting in 
hesitancy when it comes to co-operating with other States.
281
 The second 
prevalent obstacle is difficulty in harmonising different legal systems, cultures 
and customs. This is a significant issue even when cooperation is agreed on and 
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assistance granted.
 282
 Domestic prosecution of transnational cases requires 
evidence, obtained in a foreign country, be presented in a form admissible in 
the prosecuting countries courts. This can often be difficult, expensive and time 
consuming to achieve.
283
  
 
 
3.2 Instruments facilitating international cooperation  
 
International instruments, also referred to as treaties, are the corner stone of 
international law and international criminal justice.
284
 They are formally signed 
and ratified agreements, made between two or more States or other 
international entities.
285
 Typically international treaties fall into two categories; 
either bi-lateral or multi-lateral.
286
 Traditionally, States have sought to form bi-
lateral agreements with key partners to achieve cooperation on specific 
matters.
287
 However, as the world becomes more integrated and the scope of 
transnational crime continues to spread around the globe it is apparent that bi-
lateral agreements are not sufficient, on their own, to deal with the challenges 
of organised crime. TNOC often occurs in or affects more than just two 
jurisdictions. Moreover, negotiating bi-lateral agreements with a large number 
of States is not only difficult and time consuming, but the substance of the 
treaties may vary from State to State resulting in lack of international 
coherence in responding to TNOC.  
 
The complexities of the legislative and procedural framework, within and 
across jurisdictions, require the international community to take an integrated 
and uniformed approach, with effective enforcement mechanisms. Such an 
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approach must be espoused as widely as possible.
288
 The international 
communities realisation of this need is reflected in recent multi-lateral 
initiatives such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (Palermo Convention), which has achieved wide spread 
signatories. 
 
3.2.1 Bi-lateral Agreements 
The traditional international instruments for cooperation between States were 
bilateral agreements, they are treaties negotiated and signed between two 
States. The advantage of bilateral agreements is that they can be tailored and 
adapted to the specific interests and context of the States involved, which is 
particularly useful when differences in legal systems must be overcome.
289
 
Furthermore, they have the advantage of being expanded, amended and 
terminated relatively easily.
290
 However, concluding bilateral treaties has a 
number of potential downsides. It can be very time consuming to negotiate 
separate bi-lateral agreements with many States and this process is often very 
resource-intensive, which is a particular disadvantage for smaller or under-
developed States who cannot afford an extensive international negotiating 
program.
291
 More powerful States will often favour bilateral agreements over 
solely multilateral treaties simply because it is a better way for them to get 
what they want.
292
  
 
3.2.2 Multilateral agreements 
Multilateral agreements have several signatories ranging from smaller 
groupings to extensive multilateral treaties, involving the wide spread 
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participation of States from around the world.
293
 Multilateral agreements are 
often more difficult to draft than bilateral agreements due to the greater number 
of participants with varying agendas and needs. Negotiations are often drawn 
out over long periods, as States seek to achieve a consensus that suits all parties 
involved.
294
 Furthermore, multilateral agreements are more difficult to amend 
and terminate, the implementation of some agreements will require establishing 
a permanent infrastructure (e.g. secretariat), which subsequently requires the 
investment of further resources.
295
 Multilateral agreements also suffer the 
perceived weakness of only achieving the lowest common denominator of 
consensus as States must exhibit as much flexibility as possible and provide 
compromises to ensure they achieve wide spread consensus.
296
 The more States 
involved the more difficult it becomes to achieve consensus, often leading to 
conventions that have watered down provisions in an effort to make the 
convention palatable to the diverse parties involved.  
 
Despite the problems in negotiating multilateral agreements, and the potential 
for ambiguous or weakened provisions, there are a number of advantages to a 
multilateral convention. Multilateral agreements provide a framework and 
degree of stability to international cooperation.
297
 A multilateral treaty has the 
potential to achieve a truly wide spread international consensus, particularly 
when formulated through an organisation with wide spread membership, such 
as the UN. Multilateral treaties have the advantage of documenting and 
reinforcing international norms.
298
 The parties involved are clearly signalling 
their resolve to establish lasting rules and institutions, based on mutual 
solidarity and shared responsibility.
299
 This is of vital importance when 
attempting to create an international system to combat TNOC.  
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There must be wide spread international resolve to confront TNOC and to 
ensure there are common, at least minimum, standards by which States are 
expected to adhere. On a practical level, signing up to a multilateral agreement 
relieves the burden on States from having to enter into numerous bilateral 
agreements, each of which may require different procedures
300
 and where the 
substance of the agreement may differ depending with whom it is signed. 
Finally, in the criminal justice sphere and particularly important in the context 
of TNOC, by extending the geographical scope of those signing up to a treaty 
there is a reduction in the possibility that offenders can evade justice, or hide 
proceeds of crime, by operating from or escaping to States that are not parties 
to such agreements.
301
 
 
3.2.3 Domestic Law 
States may also make allowance for international cooperation, in the absence of 
formal treaties, within their domestic legal frameworks. The United Nations 
expressly encourages States to make provision for cooperation on criminal 
matters within their domestic law.
302
 For instance, New Zealand has relatively 
few bi-lateral treaties relating to extradition or mutual legal assistance, instead 
provides such assistance based on domestic legislation.
303
 
 
3.3 Criminal justice across borders 
 
Extradition and mutual legal assistance are essential to facilitating cooperation 
amongst states to combat TNOC. Extradition ensures that criminals cannot 
evade justice simply by crossing borders and mutual legal assistance ensures 
that criminals cannot evade prosecution and confiscation of proceeds when 
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evidence or proceeds of crime are located in another country.
304
 Cooperation 
amongst police and other law enforcement officials is also of vital importance 
but is usually achieved outside of treaty level on a more informal basis. This 
section will introduce and outline these key tools, describing the way they are 
used by states and the common problems associated with them.  
 
3.3.1 Extradition  
What is extradition? 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) defines extradition 
as: 
...the formal process by which one jurisdiction asks another for the enforced return of a 
person who is in the requested jurisdiction and who is accused or convicted of one or 
more criminal offences against the law of the requesting jurisdiction. The return is 
sought so that the person will face trial in the requesting jurisdiction or punishment for 
such an offence or offences.
305
 
 
For a long period there were few examples of any provisions or treaties relating 
to extradition. Instead extradition was largely a matter of either courtesy or 
subservience, in the rare cases where it existed at all.
306
 These days the legal 
bases for extradition may be through bilateral agreements, multilateral 
treaties/conventions or through ad hoc agreements. Reciprocity or comity may 
also be a legal basis for extradition usually when supported by domestic 
legislation.
307
 Furthermore, newly emerging international criminal tribunals 
exercising treaty-based criminal jurisdiction means that extradition may be 
possible through these non-states bodies.
308
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Background 
During the 1800s bilateral extradition treaties began to emerge, particularly 
among the commonwealth States who.
309
 The first multilateral agreements 
were not formed until much later. The first multilateral convention regarding 
extradition was the 1933 Organisation of American States Convention on 
Extradition.
310
 Since then a number of conventions have been created, typically 
forming around regional groupings, for instance the Arab Extradition 
Agreement in 1952, the European Convention of Extradition in 1957 and the 
1966 Commonwealth scheme for the rendition of fugitives.
311
 More recently, 
the European Union has created multilateral treaties relating to extradition, 
such as; the 1995 Convention on simplified extradition within the European 
Union, and the 1996 European Union Convention on the substantive 
requirements for extradition within the EU.
312
 Provisions relating to extradition 
are also included in a number of multilateral conventions that deal with specific 
types of crime such as; the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (2003) and the Palermo Convention.
313
 
 
Impediments to extradition and grounds for refusal 
Despite the vast body of bilateral and multilateral agreements relating to 
extradition, or perhaps because of this fact, extradition can often be a 
cumbersome process where significant obstacles still exist to creating a 
predictable streamlined version of extradition.
314
 The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime Informal Expert Working Group on Effective Extradition 
Casework Practice (UNODC report) found a number of factors that impede 
effective extradition practises.
315
 Apart from weak/outdated extradition treaties 
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and laws the report also found that countries tend to have widely differing 
preconditions for extradition.
316
 These refusals may be based on legitimate 
rationale and moral responsibility, for instance a responsibility to respect 
fundamental human rights. However, often refusal occurs due to lack of 
awareness of national/international extradition law and practise, or of 
alternatives to refusal that may exist.
317
  
 
These, often, inconsistent conditions create delays and confusion in cases of 
TNOC. The UNODC report found that the complexity, length, cost and 
uncertainty regarding extradition process or procedures is a significant obstacle 
to swift extradition casework.
318
 The system needs to be consistent and 
predictable to be effective.  
 
Simplifying the extradition process  
In an attempt to streamline the process the UN has set about formulating 
international standards and norms for extradition and the offences they cover. 
In 1990 the UN Model Treaty on Extradition was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly resolution 45/116 and amended in 1997 by resolution 52/88.
319
 
Some of the minimum standards set out in the model treaty include an 
obligation to extradite any persons, subject to the provisions of the treaty, to 
the requesting State for prosecution or for the imposition or enforcement of a 
sentence in respect of such an offence.
320
 The model treaty also outlines what 
constitutes an extraditable offence,
321
 grounds for refusing a request
322
 and 
practical matters such as the correct procedure for channels of communication 
and required documents.
323
 In addition to model treaties, specific conventions 
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such as the Palermo Convention and the United Nation Convention against 
Corruption address extradition issues, based on experiences of member States, 
and have recommended measures to simplify evidentiary requirements and 
keep the burden of proof at a minimum in extradition proceedings.
324
  
 
While streamlining the treaty system regarding extradition is important to a 
functioning international system, it is the domestic law of requested States that 
ultimately governs the extradition process.
325
 According to the UNODC report: 
The sheer size and scope of the resulting domestic variations in substantive and 
procedural extradition law create the most serious ongoing obstacles to just, quick and 
predictable extradition.
326
 
 
The differing conditions States have for allowing/refusing extradition; the often 
burdensome evidentiary requirements of requested States, that are not familiar 
or well understood by requesting States; and inflexible prosecution practices; 
all contribute to impede efficient extradition.
327
  
 
The UN has recognised that an effective treaty system will only be as strong as 
the domestic laws used to implement the treaty. Therefore the United Nations 
Model Law on Extradition (2004) was created by the UNODC to compliment 
the UN Model Treaty on Extradition. The UNODC has constructed model laws 
for both civil law and common law countries.
328
 The UN model law includes 
provisions seeking to standardise definitions relating to extradition and outlines 
the legal bases for extradition.
329
 The model law outlines the substantive 
conditions for extradition
330
 and provides a list of legitimate grounds for 
refusing extradition, with the hope of providing consistency and accepted 
norms.
331
 The model law also contains provisions relating to documentary 
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requirements
332
, transit proceedings
333
 and provisions relating to costs for 
extradition.
334
 
3.3.2 Mutual legal assistance  
What is mutual legal assistance? 
Mutual legal assistance (MLA) describes the process by which States provide 
formal assistance to one another; commonly in criminal investigations 
prosecutions and to recover proceeds of crime.
335
 The purpose of MLA is to 
encourage a foreign State to assist in the requesting States judicial process. 
This may involve, when located in the requested States territory; securing the 
testimony of possible victims, witnesses or expert witnesses; taking other 
forms of evidence; or by checking judicial or other official records.
336
 The 
Attorney-Generals Office of Australia provides the following examples of 
common instances of MLA:
337
 
-  a person is accused of fraud and money laundering offences and the person‘s 
bank account records are sought from financial institutions in a foreign country 
to assist with the investigation and possible prosecution of the person and/or to 
recover the money/proceeds of crime, or  
-  a key witness to a crime resides in a foreign country and a witness statement is 
sought from that person to assist with the criminal investigation and possible 
prosecution of an accused person. 
 
 
Background 
Often MLA is provided and administered under specific bilateral treaties which 
will enable States to tailor each treaty to specific legal system and law 
enforcement needs.
338
 Usually the primary motivation for signing a bilateral 
treaty regarding MLA is to facilitate obtaining foreign evidence in a form 
admissible in domestic courts.
339
 In the case of TNOC however, just as with 
extradition, on their own MLA bilateral treaties have limited effectiveness. 
Noting the difficulty in attempting to sign bilateral treaties with multiple States, 
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a number of multilateral treaties have been drafted, aimed at creating 
international or at least regional norms and common practises.  
 
Two of the most influential multilateral agreements created are; the Council of 
Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1959 and an 
instrument applied within the Commonwealth called the Commonwealth 
Scheme for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (known as the Harare 
Scheme).
340
 The Council of Europe Convention focuses primarily on assistance 
in judicial matters; in 2000 the European Union created its own Mutual 
Assistance Convention to supplement the 1959 Convention.
341
 The Harare 
Scheme does not create binding international obligations but rather provides 
useful recommendations on a wide range of issues including; indentifying and 
locating persons, examining witnesses, obtaining evidence and facilitating the 
personal appearance of witnesses.
342
 Furthermore several multilateral 
agreements have been drafted that deal with specific offences and provide 
extensive provisions on the subject of MLA.
343
 These multilateral agreements 
include the Palermo Convention and the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) which are relevant in 
the context of TNOC.
344
 
 
Procedural issues relating to requests for MLA 
One significant problem, creating an obstacle to effective MLA cooperation, is 
the considerable variation in procedural laws amongst different States.
345
 For 
example, when responding to a request for evidence, the requested State may 
provide the evidence in a form or manner which is unacceptable under the 
procedural law of the requesting State, or alternatively sometimes the 
requesting State will require special procedures that are not even recognised 
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under the law of the requested State.
346
 A United Nations expert group,
347
 
considering this matter, strongly urged States to ensure the greatest possible 
flexibility in their domestic law and practice, to enable broad and speedy 
assistance. Furthermore, they noted, it was particularly important to have the 
capacity to render the assistance in the manner sought by the requesting 
State.
348
  
 
When responding to a request it is imperative that consideration is given, as 
much as possible, to the requesting States procedural requirements. Section 
10(1) of the UN Model Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2007) 
provides that; requests for assistance shall be executed in accordance with any 
procedures specified in the request, unless such execution would be contrary to 
the fundamental principles of the law of the requested State. Furthermore s 
10(2) provides that s (10)(1) shall apply even if the requested procedures are 
not used in the requested State, or not available in relation to the type of 
assistance sought domestically.  
 
Central Authorities 
In order to streamline the process of MLA many modern MLA agreements will 
provide for the creation of a ‗central authority‘ to handle incoming MLA 
requests.
349
 Usually the Ministry of Justice, or national equivalent, will act as 
the designated central authority for MLA requests.
350
 In the US the Department 
of International Affairs acts as the designated central authority
351
, in New 
Zealand it is the Attorney-General.
352
 A central authority helps to facilitate the 
taking of requests by avoiding courts and diplomatic channels, thus 
significantly reducing the time required to secure assistance.
353
 The creation of 
a central authority provides States with a nominated body capable and ready to 
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coordinate its own requests for assistance and also stands ready to respond 
swiftly to incoming requests from foreign States.
354
 This is vital if States wish 
to be successful in combating TNOC. Every country needs a centralised body 
coordinating MLA requests to ensure that delays in assistance are kept to a 
minimum and to ensure that evidence from witnesses and documentary 
evidence are produced in a form acceptable for use in the requesting States 
courts.  
 
The Palermo Convention makes it mandatory to set up a central authority to 
deal with MLA. The authority is expected to have the responsibility and power 
to receive requests for mutual legal assistance and either to execute them or to 
transmit them to the competent authorities for execution.
355
 The purpose of the 
authority as outlined in the convention is to; ―...ensure the speedy and proper 
execution or transmission of the requests received”.356 
 
3.4 Law Enforcement Cooperation 
 
The growth in cases of TNOC and terrorism has resulted in a need for law 
enforcement agencies to modernise and increase their capability to investigate 
criminal activity taking place across borders.
357
 The agencies tasked with 
investigating instances of TNOC vary from country to country but typically 
include police, customs agencies and increasingly specific intelligence lead 
agencies created to tackle organised crime.
358
  
 
The diversity in national policing structures creates a significant obstacle to 
transnational police cooperation.
359
 Even within member States of the 
European Union; divergent legal systems, different law enforcement strategies 
                                                 
354
 Dandurand Y, Colombo G and Passas  N,  supra n. 313 at 268. 
355
 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) Article 18(13). 
356
 Ibid. 
357
 Bantekas I and Nash S, International Criminal Law 3
rd
 Edition (2007) at 407. 
358
 For instance, in the United Kingdom and New Zealand specific agencies (SOCA and 
OFCANZ) have been created to combat organised crime. They work closely with Police and 
other agencies such as Customs to achieve their goals. See Chapter 4 case study on the UK 
(discussing SOCA) and chapter 5 on NZ (discussing OFCANZ). 
359
 Dandurand Y, Colombo G and Passas  N,  supra n. 313 at 279. 
64 
 
and the increasing diversity of transnational criminal activity combine to 
impede effective police cooperation.
360
 A typical example of these difficulties 
can be seen in the use of special investigative techniques. Proactive law 
enforcement strategies, and complex investigations, often require the use of 
special investigative techniques, such as, wire taps or undercover police 
operations.
361
 When a case becomes transnational, requiring cooperation 
between States, laws regulating the use of these techniques can severely 
hamper the proficiency of the investigation.
362
 This problem and many other 
difficulties have plagued police investigations, when the case has a 
transnational element. Therefore, law enforcement agencies have actively 
sought to implement and continually improve cooperation. Cooperation is 
usually structured on a relatively informal level utilising direct agency to 
agency contact, often facilitated by the service of Interpol.
363
 
 
Interpol 
Created in 1923, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) is 
the world‘s largest international police agency with 187 members (as of 
2009).
364
 Interpol seeks to facilitate cross-border police co-operation, support 
and assist all organisations, authorities and services whose mission is to 
prevent or combat international crime.
365
 Operating in four official languages 
(English, French, Spanish and Arabic), Interpol provides a secure police 
communications service, offers a range of operational databases for police and 
provides other operational police services.
366
 The Interpol communication 
system is one of its most important functions, assisting police to circulate 
crime-related information to one another.
367
 Its primary purpose is to facilitate 
cross-border police cooperation against TNOC including drug-trafficking, 
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human trafficking and internet-based child pornography.
368
 The aims of 
Interpol, as stated in the Interpol Constitution and Regulations, are: 
(1) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal 
police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in 
the spirit of the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights';  
(2) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the 
prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes.
369
 
 
Interpol is not an operational agency in the same manner as a conventional 
domestic police force. Its four core functions are to provide a secure global 
police communication service, maintain and provide an operational database 
service and databases for police for the purpose of circulating critical crime 
related information, operational police support services and, finally, provide 
police training and development expertise.
370
 
 
The two senior decision making bodies of Interpol are the General Assembly 
and the Executive Committee. The decisions of these two bodies are 
implemented by the General Secretariat which consists of several 
departments.
371
 The General Secretariat alongside the Interpol National Central 
Bureau‘s (NCB) are responsible for co-ordinating with law enforcement 
agencies in each Member State to facilitate the everyday work of police co-
operation.
372
 NCBs are vital to the functioning of Interpol‘s police cooperation 
efforts. Each Member State has an NCB, usually located within a division of 
the national police agency or investigation service. The NCB serves as a 
contact point for all Interpol investigations.
373
  
 
The General Secretariat seeks to support the NCBs in three ways; capacity 
building, police training and development of the ‗I-24/7‘ secure 
communication system.
374
 The NCBs are responsible for sending requests for 
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assistance and receiving requests from other Member States.
375
This includes 
receiving requests for information from other NCBs and replying to requests in 
turn. NCBs are also responsible for transmitting requests for international 
cooperation from domestic police and courts to foreign NCBs.
376
 Apart from 
this the other core tasks of the NCBs include:
377
 
1. Collection of criminal intelligence related to international offences and 
offenders. This intelligence is then passed on directly to other NCBs as 
well as to Interpol‘s General Secretariat; 
2. To ensure that police operations requested by other States NCBs are 
carried out proficiently; 
3. Forming part of the national delegations which attend the annual 
meeting of the General Assembly. 
 
 
3.5 United Nations Convention against Transnational organised Crime 
Development of international conventions 
The rise of TNOC as a perceived threat, in the eyes of world leaders, has led to 
the creation of several international multi-lateral conventions. These 
conventions are designed to promote cohesion and uniformity in the measures 
taken to combat TNOC. The UN has been the vessel for the creation of a 
number of conventions relating to TNOC, including; the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988) The United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention), the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (2003)  
 
Led by the United States, the conventions directed at illicit drugs and drug 
trafficking represent a desire, of the international community, to curb the 
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production, transportation and supply of illegal drugs.
378
 An important purpose 
of the two earlier treaties is to codify internationally applicable control 
measures in order to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances for medical and scientific purposes, and to prevent their diversion 
into illicit channels.
379
 The purpose of the 1988 Convention is set out in article 
2 where it states; 
The purpose of this Convention is to promote co-operation among the parties so that 
they may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances having an international dimension...
380
 
 
It is intended that the three conventions, relating to illicit drugs, will be 
mutually supportive and complementary, creating a comprehensive 
international legal framework for the purpose of stemming the production and 
supply of illegal drugs.
381
 The 1988 Convention also highlights the perceived 
growing links between organised crime and drug trafficking. It states in the 
preamble that State Parties are aware that the illicit traffic in drugs; 
...generates large financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal 
organisations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, 
legitimate commercial and financial business, and society at all levels. 
 
In recognition of the need for States to better co-operate in facing up to 
criminal groups involved in the illegal narcotic trade the 1988 convention 
includes specific articles on extradition (article 6), mutual legal assistance 
(article 7), money laundering (article 5), transfer of proceedings (article 8), as 
well as other forms of co-operation and training (article 9).  
 
The conventions, relating to illicit drugs, represent awareness by the 
international community of the need for effective cooperation to combat 
organised crime and its associated activities. However, until the creation of the 
Palermo Convention, cooperation was limited; applying only to specific 
activities, such as, drug production and trafficking. 
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3.5.1  Universal convention to combat TNOC 
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
(known as the Palermo Convention) opened for signature in Palermo, Italy, on 
the 12-15
th
 December 2000 and came into force on 29 September 2003.
382
 It is 
the product of efforts undertaken by the UN beginning in 1994, the year in 
which the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime 
(Naples Conference) produced a Political Declaration and a Plan of Action.
383
 
These instruments plotted for the first time the creation of a uniform and 
legally-binding convention, with an aim to harmonise methodologies, 
structures and procedures needed to tackle TNOC in all its forms and 
manifestations.
384
  
 
The Convention represents the international community‘s desire for a truly 
global approach to combat TNOC. One of its main purposes is to promote 
cooperation for the prevention of, and effective fight against, TNOC.
385
 It seeks 
to enlarge the number of States that take effective measures against TNOC and 
to forge and strengthen cross-border links between States. The convention 
wishes to respect the differences and specificities of diverse legal traditions and 
cultures, while at the same time promoting a common language, uniform 
minimum standards and helping to remove some of the existing barriers to 
effective transnational collaboration.
386
  
 
The Palermo Convention has three supplementary protocols dealing with 
specific offences. The protocols were deemed necessary, in addition to the 
main convention, to effectively deal with the offences contained within them. 
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The three protocols address, respectively, offences relating to human 
trafficking, migrant smuggling and firearms.
387
 
Structure  
The Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the Palermo Convention 
summarises the main goals and achievements of the convention as follows:
388
 
The Organized Crime Convention: 
(a) Defines and standardizes certain terms that are used with different meanings in 
various countries or circles; 
(b) Requires States to establish specific offences as crimes; 
(c) Requires the introduction of specific control measures, such as protection of 
victims and witnesses; 
(d) Provides for the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime; 
(e) Promotes international cooperation, for example through extradition, legal 
assistance and joint investigations; 
(f) Provides for training, research and information-sharing measures; 
(g) Encourages preventive policies and measures; 
(h) Contains technical provisions, such as for signature and ratification. 
 
The legislative guide clarifies the terminology relating to States obligations 
under the convention. Some provisions are explicitly mandatory, other 
measures are strongly encouraged and some are entirely optional.
389
 The guide 
also acknowledges that the Palermo Convention was drafted for general 
purposes; thus the level of abstraction is high, and therefore, the text is not 
suitable to be adopted verbatim into domestic legislation. Rather, States are 
encouraged to adopt the spirit and meaning of the various articles, as they draft 
national legislation.
390
  
 
It should be emphasized that the provisions of the Convention, and its 
Protocols, set only minimum standards, which States are expected to meet for 
the sake of conformity.
391
 Provided that the minimum standards are met, State 
Parties are free to exceed those standards and, in several provisions, are 
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expressly encouraged to do so.
392
 The Palermo Convention can be divided into 
four main thematic areas containing provisions dealing with; criminalisation, 
measures to enhance international cooperation, technical cooperation and 
implementation.
393
 
 
Substantive Criminal Law 
The Palermo Convention contains mandatory provisions requiring State Parties 
to establish a number of offences in their domestic legislation, if these do not 
already exist. Those States with relevant legislation already in place must 
ensure the provision of such laws conform to the convention‘s requirements 
and amend their legislation should that be necessary.
394
 Under the provisions of 
the Palermo Convention State Parties are expected to adopt, into their domestic 
legal framework, measures that include: 
- criminalising participation in an organised criminal group,395  
- criminalising and taking measures against the laundering of proceeds of 
crime,
396
 
- criminalising and taking measures against corruption,397  
- criminalising and taking measures against obstruction of justice398  
 
A general consensus was found during the negotiations for the Palermo 
Convention that the activities covered by these offences are vital to the success 
of the vast majority of criminal operations, and to the ability of offenders to 
operate efficiently.
399
 They also enable groups to generate substantial profits 
and to protect themselves, as well as their illicit gains, from law enforcement 
authorities. It is therefore necessary to criminalise and focus on these offences, 
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as part of a coordinated global effort to combat organised criminal groups and 
their associated activities.
400
 
 
Criminalising participation in an organised criminal group 
Article 5 of the Palermo Convention requires State Parties to adopt legislation, 
and other measures
401
 that may be necessary, to establish as criminal offences, 
distinct from offences involving the attempt or completion of criminal activity, 
either or both of the following offences
402
: 
 (i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose 
relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit 
and, where required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the 
participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group; 
(ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal 
activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in 
question, takes an active part in: 
a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group; 
b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his or her 
participation will contribute to the achievement of the above-described criminal aim; 
 
As outlined in chapter two,
403
 the Palermo Convention employs a broad notion 
of what constitutes an organised criminal group. This ensures that both 
structured criminal groups and looser networks of criminals are included in the 
scope of this convention.   
 
The two criminalisation options, outlined in article (5)(a)(1)(i) and (ii), reflect 
the two common methods States have used to criminalise the act of 
participation in a criminal group. Typically Common Law countries have used 
the offence of ‗conspiracy‘, while Civil Law countries tend to use offences that 
proscribe an involvement in a criminal group. Alternatively some States have 
opted to use a combination of both approaches.
404
 To ensure that these 
approaches are used in harmony in the global effort to combat TNOC, both 
methods are considered equivalent under the convention. States have the 
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discretion to choose to criminalise one or the other, or both offences. Article 
5(1)(a)(i) reflects the ‗conspiracy‘ approach and 5(1)(a)(ii) the approach 
favoured by civil law countries who have sought to criminalise participation in 
a criminal group.
405
  
 
Including both methods allows for effective action against organised criminal 
groups, without forcing States to introduce a legal concept (conspiracy or 
criminal association) that was foreign to their domestic law prior to ratifying 
the convention. However, it would be useful for States signing up to the 
convention to be familiar with both concepts, in addition to treating them as 
equivalent, to facilitate in answering requests for legal assistance in cases of 
TNOC. 
 
Article 5(1)(b) also deals with persons who organise, assist or in someway 
facilitate serious organised criminal groups. The provision requires that States 
establish as an offence, when committed intentionally: 
 (b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission 
of serious crime involving an organized criminal group. 
 
This article stresses the need to criminalise those who organise serious criminal 
activity, but, who may not necessarily participate in the commission of the 
offence. Article (5)(1)(b) also reflects the need to target intermediaries and 
facilitators who are often instrumental in bringing together criminals and 
resources needed for the successful commission of serious crimes. This is 
particularly true in the network model of organised crime, where looser 
connections of criminals need intermediaries, those people with the ‗right‘ 
contacts, so they can gather the necessary skill sets for a particular ‗job‘.406 
 
Criminalising and taking measures against the laundering of proceeds of 
crime 
Successful organised criminal operations, aimed primarily at generating large 
amounts of money, need to find a way to store and use the money without its 
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illegal source being traceable. This requires a method of making ‗dirty‘ money 
‗clean‘, a process that is commonly referred to as ‗money laundering‘.407 
Money laundering involves transforming the profits of a crime (or crimes) into 
money that has the appearance of coming from a legitimate source, and makes 
the criminal origin of the money difficult to trace.
408
 The assets criminals 
accumulate from TNOC activity can be used to finance future criminal 
operations, reward past crimes and provide an incentive to participate in future 
crimes.
409
 An effective global effort to combat TNOC needs to have strong 
harmonised measures to deal with money laundering and to ensure criminals 
cannot profit from their ill-gotten gains.  
The Palermo Convention reflects the need for an effective international 
solution to the problem of money laundering.
410
 Thus the convention includes 
provisions dealing with criminalisation of money laundering and provisions 
outlining measures that States must take to ensure they will effectively 
confront money laundering. Furthermore, the convention includes provisions 
directed at seizing and confiscating the proceeds of crime, with the aim of 
ensuring that crime does not pay. 
Criminalisation aspects 
Article 6 requires States to criminalise the conversion or transfer of proceeds of 
crime
411
 and the concealment or disguising of the nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement or ownership of proceeds of crime.
412
 Furthermore, but 
subject to the basic principles of each States domestic law, States must also 
criminalise the acquisition, possession or use of proceeds of crime
413
 and the 
participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit, 
and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the 
offences established in accordance with Article 6.
414
 To satisfactorily meet the 
requirements set out under this article States must seek to apply the offences 
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listed above to the widest range of criminal conduct.
415
 For instance, where a 
State party requires legislation setting out a list of specific predicate offences, 
such a list must include a comprehensive range of offences that are associated 
with organised criminal groups.
416
  
 
Additional measures 
Placing illicit funds into the legitimate financial system is a vital part of the 
money laundering process. Once achieved, tracing the assets gained from illicit 
activity becomes much harder or even impossible. Stopping organised criminal 
groups from taking this first step and developing the capacity to track the 
movement of assets is crucial and requires significant international cooperation 
and harmonisation.
417
 Article 7 of the Palermo Convention outlines a number 
of additional measures that States are expected to take to effectively deal with 
money laundering problems. This article emphasises an expectation that all 
State Parties will take strong domestic measures to deter money laundering.  
 
Notably Article 7 contains two major mandatory requirements. Firstly, States 
are expected to establish a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory 
regime for banks, non-bank financial institutions and where appropriate other 
bodies susceptible to money laundering.
418
 Secondly, they must ensure that the 
domestic agencies tasked with combating money-laundering have the ability to 
cooperate, and exchange information, at the national and international levels. 
This includes seriously considering the establishment of a specialist financial 
unit to serve as national centre to aid in the collection, analysis and 
dissemination of information regarding potential money laundering.
419
 The aim 
of these two requirements is to prevent the introduction of illicit funds into the 
legitimate financial system and furthermore to ensure the necessary 
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mechanisms and procedures are in place to detect and trace transactions or 
funds that may be of a criminal nature.
420
  
 
Targeting criminal proceeds: Making sure crime doesn‟t pay 
In addition to the money laundering provisions, the Palermo Convention 
provides a number of provisions aimed at; identifying, freezing, confiscating 
and seizing illegally gained proceeds and property.
421
 There has been difficulty 
in harmonising the international system in this area because significant 
variations exist in the methods and approaches employed by different legal 
systems.
422
 Some countries employ a property-based system, others a value-
based system, and a number opt to combine the two. The first method allows 
for the confiscation of property found to be proceeds or instrumentalities used 
for the commission of crime. The second method allows the determination of 
the value of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime and the confiscation of an 
equivalent value.
423
 The Palermo Convention attempts to achieve some 
integration and promote a global approach by devoting three articles (articles 
12-14) to this issue.
424
 
 
Article 12 
Article 12 requires States to adopt measures, to the greatest extent possible 
within their legal systems, which may be necessary to enable the confiscation 
of proceeds of crime derived from offences covered by the convention or 
property that corresponds to the value of the proceeds.
425
 Furthermore States 
must also adopt measures that enable the confiscation of property, equipment 
or other instrumentalities used in, or destined for use in offences, covered by 
the convention.
426
 The legislative guide supplementing the Palermo 
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Convention indicates that the phrase, “to the greatest extent possible within 
their domestic legal systems”, is intended to reflect the variations in the way 
that different legal systems carry out their obligations under this convention.
427
 
While acknowledging the diverse methods States choose, to deal with these 
obligations, it is expected they will comply with the intent and ‗essence‘ of the 
provisions of the article.
428
 
 
Article 12(6) also requires that State Parties empower their national courts or 
relevant authorities to order bank, financial or commercial records be made 
available or be seized.
429
 Furthermore, this article expressly forbids the use of 
‗bank secrecy‘ as a reason for States failing to fulfil this provision. This 
provision reflects the importance of financial institutions in the money 
laundering process and also how vital cooperation between them and the 
authorities is in tracing criminal‘s illegal gains. 
 
Article 13 
Article 13 deals with procedures relating to international cooperation for the 
purposes of confiscation, reflecting the need to address the transnational nature 
of organised crime, where criminals often seek to hide illegal proceeds 
overseas. The article requires that State parties; receiving a request from 
another State party, regarding confiscation matters, must take steps to identify, 
trace, and freeze or seize proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other 
instrumentalities referred to in article 12(1), situated in the territory of the 
requested State Party, for the purpose of eventual confiscation.
430
 Article 13(3) 
outlines practical matters relating to the form in which requests are to take and 
the substance contained within them. For instance, Article13(3)(a) details that a 
request should include a description of the property to be confiscated and a 
summary of the facts the requesting State party is relying on, to make such an 
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order. This article also outlines the manner in which requests should be drafted, 
submitted and executed by the State parties involved.
431
 
 
Article 14 
Article 14 focuses on the disposal of confiscated crime proceeds. Paragraph 2 
provides that requested State parties, when determining how to dispose of 
confiscated proceeds, shall give priority to the requesting State party. There is a 
desire that the confiscated assets should be returned to the requesting State so 
compensation may be given to the victims of the crime or to return the property 
or proceeds of crime to their legitimate owners. However, Article 14(3) also 
encourages States to consider concluding an agreement whereby proceeds may 
be contributed to the United Nations to fund technical assistance activities 
under the Palermo Convention, or an arrangement to share the proceeds with 
other States parties that have assisted in their confiscation.
432
 
Obstruction of Justice 
Article 23 of the Palermo Convention obliges State Parties to create two 
criminal offences relating to the obstruction of justice. Firstly, States must 
establish as a criminal offence; the use of physical force, threats, intimidation, 
or the giving of undue advantage to induce false testimony, or to interfere in 
the giving of testimony, or the production of evidence in a proceeding relating 
to offences established under the convention.
433
 Secondly, States are required 
to criminalise interference with the exercise of duties by justice or law 
enforcement officials.
434
 
 
The aim of the first offence is to deter efforts to influence potential witnesses. 
Thus the article addresses both coercive measures (threats, physical force) and 
corruptive measures (bribes).
435
 The second offence only includes coercive 
measures because, as public officials, justice and law enforcement officials are 
                                                 
431
 Supra n. 385 at 143. 
432
 Ibid. 
433
 Article 23(a). 
434
 Article 23(b). 
435
 Supra n. 385 at 92. 
78 
 
included under article 8 relating to corruption.
436
 In addition to criminalising 
efforts to obstruct justice, article 24 requires that States take appropriate 
measures to ensure the protection of witnesses.  
 
Promoting International Cooperation 
The Palermo Convention seeks to promote cooperation, amongst State Parties, 
primarily by provisions relating to extradition, mutual legal assistance and law-
enforcement cooperation.
437
  
 
Extradition  
Article 16 of the Palermo Convention relates to extradition. The main 
obligations for State Parties under this article are to ensure that the following 
offences are deemed extraditable offences in any extradition treaties signed 
between States
438
; 
- Offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of the 
convention, that are transnational in nature and involve an organised 
criminal group.  
- The article may also apply to other serious crime not covered by this 
article; when the offence is transnational in nature and involves an 
organised criminal group
439
 
- Offences established in accordance with Articles 5, 6, 8 and 23; that 
involve an organised criminal group, or serious crime that involves an 
organised criminal group, where the person who is to be extradited is 
located in the territory of the requested State. 
 
State Parties employing a general statutory extradition scheme must ensure that 
the offences described above are included as extraditable offences under such a 
scheme. 
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The principle of dual criminality applies regarding extradition under this 
article. This requirement should be automatically fulfilled, amongst Parties to 
the Palermo Convention, in respect to offences established under articles 6, 8 
and 23. However, in respect of offences under article 5 or to serious crime, 
where States are not required to criminalise the same conduct, there is no 
obligation to extradite, unless the dual criminality requirement is fulfilled.
440
 
Apart from the obligations outlined above, most of the particulars of 
extradition are essentially left to national legislation, or treaties, that currently 
exist or that are to be concluded between States.
441
 Article 16 does outline 
some expectations, even if they are not all considered mandatory. For instance, 
article 16(10) obliges State Parties, which deny an extradition request solely 
because the person in question is a national of that country, to submit the case 
for domestic prosecution. The States involved must cooperate with one another 
to ensure the efficiency of such a prosecution. Other notable obligations or 
expectations for State Parties include; not refusing a request solely because it 
includes fiscal matters,
442
 endeavouring to expedite extradition proceedings 
and simplifying evidentiary requirements.
443
  
 
Furthermore, States should consult with a requesting party before refusing a 
request, therefore, enabling the requesting party to present further information 
or views on the matter.
444
 States who require a treaty basis for extradition may 
use the Palermo Convention as that basis, when receiving a request from 
another State with whom they have no prior treaty.
445
 Finally article 16(17) 
encourages States to conclude further bilateral or multilateral agreements, to 
enhance the effectiveness of extradition. 
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Mutual Legal Assistance 
The Palermo Convention contains detailed provisions relating to mutual legal 
assistance, prompting some to label it as a ‗treaty within a treaty‘.446 Article 18 
seeks to promote extensive and effective mutual assistance between States, as 
can be seen in the first paragraph, where States are explicitly obliged to provide 
one another „the widest measure of legal assistance‟ in investigations, 
prosecutions and judicial proceedings relating to offences provided under 
article 3 of the Palermo Convention.
447
 Article 18(2) also provides that MLA 
shall be provided to the fullest extent possible in relation to offences where a 
legal person may be held liable.  
 
If a countries current Mutual Assistance laws and treaties are not broad 
enough, to meet the requirements of article 18(1) or (2), then they may need to 
amend their legislation.
448
 Article 3 requires that the offences be transnational 
and involve an organised criminal group. Article 18 sets a low evidentiary 
standard for achieving this purpose. For instance, the mere fact that victims, 
witnesses, proceeds, instrumentalities or evidence of offences under the 
Convention are located in another State shall constitute in itself sufficient 
prima facie grounds that the offence is transnational.
449
  
 
Article 18(3) provides that mutual legal assistance may be requested for any of 
the following reasons: 
(a) Taking evidence or statements from persons; 
(b) Effecting service of judicial documents; 
(c) Executing searches and seizures, and freezing; 
(d) Examining objects and sites; 
(e) Providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations; 
(f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and 
records, including government, bank, financial, corporate or business records; 
(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities or 
other things for evidentiary purposes; 
(h) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting 
State Party; 
(i) Any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law 
of the requested State Party. 
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Furthermore, Article 18 requires that States designate a central authority to 
handle and make requests
450
 and also outlines in detail practical and procedural 
aspects for making a request to ensure the process is streamlined and 
expedient.
451
 Article 18(8) and (22) explicitly forbid States from denying 
requests solely on the basis of bank secrecy or requests they consider involve 
fiscal matters. 
 
Article 18 of the Palermo Convention also seeks to introduce some innovative 
provisions, although not mandatory, in order to facilitate the hearing of witness 
or expert evidence. For instance Article 18(18) provides that where ever 
possible and when it is not desirable for a witness or expert to travel to the 
requesting State, then the first State party may at the request of the other State 
permit the hearing to take place via video conference. Article 18(24) 
encourages States to fulfil requests promptly and take into account, where 
possible, any deadlines suggested by the requesting State. However Article 
18(25) allows States to postpone responding to a request when such a request 
may interfere with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or judicial 
proceeding.  
Law enforcement cooperation 
Article 19 provides a some what token mention of the possibility of joint 
investigations. Under this article State Parties are encouraged to consider 
concluding bilateral, or multilateral, arrangements in relations to investigations, 
prosecutions or judicial proceedings in one or more States. If no such 
agreement exists then States are required to consider making agreements on a 
case by case basis. There is a clear tension in this article between the desire of 
States to protect their sovereignty and the knowledge that comprehensive 
cooperation is needed to conduct effective transnational investigations. 
 
Article 27 contains a mandatory provision that States must strive to cooperate 
closely with one another to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement 
action against offences covered by the Palermo Convention. This provision is 
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tempered by the acknowledgment that States are required only to cooperate 
when consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative 
systems. This has the effect of allowing States to refuse cooperation, or provide 
conditions, when they believe providing such cooperation would not be 
consistent with their domestic requirements.
452
 However, the legislative guide 
accompanying the Palermo Convention makes it clear that apart from this 
general limitation State Parties must strive to 
... strengthen the channels of communication among their respective law enforcement 
authorities; undertake specific forms of cooperation in order to obtain information 
about persons, the movements of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime provide to 
each other items or quantities of substances for purposes of analysis or other 
investigative purposes; promote exchanges of personnel including the posting of 
liaison officers; exchange information on a variety of means and methods used by 
organized criminal groups; and conduct other cooperation for purposes of facilitating 
early identification of offences.
453
 
 
 
Article 23 also contains some completely optional provisions providing for the 
possibility that States enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements on direct 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies or alternatively use the 
Palermo Convention as the basis for such mutual law enforcement 
cooperation.
454
 Finally, Article 23 asks meekly that States endeavour to 
cooperate with one another on the issue of TNOC committed via the use of 
modern technology.
455
 
 
Prevention 
Article 31 of the Palermo Convention encourages States to develop national 
projects, best practices and policies aimed at aiding in the prevention of 
organised crime activity and to dissuade people from joining criminal groups. 
Furthermore, the article encourages States to raise public awareness regarding 
organised crime. Organised criminal activities such as money laundering will 
often bring major criminals into direct contact with legitimate financial and 
banking markets, and with professionals such as accountants and lawyers, who 
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may or may not know they are facilitating crime.
456
 Therefore increasing public 
awareness of organised crime will decrease the possibility that members of the 
public or legitimate institutions unwittingly become facilitators of serious 
organised crime. 
 
State Parties ratifying the Palermo Convention must commit themselves as 
much as possible to prevent organised crime by, for example, strengthening 
relationships between law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, relevant private 
entities including industry and also to promote codes of conduct for relevant 
professionals such as lawyers and accountants.
457
 The article also encourages 
States to take measures preventing organised criminal groups from 
manipulating bidding procedures for private contracts, public subsidies and 
licences for commercial activity.
458
 The convention provides only weakly 
worded suggestions for non-traditional preventive measures and contains no 
mandatory provisions. This reflects the fact that the Palermo Convention is 
primarily focused on traditional repressive measures to combat organised 
crime, rather than community based, or other non-traditional, crime prevention 
measures. 
 
3.6 Confronting Corruption 
Close connections exist between corruption and TNOC. Organised crime is 
often facilitated by corruption and the successes of TNOC operations are 
deeply dependent on corruption among customs and migration officials.
 459
 The 
World Bank has estimated that up to $US1 Trillion is paid in bribes each year 
around the world, and with strong links existing between corruption and TNOC 
it can be assumed a great portion of that is linked to facilitating organised 
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criminal activity.
460
 Therefore strong measures to combat corruption in its 
various forms are a necessary aid in the overall fight against TNOC.  
 
Corruption not only facilitates crime by aiding illegal markets such as illegal 
immigration, human trafficking and arms trafficking, but it can also have the 
further effect of undermining the stability of governments as the public lose 
confidence in their leader‘s ability to govern justly especially when corruption 
extends to high levels of public office.
461
 Moreover, corruption can jeopardise 
inter-State relations and act as a discouragement to foreign investment 
therefore hampering the economic and social advancement of countries who 
suffer from endemic corruption.
462
 This section will discuss the measures 
outlined firstly; in the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime and secondly; in the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. 
 
3.6.1 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime 
Article 8 of the Palermo Convention requires States to make corruption a 
criminal offence. Primarily this consists of criminalising the act of bribing 
public officials (active corruption) and criminalising the acceptance of such 
bribes by public officials (passive corruption).
463
 States are also required to 
consider adopting legislative measures to make the conduct mentioned above a 
domestic offence even when it involves foreign officials.
464
 Furthermore States 
should also adopt measures to establish as a criminal offence participation or 
acting as an accomplice to the offences outlined above. 
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Article 9 outlines further mandatory measures that States should take against 
corruption. These include adopting legislative or other relevant measures to 
promote integrity of public officials; prevent, detect and punish corruption of 
public officials; and to ensure effective action by officials.
465
 Finally, each 
State Party is required to provide anti-corruption officials with sufficient 
independence so as to deter the application of undue influence on their 
actions;
466
 in other words to shield anti-corruption officials from being 
corrupted.   
 
3.6.2 United Nations Convention against Corruption 
In January 2001 the United Nations General-Assembly Resolution 55/61 
determined that a Convention independent of the Palermo Convention was 
required to effectively meet the challenges posed by corruption in its various 
forms.
467
 Work was then undertaken to create a comprehensive convention 
dealing specifically with corruption resulting in the 2003 General Assembly 
Resolution 58/4 adopting the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(Corruption Convention). The perception created by Kofi Annan, in the 
conventions foreword, is that it will provide States with an effective legal 
framework, which used in tandem with the Palermo Convention, will enhance 
the international community‘s ability to deal with TNOC. 
 
The Corruption Convention is structured into chapters dealing with prevention, 
criminalisation, international cooperation and asset recovery. It also contains 
provisions relating to law enforcement and jurisdiction.
468
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Criminalisation 
Many of the substantive criminalisation parts of the Corruption Convention are 
identical to those in the Palermo Convention. For instance Article 15 of the 
Corruption Convention uses identical language to Article 8(1) of the Palermo 
Convention. However there are number of important differences
469
 notably; 
Article 16 requires State Parties to make domestic criminalisation of bribery of 
a foreign official mandatory, where it was optional under the Palermo 
Convention. Furthermore, the Corruption Convention employs a broader 
definition of ‗public official‘ than the Palermo Convention expanding the scope 
of who can be held accountable for corrupt activities.
470
 
 
The Corruption Convention also includes mandatory provisions requiring 
States implement specific criminal offences relating to; the embezzlement, 
misappropriation, diversion, by a public official, of any funds or things of 
value entrusted to them
471
; laundering proceeds of crime
472
; and obstruction of 
justice
473
. Article 27 contains a mandatory requirement that States criminalise 
participation in any capacity such as an accomplice, assistant or instigator in an 
offence established in accordance with the Convention.
474
 
 
The Corruption Convention also includes a number of optional criminalisation 
provisions, that States are encouraged to consider implementing,
475
 including 
provisions relating to corruption in the private sector. 
 
Prevention 
The Corruption Convention contains a number provisions aimed at fostering an 
environment that minimises opportunities for corruption and seeks to 
encourage integrity and transparency; promote strong and legitimate normative 
guidance and integrate the efforts of the public sector, the private sector and 
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civil society together.
476
 The convention devotes an entire chapter to 
prevention measures; article 5 firstly outlines the aims of prevention and the 
means to attaining them.
477
 The remainder of the articles in the chapter 
illustrate how those general principles can be applied in accordance with the 
fundamental legal principles of the State Parties.
478
 
 
3.7 Implementation and monitoring mechanisms for the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
 
Article 32 of the Palermo Convention provides for the creation of a Conference 
of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (COTP). Its purpose is to improve the capacity of State 
Parties to combat TNOC and to promote and review the implementation of this 
Convention.
479
 Among the roles outlined for this supervisory body are; 
mobilising voluntary donations for funding, facilitating the exchange of 
information among State Parties on patterns and trends in TNOC and on 
successful practices in combating it. The COTP also has the important role of 
periodically reviewing the implementation of the convention.
480
 Since its 
formation the COTP has undertaken four regular review sessions in 2004, 
2005, 2006 and, most recently, in 2008.
481
  
 
The COTP monitors the implementation of the Palermo Convention and its 
protocols by delivering questionnaires and checklists to States Parties in order 
to canvas the level and scope of implementation and to determine any problems 
States may have encountered in implementing the conventions provisions. The 
information returned by States is then consolidated into a report 
(Implementation Report) that outlines the level of implementation, problems 
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encountered and recommendations for the future. The 2008 Implementation 
Report
482
 is divided into two cycles based on the feedback of States to the 
checklist and questionnaires. The first cycle contains a consolidated report 
relating to criminalisation requirements, international cooperation 
requirements, difficulties reported and technical assistance needs.
483
 The 
second cycle contains a report relating to measures to combat money 
laundering, the investigation of TNOC, measures related to the protection of 
witnesses and victims and finally measures to prevent TNOC.
484
 Of the 140 
States that have signed up to the Palermo Convention, 107 responded with 
answers to the checklist and questionnaire.
485
  
 
Criminalisation 
Almost all responding States have fulfilled their obligations (under article 5) to 
criminalise participation in an organised criminal group.
486
 Most have 
criminalised the laundering of proceeds of crime (under article 6) and 
furthermore almost all States indicated that all the offences covered by the 
Convention were under their domestic law predicate offences to money-
laundering;
487
 likewise most States reported that their domestic legislation 
allowed for confiscation and seizure required under article 12.
488
 All reporting 
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States, with the exception of three, reported that their domestic legislation 
criminalised active and passive bribery of public officials (in accordance with 
article 8) as well as acting as an accomplice in bribery offences.
489
 Finally most 
States reported that obstruction of justice was at least to some extent 
criminalised under their domestic legislation.
490
 
 
Measures to combat money laundering 
The vast majority of reporting States have fulfilled their obligations, under the 
article 7, to institute a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for the 
deterrence and detection of all forms of money-laundering.
491
 The report 
indicates that compliance amongst States under the Convention to establish a 
comprehensive regime against money-laundering is quite advanced. The report 
illustrates that most of the minimum measures required are in place and the 
level of awareness and knowledge on the area is steadily growing.
492
 The 
report suggests that this high standard is due to many States having obligations 
under a number of conventions, notably the Palermo Convention and relevant 
instruments against terrorist financing.
493
 
 
Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance 
Only two reporting States, Honduras and Myanmar, reported extensive 
restrictions relating to the provision of extradition.
494
 Most States made 
extradition conditional on the principle of dual criminality and 50 States further 
indicated they would not extradite their own nationals due to constitutional or 
other reasons.
495
 However, all of those States who refuse to extradite their own 
nationals, except Honduras, indicated they were able to establish jurisdiction 
over offences committed by their national abroad, in accordance with article 
16(10), and could therefore, submit the case to their own relevant authorities 
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for the purpose of prosecution.
496
 47 responding States also indicated that 
extradition was subject to evidentiary requirements. These requirements were 
often considered burdensome particularly when civil law countries seek 
assistance from common law countries; States are therefore encouraged to 
further simplify their evidentiary requirements.
497
 
 
In regards to Article 18 on mutual legal assistance; all but 11 States responded 
that they would be able to implement the provisions of Article 18(9)-(29). 
Those 11 States who were not able to fulfil their obligations under this article 
must take appropriate measures to do so, as the convention is mandatory on 
this point.
498
 The vast majority of States indicated they have domestic 
legislation allowing for the provision of mutual assistance and all but one 
indicated they were parties to bilateral and multilateral treaties on mutual legal 
assistance. Furthermore, many also indicated that reciprocity or comity was a 
basis on which mutual legal assistance could be granted.
499
 Most States 
responded that they were able to provide all the types of assistances outlined in 
article 18(3), although it should be noted again that this list is a minimum 
standard. In addition many States also indicated they were in a position to 
allow evidence to be heard via video conference (a less traditional method 
outlined in Article 18(8)) in circumstances where the requested person could 
not be present in the requesting State.
500
 
 
In relation to Article 18(15), which outlines the minimum information 
requirements to be included in a request for assistance, most States reported 
that minimum information requirements included the identification of the 
authority requesting assistance, the type and nature of the assistance requested, 
the description and legal classification of the relevant facts, as well as the 
purpose of the assistance sought in conjunction with the subject and nature of 
the proceedings in the requesting State to which the request related. Some 
States also referred to confidentiality assurances and time limits for the 
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provision of assistance.
501
 Moreover, many States emphasised that the 
requirement for any additional information to be included in a MLA request 
was dependent on the type of assistance sought.
502
 Most responding States have 
also fulfilled their obligation to exclude bank secrecy as a ground for refusing a 
request for MLA.
503
 
Law enforcement cooperation 
In accordance with article 27 virtually all States responded that channels of 
cross-border communication, coordination and cooperation were available to 
and routinely used by their law enforcement agencies. Many also indicated that 
cooperation between law enforcement authorities was formalised through 
bilateral or regional agreements, providing for the exchange of information on 
offences, offenders and proceeds of crime.
504
  
 
The report indicates that many national law enforcement authorities take 
advantage of services offered by INTERPOL, and its national central bureaux, 
to exchange information and cooperate with foreign authorities beyond 
bilateral and regional networks. In particular, many of the respondents 
highlighted INTERPOLs ‗I-24/7‘ system of police communications as a mode 
for sharing information on offenders and transnational criminality.
505
 
Moreover, the report indicates that many responding States have entered into 
agreements to allow the use of joint investigative teams to address cases of 
TNOC. This may be provided for through bilateral and multilateral treaties or 
on a case-by-case basis.
506
 However, the extent of such agreements varied 
amongst States, with some having only concluded agreements with 
neighbouring countries and other States not allowing for the possibility of ad 
hoc joint investigation teams where a treaty did not exist.
507
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Chapter Four 
 Case studies 
 
 
4.1 United States of America 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2 the United State‘s historical perception of, and 
reactions to, organised crime has immensely impacted on responses to 
organised crime around the world. This case study will show that the US 
perception of organised crime has changed little from the traditional, outsider 
conspiracy, inspired perception. The mafia inspired perception has been the 
premise for the creation of The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, the main legislative tool used to combat organised crime. 
This erroneous conception of organised crime has led to confusion in the US 
Courts and created the impetus for an intense, but ultimately misguided, 
response by US law enforcement, in their efforts to combat organised crime 
both domestically and trans-nationally.  
 
4.1.1  Failure to adopt a modern conception of organised crime 
The traditional view of organised crime, which was propagated by the US, has 
attracted criticism for its failure to reflect the reality of modern organised crime 
and transnational organised crime.
508
 However, the US perception toward 
organised crime has changed very little and continues to regard organised 
crime as an outsider conspiracy consisting, predominantly, of large structured 
mafia style organised groups. William Geary laments the lack of substantial 
change in the US position since the original mafia model was conceived, in the 
1950s, in his paper “The legislative recreation of RICO: Reinforcing the 
“myth” of Organized crime”:509 
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Rhetorically, even though the government‘s view of organized crime has backed away 
from an orthodox Mafia view, remnants of the past remain. Recent hearings reflect the 
government‘s emphasis on sub-cultural traits and the Mafia as a standard.510 
 
In substance very little has changed. The US government pays some lip service 
to recent findings, regarding organised crime, but has taken no meaningful 
steps to implement any change in its policies or strategy to combat organised 
crime. 
 
A recent congressional research paper, discussing organised crime trends in the 
United States, illustrates Geary‘s claim. The section on definition firstly 
acknowledges that; modern organised criminal groups do not tend to exhibit 
the characteristics of traditional organised criminal groups, such as the Italian 
Mafia.
511
 However, the paper continue to propagate a list of essential 
characteristics, relating to organised crime groups, that are based on traditional 
conceptions. They are perceived as highly structured, having a restricted 
membership and continuity beyond the life time of individual members.
512
 
These perceived characteristics may be true in some cases but they certainly 
are not an accurate representative of all modern organised criminal groups. 
More of this confusion can be seen in the main legal tools used to combat 
organised crime. 
 
4.1.2 Legal Tools to Combat Organised Crime in the US 
The leading
513
 US statutory definition of organised crime is found in the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Crime Control Act).
514
  
The unlawful activities of the members of a highly organized, disciplined association 
engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, 
prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful activities 
of members of such organizations. 
 
This definition comes from a time in history, when the Mafia was thought to 
dominate practically all organised crime activity, therefore, it is clearly not 
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suitable to encompass modern, more loosely organised, episodic criminal 
activity. However, the Crime Control Act is not the preeminent legal tool used 
to fight organised crime. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO) created within the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-
452) is the dominant statutory tool, used, to combat organised crime. RICO 
does not explicitly define organised crime but rather describes it in terms of 
illegal enterprises, involved in a pattern of racketeering activity.
515
  
 
4.1.3 RICO 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
516
 better known 
simply as RICO, is considered the most important piece of organised crime 
legislation created in the US.
517
 Since being enacted in 1970 it has become one 
of the most dominant tools, used to combat and prosecute organised criminal 
groups in the US.
518
 RICO was designed to have a broad application that 
extends beyond organised crime. Congress directed that RICO should, “be 
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes”.519 In addition the 
Supreme Court has held that the application of RICO is not limited to 
organised crime but may also be applied to legitimate businesses.
520
 However, 
the primary purpose, Congress intended for RICO, was to implement a piece of 
legislation effective in combating organised crime.
521
 During the first decade of 
its existence, RICO lay relatively dormant and was little used. However the 
1980s-1990s saw a massive increase in the use of RICO, for both public and 
private litigants.
522
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Offences under RICO 
Section 1962 of RICO outlines those activities that are to be considered 
unlawful under the Act, including conspiracy to commit or participate in such 
activities: 
i) Prohibiting any person
523
 from using income derived from a pattern 
of racketeering activity or from the collection of an unlawful debt to 
acquire an interest in an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce;
524
  
ii) Prohibiting any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
through collection of unlawful debt, acquiring or maintaining an 
interest in or control of any enterprise which affects interstate or foreign 
commerce;
525
  
iii) Prohibiting any person from conducting or participating in the 
conduct of the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of 
unlawful debt;
526
  
iv) Section 1962(d) also prohibits any person from conspiring to violate 
any of the subsections outlined in the section.  
 
Penalties prescribed by RICO 
Section 1963 on criminal penalties states that; whoever violates the provisions 
under section 1962 can face fines or, imprisonment not exceeding 20 years.
527
 
Furthermore, this section provides that any interest, property, or proceeds the 
person has acquired, or maintained, in violation of section 1962 will be 
forfeited.
528
 Congress amended RICO in 1985, and again in 1986, to enhance 
the government‘s ability to seize assets obtained through racketeering activity. 
These amendments provided the government with additional powers to seek 
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pre-indictment restraining orders.
529
 Section 1963(d) of RICO contains a 
feature which allows the court, prior to any conviction, to enter a restraining 
order, injunction, or other action, to ensure the availability of the property for 
forfeiture. In addition to criminal liability under section 1963 the government 
may bring a civil action to obtain equitable relief and recover damages against 
the offender under section 1964.
530
 Furthermore, private parties injured in their 
property or business by reason of a violation under section 1962 may also bring 
a civil action.
531
 They are entitled to recover threefold the damages they may 
have sustained and the cost of the law suit including attorney fees.
532
 
 
Criminal enterprise and racketeering activity 
RICO itself, although enacted to combat organised crime, does not contain any 
definition of organised crime. It focuses instead on individuals or enterprises, 
involved in a pattern of racketeering activity.  RICO provides for the 
prosecution of anyone who participates or conspires to participate in a criminal 
‗enterprise‘533 through a ‗pattern of racketeering activity.534 These two terms 
were intended to provide guidance as to what an organised criminal group is 
and what such a group does.
535
 It must be recalled that when RICO was 
created, in 1970, organised crime was viewed in the traditional sense.
536
 Thus 
RICO was originally intended to provide an effective tool to combat highly 
structured, mafia type, criminal groups.
537
 
 
Racketeering activity within RICO consists of “no more and no less than 
commission of a predicate act.”538  The predicate acts are outlined in section 
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1961(1) of RICO. Section 1961(5) defines a ‗pattern of racketeering activity‘ 
as requiring at least two acts of racketeering activity within a ten year period.
539
 
Initially this seems like a very broad definition of ‗pattern‘, however, it is clear 
in a 1969 Senate Report that the intention of RICO is not to target ‗sporadic 
activity‘.540 In fact the sponsor of the Senate bill, Senator McClellan, stated 
that the term pattern in itself requires “the showing of a relationship” and thus 
proof of two acts of racketeering without more would not be sufficient to 
establish a ‗pattern‘.541 Congress was more specific when it sought to define 
‗pattern‘ in a later provision of the same bill.542   
"[Criminal] conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or 
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or 
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 
 
It is this reading of ‗pattern‘, one that incorporates many elements of the 
traditional view of organised crime, which the Supreme Court in Sedima, 
S.P.R.L v. Imex Co follows. Another leading Supreme Court case H.J. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
543
 Confirms, and further clarifies, this 
interpretation of a pattern of racketeering activity. Brennan J stated that: 
To establish a RICO pattern it must also be shown that the predicates themselves 
amount to, or that they otherwise constitute a threat of, continuing racketeering 
activity.
544
 
 
He went on to say: 
A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by 
proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time. 
Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future 
criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement: Congress was concerned in RICO 
with long term criminal conduct.
545
 
 
The case also went on to discuss whether RICO racketeering activity should 
include only activities that have a clear connection to ‗organised crime‘. In 
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making reference to organised crime the court seems to be viewing it in the 
traditional sense, as outlined in Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968.
546
 The court held it would be counterproductive, and a misrepresentation 
of congressional intent, to adopt a narrow construction of the statute's ‗pattern 
element‘, if it required proof of an organised crime connection.547  
Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, 
although it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to 
organized crime.
548
 
 
The Court felt that Congress had drafted RICO broadly to:  
...encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many different forms and likely 
to attract a broad array of perpetrators, operating in many different ways.
549
  
 
 
Although there is no exact consensus amongst the US Court circuits, many 
leading cases interpret RICOs pattern of racketeering activity to require at a 
minimum: 
- Proof of a relationship between the predicate acts and; 
- Continuity of those acts over an extended period of time 
These two requirements have been referred to as the ‗continuity plus 
relationship test‘ now widely applied by the US court circuits albeit with some 
varying conclusions.
550
 In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co, where 
the test was first formulated,  it was held that continuity may be sufficiently 
established where the defendant is operating as part of a long-term association 
that exists for criminal purposes.
551
 However, it has been argued that Congress 
did not intend RICO to be limited, in its scope, to only criminal groups or 
associations, but rather it should be more widely applied to even target 
individuals working alone.
552
  
 
Likewise, ‗enterprise‘ has also been broadly interpreted by the Courts.  Section 
1961(4) of RICO defines an ‗enterprise‘ as;  
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...any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 
 
The US Court circuits are yet to come to a uniformed definition of ‗enterprise‘, 
although one common element they generally require is some form of 
organisational structure. However, a wide array of groups; large and small, 
highly structured and loosely structured, have been deemed to fit the definition 
of ‗enterprise‘ under the RICO statute.   
 
For instance, the decision of United States v. Turkette
553
 deemed an ‗enterprise‘ 
to include legitimate and illegitimate, as well as, formal and informal 
organisations.
554
 The case of Bach v. Bear, Stearns and Co.
555
 sought to clarify, 
and narrow, the definition by stating that an enterprise must ―be an 
organisation with a structure and goals separate from the predicate acts 
themselves”.556 A RICO enterprise has also been held to mean:  
...an ongoing 'structure' of persons associated through time, joined in purpose, and 
organized in a manner amenable to hierarchical or consensual decision-making.
557
  
 
When applied to a criminal group this would seem applicable to organised 
criminal groups in the traditional sense. However, the case of United States v. 
Rogers
558
 held that: 
...the continuity of an informal enterprise and the differentiation among roles can 
provide the requisite 'structure' to prove the elements of 'enterprise‘.559  
 
In an even more liberal interpretation of RICO the case of United States v. 
Swiderski
560
 held that a “shifting definition of enterprise” was “necessary in 
view of the fluid nature of criminal associations”. This is an apparent 
acknowledgement that a strict interpretation of RICO would result in many 
criminal associations passing below the threshold of ‗organisation‘. 
 
In light of the original intent of RICO, it is simply fortuitous that the 
interpretation of RICO, by some Courts, has allowed it to be used against 
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various forms of organised criminal groups. Some courts have encompassed 
the very structured, to more loosely organised groups. However, many 
prosecutors have found it difficult to use RICO against ‗street gangs‘, some of 
whom exhibit all the characteristics of a transnational organised criminal group 
under other definitions, such as the UN definition found in the Palermo 
Convention.
561
 In the same paragraph of a Congressional Research Service 
Report, titled Emerging Transnational Gang Threats, the author describes how 
RICO has been instrumental in hampering, and dismantling organised criminal 
enterprises, but, very ineffective in combating organised street gangs, some of 
whom have established bases in a number of South American countries.
562
 
Because these ‗gangs‘ do not fit neatly into the traditional view of organised 
crime prosecutors find it difficult to develop a RICO case against them.
563
 
Debate concerning RICO’s application 
The broad interpretation given to RICO in some US Court circuits has attracted 
criticism from many of RICOs original sponsors. In 1985 Congress held 
hearings to debate some potential major changes to RICO, with the primary 
issue being ‗how is RICO being used‘.564 Chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Strom Thurmond began the proceedings by stating that: 
Regrettably, the improvements contained in the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act 
have seemingly proven insufficient to stem the rising tide of organized crime 
activities.
565
 
 
The rhetoric employed by Thurmond and others goes on to mirror that of 1969, 
when RICO was first being considered. At that time RICO was considered 
necessary to provide an effective tool to combat (mafia type) organised crime.  
The 1985 hearing focused on a perceived insufficiency of RICO due to, 
amongst other factors, organised crime adapting and apparently becoming 
more organised than current legislation and law enforcement. Compounding 
the problem, it now involved new types of organised crime such as 
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‗oriental‘.566 The irony is that, in 1969, it was argued a new law was needed to 
effectively combat organised crime (the result being RICO) while on the 1985 
occasion Thurmond is now arguing for limitations on RICO to better focus on 
‗organised crime‘.567 
 
Another to testify, in 1985, was Roman Hruska one of those who founded 
RICO.
568
 It was his belief: 
. . . that in the past several years we have seen a distortion and an unintended 
application of RICO provisions in ways that have produced harmful results... it was 
not my intention that the civil sanctions contained in Title IX serve as a vehicle to 
engage in the type and extent of use to which many efforts are directed. My bills, and 
their successors, were directed at organized crime. They were not intended to be a 
vehicle to charge legitimate businessmen with organized crime activities.
569
 
 
What ‗legitimate‘ businessmen might be in danger of being targeted by RICO, 
he does not clarify. Furthermore, he contends that the courts have used RICO 
to target criminals far outside its original intent.
570
 He makes this contention 
due to his distorted perception of what ‗organised crime‘ is: 
It is an elaborate hierarchy – a body of persons organized and classified according to 
rank, capacity, and authority. It operates as an invisible form of government; 
dictatorial, tyrannical, oppressive. Edicts of the rulers, even the slightest order, are 
carried out dutifully, scrupulously, and mercilessly by the lesser members. Disloyalty, 
disobedience, and even inefficiency in performance mean summary imposition of 
sanctions without benefit of hearing or trial. Punishment runs the gamut of beatings, 
torture, deprivation of property, and often capital punishment in gangland style. . . It is 
contemptuous of the rules of conduct and even of standards of human decency which 
our Nation has evolved through the ages through our democratic, constitutional 
structure. It exploits and despoils our institutions wantonly – institutions which have 
been developed through the generations of our Nation to form a civilization worthy of 
human aspiration.
571
 
 
It is this perception that compels Hruska, and those with a like-mind, to 
contend that legislation designed to combat organised crime should not be used 
against ‗legitimate businessmen‘ or other such people, even when they have 
committed serious offences, because they do not fit into this mythical category 
of organised crime. This mind-set also allows well organised ‗street gangs‘ to 
fall outside the scope of legislation, aimed at combating ‗organised crime‘, 
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despite the clear harm they are inflicting on society. Dwight Smith claims this 
approach is reflective of a “preoccupation with people (who) called organized 
crime rather than events (what) called organized crime”.572 Therefore, those 
trying to reinforce their belief of organised crime as ethnically defined 
outsiders, involved in a highly structured criminal conspiracy, seek to limit 
legislation (in this case RICO) to cover only certain types of people and 
activities, with the purpose of excluding individuals, or groups, who do not fit 
into the traditional ideology of organised crime.
573
  
 
The distorted perceptions of organised crime, in the US, are further highlighted 
by the fact that during the 1985 hearings, even those who argued for retaining a 
broad interpretation of RICO, did not necessarily do so on the grounds that 
they believed it can be useful to better combat modern organised crime. 
Neither did the opposing sides seriously consider, or even debate, including a 
modern definition of organised crime in RICOs provisions.
574
 In fact there was 
very little debate, or recognition that perhaps the underlying problems with 
RICO stems from the erroneous preconceptions of what organised crime is, 
amongst those in Congress.  
 
Continued Confusion in the United States 
Since RICOs inception, voting on amendments have, generally, always been 
close. Subsequently little has been done by the legislature to address the 
controversial provisions of RICO.
575
 Thus, the leading US statutory tool to 
combat organised crime remains without a clear definition of what it is meant 
to combat. Furthermore, in the best case scenario, current understanding of 
‗enterprise‘ and ‗a pattern of racketeering‘, within RICO, provide an unclear 
perception of organised crime, at worse these terms simply reinforce a false 
conception based on traditional views, that border on a myth. Because of this 
lack of definition and accurate perception of organised crime, the US courts 
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continue to interpret RICO broadly, with significantly varying conclusions in 
regards to what constitutes ‗enterprise‘ and ‗a pattern of racketeering activity‘. 
The result is a muddled conception of what organised crime is and how it 
should be approached.  
 
Efforts to combat organised crime in the US will continue to be confused, 
lacking a clear focus or direction, as long as organised crime remains 
undefined in leading legislation. Furthermore, compounding the problem, those 
in decision making positions continue to adhere to a traditional view of 
organised crime that fails to encapsulate modern realities. Until these views are 
seriously challenged, it will be impossible to achieve an accurate concept of 
organised crime, for the purpose of guiding strategies and legal tools, to 
combat it. 
4.1.4  Law Enforcement 
The same perceptions regarding organised crime, found amongst US law 
makers and policy drivers, are also found at the law enforcement level. Those 
primarily responsible for enforcing laws to combat organised crime have, 
naturally, adopted the traditional concept of organised crime as the central 
focus in their strategy to combat organised crime. 
 
Together, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the US Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) lead and coordinate a number of agencies, in 
investigating organised crime and transnational crime.
576
 The Organized Crime 
and Racketeering Section (OCRS) is responsible for coordinating DOJ 
programs, to combat organised crime.
577
 The principal enforcement efforts are 
currently directed against a number of ethnically defined ‗outsider groups‘, 
including “traditional groups” such as Italian La Cosa Nostra families; 
emerging groups from Asia and Europe, such as Chinese Triads, the Sicilian 
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Mafia, and Russian organized crime.
578
 The OCRS provides prosecutors to the 
Crime Strike Force Units of the U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices, which supervise 
investigations and prosecutions of transnational organised criminal groups. The 
OCRS is also responsible for reviewing all proposed federal prosecutions under 
RICO, and furthermore, provides extensive advice to prosecutors about the use 
of the statute.
579
  
FBI 
The primary US agency, responsible for investigating and disrupting organised 
crime, is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
580
 The FBI continues to 
conceive and view organised crime in a traditional sense. The FBI defines 
organised crime as
581
: 
...any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary 
objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their 
position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, 
or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales, 
region, or the country as a whole. 
 
Furthermore, because RICO does not define or refer explicitly to ‗organised 
crime‘ in its provisions, the FBI must reflect RICO and employ a definition of 
‗enterprise‘ as a guide to what constitutes organised crime. 
The FBI defines a criminal enterprise as a group of individuals with an identified 
hierarchy, or comparable structure, engaged in significant criminal activity. These 
organizations often engage in multiple criminal activities and have extensive 
supporting networks.
582
 
 
This definition also employs terminology that mirrors the traditional concept of 
organised crime. Confusingly, it appears that the FBI tries to distinguish 
‗organised crime‘ from ‗criminal enterprise‘583 on the basis that RICO does not 
define organised crime but does provide a definition of ‗enterprise‘. However, 
when providing other characteristics and examples of organised criminal 
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activities, it seems that both definitions are used as a guide to illustrate the 
FBIs perceived view of organised crime.
584
 
 
Continuing with the traditional model of organised crime, the organised 
criminal threats identified by the FBI are strictly ethnically defined and the 
rhetoric employed by the FBI reflects the conspiracy view that evil outsider 
forces are seeking to corrupt, otherwise morally sound, American institutions, 
people and their communities.
585
 
...organized crime includes: 
- Russian mobsters who fled to the U.S. in the wake of the Soviet Union‘s collapse; 
- Groups from African countries like Nigeria that engage in drug trafficking and 
financial scams; 
- Chinese tongs, Japanese Boryokudan, and other Asian crime rings; and 
- Enterprises based in Eastern European nations like Hungary and Romania. 
All of these groups have a presence in the U.S. or are targeting our citizens from 
afar—using the Internet and other technologies of our global age. 
 
The FBI identifies and divides the main perceived threats from organised 
criminal groups into three ethnically based groups.   
 
i)  Italian crime ‗syndicates‘ in particular La Cosa Nostra  
ii)  Eurasian/middle eastern criminal groups 
iii) Asian and African criminal ‘enterprises‘ 
 
The branch of the FBI tasked with investigating organised crime, (The 
Transnational Criminal Enterprise Section in the Criminal Enterprise Branch of 
the Criminal Investigative Division), is subsequently divided into three 
divisions, focusing on the three ‗categories‘ of groups outlined above.586  
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US efforts to combat TNOC have seen the placement of FBI agents in more 
than 50 countries. They are responsible for training foreign law enforcement 
personnel and in return the FBI receives foreign cooperation, for the purpose of 
gathering evidence relating to instances of TNOC, particularly drug crime.
587
 
Moreover, the FBI is involved in a number of international ‗working groups‘, 
such as; the „Italian American Working Group‟, „Eurasian Organized Crime 
Working Group‟ and the „Central European Working Group‟.588 The purpose 
of these groups is to encourage closer working relationships with foreign 
counterparts. For instance, the Italian working group arrangement has provided 
for an exchange of agents between the FBI and the Italian National Police 
headquarters.
589
 Other initiatives have included setting up joint initiatives with 
other States. For instance in 2000 the FBI established a joint FBI/Hungarian 
National Police task force in Budapest to combat ‗Russian organised crime‘. 
The purpose of the task force was to counter the perceived increasing threat of 
Russian organised crime.
590
 
 
Mired in the ethnicity trap 
The DOJ, DHS and the FBI specifically define the ‗greatest‘ organised 
criminal (and by their nature transnational) threats as: Russian, Asian, Italian, 
Balkan, Middle Eastern and African crime, without stating, specifically, what 
is unique about these particular categories (other than their ethnicity). Nor do 
they provide convincing evidence to illustrate how they are a particularly ‗great 
threat‘.591 Transnational criminal groups are viewed as primarily responsible 
for modern day organised crime, overtly targeting US citizens from afar as well 
as bringing drugs into US cities and raising the level of violence in US 
communities.
592
 Therefore law enforcement resources and personnel are 
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focused on addressing these perceived threats. This approach illustrates clearly 
‗the ethnicity trap‘, where the blame for criminal problems is assigned to 
outsiders and enforcement measures are primarily directed at these ethnic 
groups. All the while authorities fail to recognise that ethnicity is but one 
contingent characteristic of organised crime.
593
 
 
4.2 United Kingdom 
 
Over the last decade the United Kingdom has undertaken a number of reforms, 
to update its response to organised criminal activity. These include the 
formation of a new organised crime agency, and reforming legislation relating 
to money laundering and the forfeiture of criminal finances. The UK legal 
system has resisted including a definition of organised crime. Subsequently 
participation in an organised criminal group has not been made illegal; rather, 
the UK relies on a ‗sectorial‘ approach, targeting separate activities related to 
organised crime rather than organised crime as a ‗whole‘. This case study, on 
the UK, will discuss and analyse the recent reforms, and highlight the ongoing 
debate over participation offences.  
 
4.2.1 Perceptions of organised crime in the UK 
Like most western countries the United Kingdom views transnational 
organised criminal activity as an ever increasing threat, which undermines 
legitimate institutions, and causes immense harm to society.
594
 In light of this 
perceived rising threat the UK began; to review, in the early 2000s, its ability 
to combat TNOC, and develop new approaches, to better attack modern 
criminal networks. In 2004 the Home Office released a White Paper titled: One 
Step Ahead: A 21
st
 Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime (Organised 
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Crime White Paper). This Paper announced and outlined a number of potential 
new innovations, including; the creation of the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency (SOCA) and new powers against organised crime, such as, 
conspiracy/participation offences, and new powers to collect evidence.  
 
The Organised Crime White Paper uses typical rhetoric, to describe the threat 
of organised crime, and reflects the tendency for countries to describe 
organised crime in terms akin to a serious national security threat:
595
 
Organised crime reaches into every community, ruining lives, driving other crime and 
instilling fear. At its worst, it can blight our most vulnerable communities driving out 
innocent residents and legitimate businesses. It manifests itself most graphically in 
drug addiction, in sexual exploitation and in gun crime. Its influence corrupts 
government and law agencies in many states world-wide which desperately need good 
and honest government as a foundation for economic prosperity, order, security and 
political liberty. 
 
 
How is Organised Crime perceived in the UK? 
The Organised Crime White Paper asks the key question: What is organised 
crime? There is an assumption that it dominates much of the criminality that 
has the most harmful impact on the UK.
596
 Thus, it is firstly described in terms 
of its activities, covering a very broad range, from ―drugs and organised 
immigration crime, through evasion of VAT and excise duties, financial and 
business fraud to intellectual property theft or counterfeiting”.597 Furthermore, 
many organised criminal groups are believed to be operating essentially as 
sophisticated businesses on a wide spectrum of ‗organisation‘; with those most 
organised and sophisticated posing the biggest threat.
598
 
 
UK authorities have sought to refine this conception of organised crime as they 
have learnt more about how criminals operate and how criminal networks 
form.
599
 In the 2006/07 United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Serious 
                                                 
595
 Home Office, ―One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime‖, 
March 2004, at 1, online at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-organised-crime-
300704/organised-crime-3007042835.pdf?view=Binary>. Retrieved 27 June 2009. 
596
 Ibid at 7. 
597
 Ibid. 
598
 Ibid. 
599
 Cabinet Office: Strategy Unit and Home Office, ―Extending Our Reach:  A Comprehensive 
Approach to Tackling Serious Organised Crime‖, July 2009, online at 
109 
 
Organised Crime (2006 Threat Assessment), published by SOCA, criminal 
structures are described as varied, generally consisting of a durable core of key 
individuals, and linked by factors such as family, friendship, a shared history of 
criminal activity or imprisonment together.
600
 The groups are thought to have a 
cluster of lower level subordinates, specialists and more transient members, in 
addition to a network of dispensable associates.
601
 Other structures may 
involve loose networks, or ‗career criminals‘, who come together for a specific 
criminal venture, then disperse once that is complete.
602
 The 2006 Threat 
Assessment makes it clear that particular criminal activities will require 
different criminal structures. For instance, a successful armed robbery may 
require a group with clearly assigned roles and co-ordination in order to carry 
out a plan while other groups involved in drug illicit commodities may have a 
cellular structure performing specific functions.
603
 
 
A 2009 paper released by the Home Office titled Extending our Reach: A 
Comprehensive Approach to Tackling Serious Organised Crime (2009 
Strategy) introduces what is termed a ‗new strategy‘.604 This paper would be 
more accurately described as building on the 2004 strategy, by implementing 
what SOCA and police have learned, from research and gathering intelligence, 
about organised crime over this time period.
605
 In this paper the nature of 
organised crime is described as involving some hierarchical tight knit groups, 
based around a durable core group of individuals, but predominantly, in the 
UK, it involves loose networks of criminals who come together for the duration 
of a particular criminal activity.
606
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Ethnicity and Organised Crime in the UK 
The role that ethnicity plays in organised crime is addressed in many of the 
annual UK Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessments and differs 
significantly from the stance held in the US. The latest UK Threat Assessment 
of Organised Crime (covering the period 2009/10) portrays ethnicity as but one 
factor that can reinforce collaboration amongst criminals, alongside other 
factors such as family ties, shared experiences (for example prison) or 
recommendation from trusted individuals.
607
 These Threat Assessments have 
been careful to avoid the ethnicity trap. While not ignoring that fact that 
ethnicity can have a role to play in facilitating organisation it is not treated as 
the only, or even the key, factor in why criminals become organised.
608
 
 
4.2.2 Strategy to combat organised crime 
Harm Reduction Approach 
The UK strategy to combat organised crime aspires to a ‗harm reduction‘ 
approach.
609
 The Home Office acknowledges that little work has been done 
world wide to measure the scale of organised crime and the harm it does. 
Nonetheless, a Harm Framework was developed in an attempt to help measure 
the scale of harm. The framework introduced a number of measures.
610
 
- First, the economic and social costs of organised crime, ranging from 
straightforward financial losses to health and crime harms. 
- Secondly, the level of public concern about organised crime and the problems it 
causes. Some issues, like the availability of drugs, are of general concern. But we 
need to take account of local factors too, like the fear which organised crime can 
inflict on particular neighbourhoods. 
- Thirdly, the size of the criminal market involved. This will help measure the 
profitability of criminal markets, which poses its own challenge to society and the 
rule of law. 
 
 
Preliminary results, in 2004, indicated that all losses and harms caused by 
organised crime, in the UK, amounted to around £40 billion per year.
611
 In the 
2009 strategy, defining and measuring harm, caused by organised crime, 
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continues to be problematic, despite the development of a more comprehensive 
Harm Framework.
612
 Rather than attempting a concise definition of harm the 
Harm Framework includes a basket of indicators;  
...derived from various sources and of varying degrees of precision and proximity to 
the harms themselves, from which the most relevant can be selected and applied to 
each circumstance.
613
 
 
Determining what constitutes ‗the most relevant‘ is an ongoing process of 
learning through practical experience. The basic principles guiding a harm 
reduction strategy to combat organised crime consist of: 
- Reducing profit opportunities. This means reducing demand for the goods and 
services trafficked by criminal enterprises. It also means reducing the vulnerability of 
the public and private sector to attack by organised crime. 
- Disrupting the businesses and their markets. We must make criminal enterprise 
unprofitable in the UK by disrupting and dismantling their businesses and the markets 
in which they operate. This means using all the regulatory and other powers at our 
disposal, including our tax powers, our financial recovery powers and our powers to 
bear down on money laundering.  
- Increasing the risk. We must raise the personal risks for the criminals, particularly 
the leading figures, by prosecuting the key players involved in organised crime. And 
we must reform the criminal justice system to enable us to bring to bear the evidence 
which will lead to convictions for involvement in organised crime.
614
 
 
 
The willingness of the UK to review its conceptions of organised crime, and 
adjust definitions if needed, is in stark contrast with the US approach, where 
the prevailing perception of organised crime has changed little since the 1950s. 
The flexibility, demonstrated in the UK, is a reflection of a commitment to an 
intelligence led approach, in its efforts to combat TNOC.
615
 Organised crime is 
not defined strictly by activity or degree of organisation, but responses to 
organised crime are guided by a combination of both. There is a focus on 
particular activities, and those groups who are better organised and considered 
to have more ability to cause harm. Various policing and legislative 
innovations have been developed in the UK to implement the strategy. 
However, the UK has resisted creating a statutory definition of organised 
crime, reflecting a preference to target individuals and particular criminal 
offences related to ‗organised crime‘, rather than criminal groups as a whole.  
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4.2.3  Serious Organised Crime Agency 
To better deal with organised crime in the UK, the government identified a 
need to reorganise UK agencies tasked with combating organised crime and 
create a ―critical mass” particularly in ―the key areas of competence and focus 
our efforts on front-line intelligence and investigation”.616 Therefore, the UK 
government launched a review to determine whether the current organisational 
structures could effectively tackle the immediate challenges posed by 
organised crime.
617
 The review found that UK ―law enforcement agencies are 
effective and well respected amongst their international peers...” However, 
―...the dividing line between institutional responsibilities remains unclear in 
several areas”.618  
 
The government determined that better coordination and efficiency could be 
achieved by creating one agency, which combined the National Crime Squad, 
the National Criminal Intelligence Service, her Majesty‘s Customs and Excise 
investigation and intelligence work on serious drug trafficking and recovering 
related criminal assets, and the Immigration Service‘s work on organised 
immigration crime.
619
 The result of this merge was the creation of the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). The aspiration for SOCA is that it will; 
...lead to greater consistency of approach; a critical mass in key skill areas, address 
current problems of duplication and co-ordination, limit bureaucracy, provide 
opportunities for economies of scale, and represent a ‗one stop shop‘ for our 
international partners. In particular, it should address some of the key weaknesses in 
the generation, dissemination and use of intelligence material.
620
 
 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
SOCA was established under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 
2005 (SOCPA). Section 2 of SOCPA provides for SOCA‘s establishment, 
outlines its activities and states that SOCA‘s functions shall be: 
(a) preventing and detecting serious organised crime, and 
(b) contributing to the reduction of such crime in other ways and to the 
mitigation of its consequences. 
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Section 5(3) makes clear that, despite reference to „serious organised crime‟ in 
Section 2(1), SOCA may carry out activities in relation to other crime, if they 
are carried out for the purpose of any functions outlined in Section 2 or 3. 
„Serious organised crime‟ is not defined within the Act, which in effect allows 
SOCA a lot of flexibility to determine what should be targeted, but could 
potentially cause a loss of focus. To guide SOCA, the broad definition of 
organised crime, originally formulated by the NCIS, continues to be used. 
Those involved, normally working with others, in continuing serious criminal 
activities for substantial profit, whether based in the UK or elsewhere.
621
 
 
This very broad definition is capable of encapsulating a very wide range of 
groups. 
 
4.2.4  Legal tools to combat organised crime 
Despite the stated aims, in the 2004 Organised Crime White Paper, to target 
and increase the risk for those criminals involved in organised crime, there has 
been a reluctance to define organised crime.
622
 This approach seemingly 
reflects a determination to tackle specific organised crime activities or sectors 
rather than “impose a single template to tackle organised crime in all its 
aspects”.623 Subsequently there is also no offence prescribed for participation 
in an organised criminal group. Rather individuals are charged, on an 
individual basis, for the commission of an offence, such as; offences under the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 or the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.
624
 The UK 
manages to technically fulfil its mandatory obligations, under Article 5 of the 
Palermo Convention,
625
 through the common law conspiracy offence. Under 
section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 when two or more people agree to 
commit an offence they may be charged with conspiracy to commit such an 
                                                 
621
 Supra n. 604 at 6. 
622
 Supra n. 595 at 12. 
623
 Ibid at 12. See also in supra n. 604 at 12, which identifies those most prevalent organised 
criminal activities as; drug trafficking, human trafficking and people smuggling, firearms 
trafficking, fraud, counterfeiting and smuggling. 
624
 Leong A, supra n. 14 at 99. 
625
 Article 5 requires State Parities to criminalise participation in an organised criminal group. 
114 
 
offence. This also extends to conspiracy to commit offences outside of the 
UK.
626
  
 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
A 2000 report from the Cabinet Office‘s Performance and Innovation Unit 
(PIU) titled “Recovering the Proceeds of Crime” provided the impetus for the 
creation of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (PCA).
627
 The report was the 
culmination of a nine month investigation by the PIU focusing on: 628 
- The effectiveness of pursuing and removing criminal assets as part of the fight 
against crime, and particularly against serious and organised crime; and 
- How to maximise the effective use of these techniques. 
 
Angela Leong outlines the main proposals suggested by the report and later 
implemented in the PCA 2002:
629
 
(i) The creation of a new agency with lead responsibility for asset recovery and 
containing a ‗Centre of Excellence‘ for financial investigation training. 
(ii) The consolidation of existing laws on confiscation and money laundering into 
a single piece of legislation 
(iii) The introduction of new civil recovery proceedings without the need for a 
criminal conviction 
(iv) The use of Inland Revenue functions by the new agency in relation to 
criminal gains 
(v) The development of gateways for the exchange of information between the 
new agency and the other authorities 
(vi) The assurance of sufficient trained staff in all the agencies involved in asset 
recovery so that the system can function efficiently 
 
The Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) was the title given to the new agency 
created under the PCA 2002 (Part I). Its functions were set out in the 2001 
Governments Asset Recovery Strategy and included disrupting criminal 
enterprises through the recovery of criminal asset as well as promoting the use 
of financial investigation as an integral part of criminal investigation.
630
 This 
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agency has since been merged into SOCA, who now performs the functions of 
ARA, as part of the UK‘s overall strategy to combat organised crime.631 
 
Summary 
The PCA 2002 makes provision for a confiscation regime
632
 as well as civil 
recovery and forfeiture proceedings.
633
 It consolidates, updates, and reforms 
the criminal law in the United Kingdom with regard to money laundering
634
and 
also sets out powers for use in criminal confiscation, civil recovery and money 
laundering investigations.
635
 The Act deals with the relationship between 
confiscation and insolvency proceedings
636
 and provides for co-operation in 
investigation and enforcement between the jurisdictions of the United 
Kingdom and with overseas authorities.
637
 
 
Confiscation Regime 
Section 6 of the PCA sets out the nature of confiscation orders and the 
circumstances under which they are to be made. A confiscation order is an 
order to a convicted defendant to pay a sum of money, representing the 
defendant's benefit from crime.
638
 It is mandatory for the Court to undertake a 
confiscation proceeding when both of the following conditions from the PCA 
2002 is met. Firstly: 
(a) he is convicted of an offence or offences in proceedings before the Crown Court; 
(b) he is committed to the Crown Court for sentence in respect of an offence or 
offences under section 3, 4 or 6 of the Sentencing Act; 
(c) he is committed to the Crown Court in respect of an offence or offences under 
section 70 below (committal with a view to a confiscation order being considered).
639
 
 
Secondly; 
(a) the prosecutor or the Director asks the court to proceed under this section, or 
(b) the court believes it is appropriate for it to do so 
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If these two conditions are met then the Court must determine if the defendant 
has a ‗criminal lifestyle‘.640 Furthermore, s 6 clarifies a defendant‘s benefit 
from either his ‗general criminal conduct‘ or his ‗particular criminal 
conduct‘.641  
General criminal conduct means any criminal conduct of the defendant's, whenever the 
conduct occurred and whether or not it has ever formed the subject of any criminal 
prosecution. Particular criminal conduct means the offences of which the defendant 
has been convicted in the current proceedings, together with any taken into 
consideration by the court in passing sentence. So general criminal conduct includes 
particular criminal conduct.
642
 
 
If the defendant is found to have a ‗criminal lifestyle‘ then the court must 
determine if he has benefited from this conduct and, for this purpose, is 
permitted to make four statutory assumptions under section 10.
643
 Firstly, the 
Court can assume that any property transferred to the defendant at any time, 
after the relevant day, was obtained by him as a result of his general criminal 
conduct.
644
 Secondly, it is assumed that any property held by the defendant at 
any time after the date of conviction was obtained by him as a result of general 
criminal conduct.
645
 The third assumption is that any expenditure incurred by 
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the defendant at any time after the relevant day was met from property 
obtained by him as a result of his general criminal conduct.
646
 The final 
assumption is, for the purpose of valuing any property obtained (or assumed to 
have been obtained) by the defendant, he obtained it free of any other interests 
in it.
647
  
 
Alternatively, if the Court has found that the defendant does not have a 
‗criminal lifestyle‘, the Court will decide whether they have benefited from 
their ‗particular criminal conduct‘.648 Once the court has determined the 
amount of the defendants benefit they may proceed in determining the 
recoverable amount under Section 7 and make the confiscation order requiring 
the defendant to pay that amount.
649
 To ensure that a defendant cannot dispose 
of their assets before a conviction (or during proceedings) the Court may issue 
a restraint order under Section 41 to prohibit the defendant from dealing with 
any ‗realisable property‘. 
 
Civil Recovery and forfeiture proceedings 
Following recommendations from the Home Office PIU report it was 
determined that it would be beneficial to have civil recovery powers available 
in the UK, similar to those available in the US under the RICO legislation.
650
 
These powers do not rely on the conviction of an individual, but rather, allow 
for civil forfeiture on ‗irrefutable presumptions‘ without a prior conviction.651 
Section 240 of the PCA states: 
(1)This Part has effect for the purposes of— 
(a) enabling the enforcement authority to recover, in civil proceedings before the High 
Court or Court of Session, property which is, or represents, property obtained through 
unlawful conduct, 
(b) enabling cash which is, or represents, property obtained through unlawful conduct, 
or which is intended to be used in unlawful conduct, to be forfeited in civil 
proceedings before a magistrates' court or (in Scotland) the sheriff. 
(2) The powers conferred by this Part are exercisable in relation to any property 
(including cash) whether or not any proceedings have been brought for an offence in 
connection with the property. 
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In the case of The Queen on the application of the Director of the Assets 
Recovery Agency v Jeffery David Green it was held that: 
...the Director need neither allege nor prove the commission of any specific criminal 
offence... she must not merely set out the matters that are alleged to constitute the 
particular kind or kinds of unlawful conduct, but...she must prove that, on the balance 
of probabilities, the property was obtained by or in return for a particular kind or one 
of a number of kinds of unlawful conduct.
652
 
 
Money Laundering 
Under previous legislation three types of money laundering offences existed. 
Which one applied depended on whether the underlying predicate offence was 
drug trafficking, terrorism or another serious crime.
653
 This created 
unnecessary complexity for investigators and prosecutors. Therefore, following 
recommendations in the PIU report, the concept of predicate offence was 
abolished and the money laundering offences were consolidated into one piece 
of legislation.
654
 Part VII of the PCA updates and reforms the criminal law in 
relation to money laundering offences.
655
 Part VII of the PCA creates three 
principle money laundering offences: 
i) Concealing criminal property656 
ii) Entering into or becoming concerned in an arrangement which is 
known to facilitate (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use 
or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person
657
 
iii) Acquiring, using and possessing criminal property.658 Section 
340(11)(a) further clarifies money laundering as; an act constituting 
any of the three principle offences mentioned above and an act which: 
(b) constitutes an attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit an offence 
specified in paragraph (a),  
(c) constitutes aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an 
offence specified in paragraph (a), or  
(d) would constitute an offence specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) if done in 
the United Kingdom. 
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Consolidating the previous money laundering legislation into one statute has 
not only simplified matters, but also, major changes under the PCA have 
ensured no distinction is made between the proceeds of drug offences and other 
crime, as was the case under previous legislation.
659
 Furthermore, the three 
substantive offences under the PCA now apply to the laundering of an 
offenders own money, as well as those of others. Previously a confusing 
distinction existed.
660
 Finally, the PCA has removed the requirement from 
previous legislation that money laundering offences only apply to offences 
committed for the purpose of avoiding prosecution or to avoid the making, or 
enforcement, of a confiscation order.
661
 
 
Conspiracy/ Participation offence debate 
The reluctance to criminalise participation in an organised criminal group has 
attracted criticism and could potentially undermine, or at least weaken, the 
ability to fulfil the UK‘s overall strategy to combat organised crime. It has been 
argued that measures increasing the personal risk for criminals, involved in 
organised crime, could be strengthened if participation in such a group was 
illegal and would result in stiff penalties.
662
  
 
Conspiracy and participation offences relating to organised crime have been 
debated for some time in the UK. In 1995 the Home Affairs Committee on 
Organised Crime considered whether the fight against organised crime required 
the concept of ‗criminal organisation‘ to be introduced, into the UK legal 
system.
663
 The police supported this proposal because they believed traditional 
conspiracy laws were insufficient to capture key organised crime figures, or 
other associates, who may distance themselves from the actual commission of 
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the crime(s).
664
 The police also indicated, in 1995, that even when there were 
clear links between these ‗immune‘ associates and other criminals, coupled 
with obvious wealth and no visible source of income, it was often not enough 
to support proceedings for conspiracy, or other substantive offences.
665
 
Ultimately the Committee took the stance that organised crime did not need to 
be approached any differently from other forms of serious crime, and therefore, 
specific legislative measures to deal with organised crime were not deemed 
necessary.
666
 Moreover, the Crown Prosecution Service, at the time, indicated 
that the current laws of conspiracy should be sufficient to deal with organised 
crime.
667
 
 
In 2002 the Home Office commissioned a report, titled “A comparative 
analysis of organised crime conspiracy legislation and practice and their 
relevance to England and Wales” (Conspiracy Legislation Report), which had 
as its primary purpose; the examination of the operation of the US RICO 
legislation, and other similar initiatives, to determine their potential 
applicability to England and Wales.
668
 The authors compiled the following list 
of reasons demonstrating that the current conspiracy laws may not be fully 
effective in combating organised crime.
669
 
1. Conspiracy contemplates an agreement to engage in conduct which relates to one or 
a series of closely related crimes: it does not contemplate the activities of a multi-
faceted criminal enterprise. It can accommodate certain broad conspiracies such as 
have been employed in terrorist prosecutions such as ‗conspiracy to cause explosions 
on the United Kingdom mainland‘, but that is a single form of offence. 
2. Each defendant in single conspiracy indictment has to be shown to be party to the 
same agreement. Proof of the agreement and its terms is usually indirect. It is thus 
often difficult to distinguish related or sub-conspiracies. 
3. Agreement, in the sense of a meeting of two or more minds, does not accord with 
common experience and how people actually associate in criminal endeavour. 
4. Strict rules of evidence dislocate and obscure the presentation to the court of a full 
or clear picture. 
 
Despite criticism of the ability of current conspiracy legislation to combat 
organised crime, the report indicated that RICO legislation was not entirely 
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appropriate for the particular conditions in the UK. Primarily because it was 
deemed that RICO legislation was designed to be employed against 
hierarchical type criminal groups, such as traditional mafia groups, and these 
were not prevalent in the UK.
670
  
 
The 2004 Organised Crime White Paper further discussed the need for 
conspiracy or participation offences, stating
671
: 
It is commonly believed the existing conspiracy legislation may not always reach the 
real ‗Godfather‘ figures, does not provide a practical means of addressing more 
peripheral involvement in serious crime and does not allow sentencing courts to assess 
the real seriousness of individual offences by taking into account the wider pattern of 
the accused‘s criminal activities. 
 
After careful consideration of RICO style legislation the UK government 
determined that it was not necessary for it to be introduced.
672
 The government 
was not convinced of its need for the following reasons: 673 
- To work, RICO still needs sufficient evidence to convict on the underlying 
‗predicate‘ offence before these can be set in the wider racketeering context. It 
does not, therefore, help against those targets who have evaded detection 
altogether. 
- RICO appears to be more useful against traditional ‗racketeering‘ organisations 
than the sort of large scale trafficking groups which are the main threat in the UK. 
The latter tend to be prosecuted in the US, as in the UK, for standard conspiracy 
and trafficking offences. 
- Civil RICO is less relevant in the UK, as we do not face the same difficulties of 
organised crime infiltration of legitimate institutions as the US. Moreover, the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 already provides a robust framework for dealing with 
criminal assets. 
 
The authors of the Conspiracy Legislation Report felt it would be worthwhile 
to consider implementing a more simplified form of statutory conspiracy than 
the RICO model.
674
 While they believed issues such as a higher prejudicial risk 
to defendants may occur with a participation offence, they put forward 
alternative models to RICO such as seen in Canada, New York and New 
Zealand. For a participation offence to be worthwhile, the authors of the 
Conspiracy Legislation Report held the opinion that; there must be clear 
evidence it will be effective in targeting those who organise, or provide 
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important contributions to facilitate, criminal offences.
675
 The current UK 
conspiracy offence is often not sufficient to target those who are clearly 
involved in organising or facilitating criminal activity, but, who may not be 
involved in committing the substantive offence(s).
676
 
 
Confused approach  
The absence of offences that specifically relate to organised crime appears to 
contradict the UK governments own organised crime strategy. There is a 
perceived urgent need to respond strongly to the growing threat of organised 
crime. Concerted efforts have been undertaken to develop intelligence and 
knowledge of organised crime, how it operates and, measures to more 
effectively investigate and prevent it. The government has taken steps to 
reform legislation to better target particular criminal activities associated with 
organised crime. Furthermore a powerful agency (SOCA) was created to 
specifically to deal with organised crime and to centralise and consolidate the 
response. The entire purpose of SOCA is to combat organised crime, which is 
viewed as a formidable threat capable of enormous harm, separate to other 
forms of serious crime.   
 
Despite the intense focus on organised crime as a threat to the UK, the view 
remains that there is no need to create legislation specifically targeting 
organised criminal groups, or making participation in such a group illegal. This 
policy position has been maintained despite a frank admission that: 
At present, the criminal law provisions most likely to be invoked against organised 
criminals require proof of a specific act of supply of a commodity. The evidential 
importance of seizing the commodity can tend to the prosecution of couriers and minor 
players rather than the organisers.
677
 
 
 
A stated aim of the UK‘s Strategy to combat organised crime is to make 
organised criminal activity more inherently risky.
678
 A first step to achieving 
this goal may be better served by including legislation making participation in 
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an organised criminal group illegal. However, the UK criminal justice legal 
system continues to rely on separate offences relating to organised criminal 
activities. A more unified approach could be achieved by specifically targeting 
organised crime in legislation; in addition to targeting its most prevalent 
activities. It, therefore, remains to be seen if the legislative measures 
implemented in the UK will be effective in the long term. Organised criminal 
activity has proved very proficient at adapting to legislative or law enforcement 
measures and their activities naturally evolve over time to meet new or 
changing illegal markets. In the past this has left the criminal justice system 
playing catch up and there is little reason to suspect organised criminal groups 
will become less adaptive.
679
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Chapter Five 
Combating organised crime in New Zealand 
 
 
5.1 New Zealand’s conception of organised crime 
 
Organised Crime Project 
In 1998 the New Zealand Police initiated the ‗Organised Crime Project‘ (OCP) 
for the purpose of preparing a Police strategy to combat organised crime in 
New Zealand for the period 1999-2004.
680
 One of the first issues encountered 
by the OCP was developing a working definition of organised crime.
681
 The 
Initial definition used within the OCP was:
682
  
Organised crime constitutes two or more persons engaged in continuing illegal 
activities for some purpose, irrespective of national boundaries. 
 
This definition was influenced by overseas conceptions, for instances from 
Europol and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
683
 However the OCP decided 
that this definition may not encapsulate the complexities of organised crime as 
it operates in New Zealand and therefore developed the Organised Crime 
Group Survey, published in 1999, to determine the nature and extent of 
organised crime in New Zealand.
684
 This was the first time that a survey on the 
subject of organised crime had been conducted by the New Zealand Police.
685
 
Although police acknowledged that the survey was limited to police knowledge 
and perceptions of organised crime groups, the stated aim was to:
686
 
- Estimate the number of organised crime groups that Police believe to operate in 
New Zealand; and 
-  Identify the general nature of organised crime groups in New Zealand as known 
to Police. 
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To guide police district responses to the survey, five categories of ‗criminal 
groups‘ were to be classified as ‗organised crime‘.687 
Category A – Structured gangs e.g. patched Incorporated Society outlaw motorcycle 
gangs; 
Category B – Structured groups other than gangs e.g. less overt groups such as Asian 
secret societies and triad societies; 
Category C – Family crime groups e.g. intergenerational criminal families that 
perpetuate illegal activities within the blood ties of the group; 
Category D – Activist/Paedophile crime groups e.g. groups that have ongoing illegal 
aims and structure, but may not be driven by the profit motive such as religious 
terrorist groups; and 
Category E – Career criminal crime groups e.g. criminal groups that carry out regular 
illegal enterprises within a network of trusted colleagues. 
 
The Police responses identified 337 known groups including 115 from category 
A; 44 from category B; 82 from category C; 15 from category D and; 81 from 
category E.
688
 The groups were found to be spread throughout the country and  
involved in a wide array of illegal activity.
689
 The most common features 
‗bonding‘ criminals together to form a ‗group‘ were; crime, local ties and 
drugs. Other factors linking criminals included; blood ties, ethnicity, prison, 
motorbikes, sporting interests and, in a rare few, religion.
690
 
 
Developing an updated conception of organise crime 
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is one of the primary government agencies 
responsible for dealing with organised crime issues. In March 2008 they 
released the Organised Crime Strategy (OCS), which is intended to guide 
responses to organised crime issues.
691
 This involved; building on existing 
intelligence, and knowledge regarding organised crime, to develop an accurate 
conception of organised crime. In developing this concept the MOJ has taken a 
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careful and grounded approach; not wanting to immediately assume what 
applies overseas, will necessarily apply to New Zealand‘s specific situation.  
 
Organised crime in New Zealand is perceived as being characterised by loose 
networks between groups and individuals.
 692
 Because of “the fluid and 
constantly evolving” nature of organised crime the MOJ found it unhelpful to 
try and define a rigid set of crimes or criminal groups.
693
 The OCS outlines a 
number of characteristics that criminal groups may exhibit. For example, 
organised crime groups may be law enforcement conscious and may use 
intimidation, violence and corruption to protect themselves.
 694
 However, the 
MOJ makes it clear that organised crime networks or groups vary considerably 
in size, geographic location, criminal sophistication, modus operandi and the 
impact they have on the community.
695
 Furthermore, the MOJ stresses that 
there is great diversity among criminal group membership, with all races and 
ethnic backgrounds represented.
696
 
 
The OCS outlines four categories of ‗criminal groups‘ specific to New 
Zealand‘s experience with organised crime:697 
i) Street Level Gangs: This category of ‗criminal group‘ is considered 
disorganised engaging in minor crime or territorial aggression. They 
are not the focus of the OCS. These groups are often made up of 
youths and therefore the CPU determined that delinquent behaviour 
common to some youth groups should not be branded as organised 
crime. However, they are mentioned in the strategy because 
members of such groups sometimes carry out crimes on behalf of 
adult gangs and also provide fertile recruitment grounds for more 
serious criminally-orientated gangs.
698
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ii) Territorial Gangs: Territorial groups have some similarities to street 
level gangs, but tend to dominate a specific geographical area and 
sometimes monopolise the criminal trade in that area. There are a 
number of well known gangs in this category, which are divided 
into ‗chapters‘ and feature throughout NZ. These groups are often 
involved in drugs manufacture and sale. They tend to focus on 
products supplied locally rather than those that need to be sourced 
from overseas.
699
 
iii) Organised Gangs: Organised gangs have some identifying factors 
similar to territorial groups. Their activity has increased to a 
national level, but without any strong formal linkages to 
transnational criminal activity. These criminal groups take greater 
measures to launder their illegal gains and, subsequently, are often 
more difficult to detect and target. Typically their offending patterns 
are more sophisticated and covert than street level or territorial 
gangs.
700
 
iv) Transnational Groups: This category encompasses criminal activity 
that is organised across national borders including groups primarily 
based off-shore, but, who target illegal markets in New Zealand. 
Transnational groups are active in New Zealand exhibiting 
offending that is fluid and constantly changing. Their activities 
range from low-level facilitation and commission of offending to 
large-scale operations driven by transnational ‗crime entities‘.701 
 
5.2 New Zealand’s Experience with Transnational Organised Crime 
 
Despite its geographical isolation and relatively small population New Zealand 
has not remained immune to instances of TNOC. As in every part of the world 
the exact extent of organised criminal activity in New Zealand is difficult to 
accurately measure. However, the Ministry of Justice believes that organised 
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crime in New Zealand has both a domestic front, with groups operating around 
New Zealand, and also an international front with off-shore criminal groups 
using New Zealand as either a transhipment route, or a destination market, for 
illicit goods particularly drugs.
702
  
 
The last decade has seen a significant shift in the New Zealand market for 
illicit drugs with an increasing number of overseas based groups seeking to 
‗break into‘ the New Zealand market.703 Reflecting world trends the illicit drug 
market in New Zealand is very profitable. Attracting local gangs as well as 
overseas based groups who wish to exploit the NZ market, particularly the 
amphetamine market.
704
 The methamphetamine market alone is estimated at 
over NZ $1 Billion.
705
 Pure methamphetamine (better known as ‗p‘) production 
has increased rapidly since the first ‗p‘ lab was discovered in NZ during 1996. 
Apart from being a highly profitable enterprise for criminal groups, illicit drugs 
also cause enormous harm to society. For instance during 2005/06 it is 
estimated that illicit drug use caused $NZ1.31 Billion of social costs.
706
 
Despite a rise in methamphetamine users, cannabis still remains the primary 
illicit drug of abuse in NZ and plays a significant part in the development and 
profits for organised criminal groups.
707
  
 
Customs have noted that a number of off-shore groups, from diverse parts of 
the world
708
, involved in drug smuggling, have been found to operate in or 
target New Zealand markets. 
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These groups often operate on a larger scale than local offenders and have access to 
greater resources. Their criminal activity is often organised from offshore and key 
participants may remain outside New Zealand's jurisdiction. They also present 
language and cultural barriers that can further inhibit law enforcement.
709
 
 
The Ministry of Justice also identifies other significant organised criminal 
activities affecting New Zealand as; immigration offences; fisheries and 
wildlife offences including smuggling of New Zealand‘s native animals, flora 
and fauna. Corruption and money laundering offences are also concerning 
because they are vital in facilitating organised criminal activity.
710
  
 
5.3 Programme of Action for Organised Crime 
 
On 14 May 2007 Cabinet directed officials from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
to develop a programme of action and a thorough strategy to combat organised 
crime in New Zealand.
711
 MOJ officials were asked to report back on three 
broad areas aimed at reducing the impact of organised crime in New 
Zealand.
712
 The report makes up the Programme of Action for Organised 
Crime and consists of three papers:  
- Paper 1: Programme of Action for Organised Crime and the Organised 
Crime Strategy,
713
  
- Paper 2: Establishment of the Organised Crime Agency and the 
Disestablishment of the Serious Fraud Office,
714
 
- Paper 3: Reducing the Level and Impact of Organised Crime in New 
Zealand: Recommendations for Legislative Reform.
715
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5.3.1 Organised Crime Strategy
716
 
The Organised Crime Strategy (OCS), annexed to Paper 1, is intended to 
provide the framework for all future government action to tackle organised 
crime and will guide the work of government agencies in their organised crime 
functions.
717
 The OCS emphasises an intelligence led approach to combating 
organised crime. The strategy will direct law enforcement to focus on upper-
levels of organised crime, bring key individuals before the courts and actively 
disrupt groups by depriving them of the proceeds of crime, access to assets and 
distribution networks.
718
 The OCS acknowledges that organised crime has the 
ability to evolve and adapt to a changing environment and therefore the OCS 
hopes to establish a process for identifying and targeting new and developing 
patterns of criminal activity. 
 
The OCS has four components:
719
 
- Community based engagement 
- Prevention measures 
- Intelligence gathering 
- Enhanced investigation and law enforcement 
These focus areas have been developed, with specific goals and objectives, to 
reflect the breadth of activities required to reduce the impact of organised 
crime in New Zealand.
720
 
 
Community based engagement 
This aspect of the OCS reflects the understanding that many New Zealand 
gangs, with organised crime links, have been able find fertile recruiting 
grounds among disenfranchised youth. “Gangs... are strong inter-generational 
cultural phenomena”.721 The street level youth gangs, identified within the 
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OCS, often have connections to more established ‗adult‘ gangs.722 To minimise 
their potential involvement with gangs and serious organised crime the OCS 
identifies the need to provide counter incentives such as, employment 
opportunities and building strong family linkages to draw people away from 
participation in gangs and organised crime.
723
 
 
The OCS seeks to build a solid community approach by firstly better informing 
the public about organised crime and to encourage the public to be more active 
in addressing the problem. The government has also started several initiatives 
to prevent and reduce youth offending
724
 well before it gets to a more serious 
organised criminal level. A long term strategic aim of the OCS is to deliver 
social intervention programmes, addressing the issues of gang involvement and 
participation in organised criminal activity.
725
 
 
Prevention measures 
The OCS indentifies that effective prevention of organised crime must rest on a 
“good understanding of the factors that facilitate and/or inhibit the 
development of organised crime”.726 One of the key motivators for organised 
criminal activity is money, and therefore prevention activities must necessarily 
focus on this aspect.
727
 Organised criminal activity is also believed to work 
through the legitimate business sector, and therefore, working with the business 
sector, to raise awareness of suspicious activity linked to organised crime, is 
important.
728
 New Zealand currently has a high ranking internationally as a 
country perceived to be free of corruption.  
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Maintaining the integrity of NZ government officials and a well functioning 
and transparent justice system is critical. A 2006 Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Report on the Implementation of the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
729
 was overall positive for New Zealand but 
did recommend some changes including broadening the criteria for the criminal 
liability of legal persons for foreign bribery. The OCS notes that the MOJ and 
other agencies have been implementing the recommendations of the OECD 
report, with encouraging progress made.
730
 
 
Intelligence Gathering 
The OCS stresses the importance of sound intelligence to the overall success in 
efforts to combat organised crime. 
Intelligence is critical for decision-making, effective planning, strategic targeting and 
resource deployment. Law enforcement agencies cannot function effectively without 
collecting, processing, analysing and using intelligence. Risk assessments and 
prioritisation also require a strong intelligence base.
731
 
 
The OCS mentions the development of a National Intelligence Model (NIM) 
which will provide a method for intelligence to be centrally collated, assessed 
and disseminated to relevant agencies.
732
 The rationale behind a ‗shared‘ NIM 
is to ensure that information is freely available and confidentially shared 
amongst key agencies. A number of police agencies have important roles in 
gathering, analysing and disseminating intelligence, for instance, the Police 
National Intelligence Centre (NIC) is tasked with maintaining an intelligence 
view across the entire spectrum of crime in New Zealand.
733
  
                                                 
729
 OECD: Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, New Zealand: Phase 2 
Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery 
in International Business Transactions, (27 October 2006). Online at 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/38/37658136.pdf>. Retrieved 7 Jan 2010. 
730
 Ministry of Justice, supra n. 691 at 5. 
731
 Ibid at 6. 
732
 Ibid. 
733
 Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand, Tasking Framework (Organised 
Crime), at 3 and 4. Online at <http://ofcanz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/OFCANZ-tasking-
framework-20081217.pdf>.The NIC has been established along similar timelines to OFCANZ 
with the aim of providing whole of government  intelligence to Police and OFCANZ. The NIC 
is designed to provide nationally coordinated intelligence systems providing a more effective 
and efficient approaches to crime reduction work at every level. See also New Zealand Police, 
Illicit Drug Strategy (2010) at 19. Online at: 
<http://www.police.govt.nz/resources/2009/NZ_Police_Illicit_Drug_Strategy_2009.pdf>. 
133 
 
 
The Police National Targeting and Analysis Group will facilitate the sharing of 
high quality intelligence, in accordance with the whole of government 
approach.
734
 Furthermore, the recently established Organised and Financial 
Crime Agency New Zealand (OFCANZ) is set up to adopt an intelligence led 
approach with a focus on ‗high level‘ national and transnational organised 
crime.
735
 
 
Enhanced Investigation and law enforcement 
The enforcement aspect of the OCS focuses on developing effective responses, 
to emerging organised crime threats, and the investigation and disruption of 
those threats.
736
 The outcome of successfully achieving these elements will be 
reducing risk, building strong criminal cases and achieving successful 
prosecution against key targets. The OCS acknowledges that organised 
criminal networks vary greatly, and therefore, approaches to weaken or disrupt 
them must reflect this diversity. However, there is an assumption within the 
OCS that targeting key assets and people within criminal networks will lead to 
a significant weakening of criminal infrastructure.
737
 This approach is not 
unique and has been attempted by law enforcement agencies around the world 
with variable results.
738
 Nevertheless, it is believed that this ‗enhanced‘ 
approach will lead to a reduction in the following key areas of organised 
crime:
739
 
- Networking between local and international groups 
- High level awareness of law enforcement, for example counter surveillance 
measures 
- Inter-relationship between different types of offending 
- Difficulty in developing information sources 
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- Use of fear and violence to intimidate witnesses and victims, discipline members 
etc 
- Ability to operate over longer periods of time and ability to suspend activities 
temporarily 
- Access to considerable financial resources 
- Ability to corrupt officials and organisations and gather information on 
enforcement capability 
- Access to support, financing and criminal modus operandi from overseas 
counterparts. 
 
The OCS is rightly critical of traditional methods measuring the success of law 
enforcement ‗interruptions‘.740 The traditional methods include counting; 
arrests, seizures of illicit goods (such as drugs), warrants executed and searches 
undertaken.
741
 The OCS points out that this approach merely measures the 
disruption processes, rather than measuring the actual impact on organised 
crime and crime in general. Therefore, the OCS notes, it is important to gain a 
‗real‘ understanding of the effectiveness of disruption tactics against organised 
crime. However, the OCS does not discuss in detail what measures will be 
implemented, to enable agencies to quantify the extent of disruption, only 
mentioning that they are needed, and will be developed.
742
 
 
Updated Organised Crime Strategy stalled 
The OCS covers the period, March 2008-June 2009 and is supposed to be the 
first in an ongoing cycle of strategies. The Programme of Action for Organised 
Crime directed officials to provide an update on the OCS to cabinet in May 
2009.
743
 It was envisaged that an updated full term strategy for the period July 
2009-June 2012 would be developed.
744
 Furthermore, the strategy sought to 
ensure the development of annual risk assessments that would provide details 
and scope of organised crime activities, highlighting trends and developments 
over each twelve-month period.
745
 Both of these objectives are considered 
important developments to ensure the ongoing success of New Zealand‘s 
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efforts to combat organised crime, particularly in the areas of intelligence 
gathering, anticipating criminal patterns, risk assessment and developing focus 
areas.
746
  
 
The OCS has, thus far, not been updated due in part to a restructuring in the 
MOJ, which has seen the CPU disestablished and responsibility for the OCS 
shifted to the International Criminal Law Team. The MOJ is currently 
reviewing the scope of the strategy and the OCS is listed as a priority within 
the MOJ operating intentions for 2008/09-2010/11.
747
 However, no exact date 
is given for when the updated strategy will be completed. 
 
5.4 OFCANZ 
 
In 2007, coinciding with the Programme of Action for Organised Crime, 
Cabinet directed officials to develop a model for an Organised Crime Agency 
in New Zealand.
748
 On 3 September 2007 Cabinet agreed that an Organised 
Crime Agency, focusing on serious and organised crime, should be created and 
hosted within the New Zealand Police.
749
 The agency has been modelled, to 
some extent, on the UK‘s Serious Organised Crime Agency.750 The name of 
the agency was proposed as the ‗Organised and Financial Crime Agency New 
Zealand‘ (OFCANZ) to fit the theme ‗policing the New Zealand way‘ and also 
because OFCANZ was to incorporate the functions of the Serious Fraud Office 
                                                 
746
 Ministry of Justice, supra n. 691 4-6. The OCS guides the work of OFCANZ, and moreover, 
as New Zealand has recognised that organised crime evolves and changes over time, the annual 
assessments are supposed to inform and guide the development of risk assessments and focus 
areas. See also Organised and Financial Crime Agency of New Zealand, What does OFCANZ 
do? Online at <http://ofcanz.govt.nz/about/what-does-ofcanz-do>. 
747
 Ministry of Justice, Statement of Intent: 2008/09 - 2010/11: Operating Intentions 2008/09–
2010/11 (Modified  June 18 2009). Online at <http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-
publications/m/ministry-of-justice-statement-of-intent-2008-09-2010-11/operating-intentions-
2008-0920132010-11>. Retrieved 8 January 2009. 
748
 Ministry of Justice, Establishment of an Organised Crime Agency and Disestablishment of 
the Serious Fraud Office. Online at <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy-and-
consultation/crime/organised-crime/establishment-of-an-organised-crime-agency-and-
disestablishment-of-the-serious-fraud-office>. 
749
 Ibid. 
750
 Edwards, A and Levi, M. ―Researching the organization of serious crimes‖. Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 2008Vol. 8 at 381. 
136 
 
(SFO).
751
 The SFO was to be disestablished and merged into OFCANZ. The 
reasons cited for this decision were; ―there is no justification for retaining 
separate powers that the SFO currently holds in relation to the investigation of 
serious or complex fraud.”752 This decision was made under the former, 
Labour led, Government and when the National led Government took power, 
in 2008, they decided to maintain the SFO, as a distinct and separate entity 
working closely with OFCANZ.
753
  
 
OFCANZ is guided by the following mission statement:
754
  
To improve the safety and security of New Zealand by combating serious and 
organised crime and serious or complex fraud through an inter-agency partnership 
approach. 
 
In addition OFCANZ has been tasked with achieving and maintaining the 
following objectives:
755
 
- to centralise and enhance intelligence gathering capabilities against organised 
crime networks and those committing serious or complex fraud and to ensure 
information is shared between law enforcement and other agencies; 
- to collaborate with, and enhance co-operation between, law enforcement and 
other agencies in the planning and conducting of operations, both nationally and 
internationally; and 
- to detect, investigate and successfully prosecute serious and organised crime and 
serious or complex fraud; 
- to interrupt organised criminal activity through operations to restrain and forfeit 
the proceeds of crime; 
- to confront and disrupt the activities of serious and organised criminals and those 
committing serious or complex fraud; 
- to improve understanding of the activities of organised crime networks and the 
harm they cause; and 
- to prevent risks arising or potentially arising from serious and organised crime 
and serious or complex fraud. 
 
Its core functions consist of:
756
 
- Leading, and enhancing co-operation between, law enforcement and other 
agencies in the planning and conducting of operations against organised crime; 
- Using a variety of methods to combat organised crime, including investigating 
and prosecuting, disrupting activities and linkages, and confronting serious and 
organised crime; 
- Interrupting organised criminal activity through following the money trail, and 
through operations to restrain and forfeit the proceeds of crime; 
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- Driving the intelligence process on organised crime to gather information, and to 
ensure information is shared between law enforcement and other agencies; 
- Improving understanding of the activities and harm of organised crime networks; 
and 
- Preventing risks arising from serious and organised crime. 
 
Intelligence led approach 
The intelligence led approach will see the (NIC) developing an annual strategic 
assessment, but also involves providing other on-going assessments as new 
risks or threats arise.
757
 Based on the strategic assessments, OFCANZ will 
work with other agencies to agree on ‗Focus Areas‘ to concentrate its efforts 
upon.
758
 By refining the ‗Focus Areas‘ based on a risk prioritisation process,759 
OFCANZ will identify which areas they will focus on and areas that other 
agencies may respond to.
760
 All risk areas must first be presented before the 
Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination
761
 
(ODESC) for approval. Once the Focus Areas are agreed on OFCANZ will 
proceed on a more detailed, and specific examination, of each area and then 
develop subsequent intervention strategies.
762
 The evolving nature and constant 
development of criminal networks, requires OFCANZ to have flexibility and 
the ability to re-prioritise, to cope with emerging operational issues.
763
  
 
                                                 
757
 Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand, Tasking Framework (Organised 
Crime), online at <http://ofcanz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/OFCANZ-tasking-framework-
20081217.pdf>. Accessed 12-04-2009. 
758
 Ibid. 
759
 Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand, Risk Prioritisation (Organised 
Crime), online at <http://ofcanz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/OFCANZ-risk-prioritisation-
proposal-20081217.pdf>.OFCANZ will prioritise based impact criteria including impact on 1. 
New Zealand‘s national interests 2. impact on the community and 3. impact or thematic issue 
on multiple New Zealand agencies. Organised criminal groups or activities that impact on a 
significant number of the criteria within the three categories above will be agreed on as Focus 
Areas.  
760
 Ibid. 
761
 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Security in the Government Sector, (2002) 
―The Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (ODESC) is the 
committee of government officials charged with giving the Prime Minister strategic policy 
advice on domestic and external security matters. The committee reports to the Prime Minister 
and is chaired by the Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
with membership being drawn from Chief Executives of appropriate government agencies.‖ 
From Chapter 1page 5. Online at <www.security.govt.nz/sigs/chapter-1-security-policy.doc>.  
Retrieved  8 January2010. 
762
 Ibid. 
763
 OCANZ, supra n. 759. 
138 
 
An example of how OFCANZ operates in practise is evident during 
OFCANZ‘s first completed operational phase.764 ‗Taskforce Abyss‘ was an 
operation against members of the Tribesman Motorcycle Gang resulting in the 
arrest of 14 members, accounting for 160 charges, in relation to; “selling, 
supplying and conspiracy to supply and manufacture of methamphetamine”. 
Over 100 personnel were involved across a number of agencies including; the 
SFO, Customs, Ministry of Fisheries, Ministry of Social Development, Police 
and the Department of Corrections.  Taskforce Abyss was run under the 
leadership of OFCANZ. The operation demonstrates how OFCANZ, as a 
central figure in the fight against organised crime, is able to guide and organise 
relevant agencies to participate effectively in particular operations.  
 
Although in its infant stages
765
 OFCANZ offers a promising central agency in 
New Zealand‘s efforts to combat organised crime. Committing itself to an 
intelligence led approach will keep OFCANZ from stagnating and allow it to 
keep up with organised crime trends and adapt as necessary to the constantly 
changing nature of criminal networks.  
 
5.5 Legal tools to combat Organised Crime in New Zealand 
 
Since becoming a signatory to the Palermo Convention in December 2000 New 
Zealand has undertaken a number of legal reforms to ensure its obligations 
under the convention are met.
766
 The most significant legal reforms, in regards 
to combating organised crime, have centred on making participation in an 
organised criminal group illegal and targeting the finances of criminal groups. 
New Zealand has also worked to ensure that its domestic legislation provides 
for wide ranging assistances of extradition and other criminal matters. The 
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sections below will outline and discuss New Zealand‘s legal measures to 
combat organised crime, focusing on areas relating to: 
- Criminalising participation in an organised criminal group 
- Targeting criminal proceeds of crime 
- Targeting money laundering 
- Measures to foster cooperation with foreign countries. 
 
5.5.1 Participation Offence 
Under section 98A of the Crimes Act 1961, participation in an organised 
criminal group is illegal and liable for an imprisonment term not exceeding 10 
years.
767
 The statutory definition of organised crime is kept broad, reflecting 
the need to encompass the wide variety of groups involved in organised 
criminal activities. Section 98A (2) of the Crimes Act 1961 defines an 
organised criminal group: 
a group is an organised criminal group if it is a group of 3 or more people who have as 
their objective or one of their objectives— 
(a) obtaining material benefits from the commission of offences that are punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of 4 years or more; or 
(b) obtaining material benefits from conduct outside New Zealand that, if it occurred 
in New Zealand, would constitute the commission of offences that are punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of 4 years or more; or 
(c) the commission of serious violent offences (within the meaning of 
section 312A(1)) …; or 
(d) conduct outside New Zealand that, if it occurred in New Zealand, would constitute 
the commission of serious violent offences (within the meaning of section 312A(1))  
 
Furthermore section 98A (3) goes on to say: 
A group of people is capable of being an organised criminal group for the purposes of 
this Act whether or not— 
(a) some of them are subordinates or employees of others; or 
(b) only some of the people involved in it at a particular time are involved in the 
planning, arrangement, or execution at that time of any particular action, activity, or 
transaction; or 
(c) its membership changes from time to time. 
 
 
The case of R v Cara
768
 held that under section 98A of the Crimes Act it is not 
necessary for a criminal group to display longevity or continuous membership 
to be considered ‗organised‘. Moreover, it is not necessary to prove the 
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existence of any formal roles for members of the group
769
 or the existence of 
any type of formal membership system within the group.
770
  R v Cara also held 
that a group may be considered an ‗organised criminal group‘ under s 98A of 
the Crimes Act when they formed for the commission of a single offence.
771
 
However, in such a case, there must be evidence showing the group 
deliberately formed for that particular offence, otherwise the onus is on the 
prosecution to prove the alleged group has some degree of permanence, 
regularity or an acknowledgment by the members of some commonality.
772
 
 
Section 98A had not been as effective as initially hoped, in combating 
organised crime, due in part to the low penalty, which often did not reflect the 
culpability of gang leaders and criminal organisers.
773
 Furthermore, prosecutors 
had found the evidential burden, for proving participation, onerous and 
somewhat complicated.
774
 Consequently s 98A(1) of the Crimes Act was 
amended by s 5 of the Crimes Amendment Act 2009. This amendment 
increased the length of imprisonment, for participating in an organised criminal 
group, from a maximum of 5 years to a maximum of 10 years. Section 5 of the 
Crimes Amendment Act also seeks to clarify, and simplify, the evidential 
burden for prosecution to prove participation in an organised criminal group.
775
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These amendments are intended to make section 98A a more effective tool in 
prosecuting organised criminal groups and to send a strong warning to criminal 
leaders, facilitators, and others, who assist criminal groups to achieve their 
objectives.
776
 This message is strengthened by concurrent measures amending 
the Sentencing Act 2009, to include participation in an organised criminal 
group as an aggravating factor in sentencing.
777
 
 
5.5.2 Targeting criminal finances 
 As mentioned previously in this thesis, and as outlined in the New Zealand 
OCS, targeting criminal finances is considered both an effective measure to 
prosecute organised criminals, and to ensure they do not profit from their 
illegal gains. Thus, targeting criminal finances is also regarded as a potential 
preventive measure. New Zealand legislation in these areas has recently been 
reformed, and updated, to ensure New Zealand meets it international 
obligations, and to better target organised crime and terrorist funding.  
 
Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 
The Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 (CPRA) replaces the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1991 (PCA). It is hoped that the CPRA will be a more effective tool 
in combating organised crime. The former PCA provided for the confiscation 
of property only where the owner has been convicted of a criminal offence. 
Experience has shown that this is insufficient to target al parties involved in 
organised crime.
778
 Some members (often the organisers or facilitators) of 
these criminal groups effectively distance themselves from the actual 
commission of crimes, and therefore were not targeted by the 1991 PCA. 
Subsequently the total amount confiscated under the former Act was relatively 
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small.
779
 Therefore, the CPRA provides a conviction based regime, limited to 
instruments of crime, and a non-conviction based regime (civil regime) dealing 
with all other property representing the proceeds of crime, or assessed to be the 
value of a person‘s unlawfully derived income.780  
 
Section 15 makes it clear that the criminal activity, on which a civil forfeiture 
order is made, does not need to be the subject of any, prior or current, criminal 
proceedings in New Zealand or overseas.
781
 The CPRA follows similar 
legislative initiatives implemented in other jurisdictions; such as Australia, 
Ireland and the UK, which are proving more effective in those countries 
experience.
782
 
 
Purpose of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 
The primary purpose of the Act is to establish a regime for the forfeiture of 
property that has been derived from significant criminal activity, or that 
represents the value of a person‘s unlawfully derived income.783 The policy 
objectives of the PRCA are stated as:
784
 
- To confiscate property from persons who have engaged in or profited from 
significant criminal activity: 
- To reduce the rewards from crime for the individual: 
- To reduce the attraction of crime for potential offenders: 
- To reduce the resources that could potentially be used for criminal activity. 
 
Furthermore, the CPRA seeks to facilitate cooperation with other jurisdictions 
by addressing matters relating to foreign forfeiture and restraining orders.
785
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Significant criminal activity is defined under s 6 of the CPRA as;  
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imprisonment of 5 years or more; or 
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Conviction based regime 
Subpart 4 of the CPRA deals with the forfeiture of instruments of crime. In 
addition, many aspects of New Zealand‘s conviction-based forfeiture regime 
are included in the Sentencing Act 2002. An instrument forfeiture order is one 
made under s 142N of the Sentencing Act, which allows the Court to order that 
the instrument of crime, or any part of it, be forfeited to the Crown. An 
instrument of crime refers to any property “used (wholly or in part) to commit 
or facilitate the commission of a qualifying instrument forfeiture offence”.786 A 
qualifying instrument offence is an offence punishable by a maximum 
imprisonment term of 5 years or more.
787
 Previously; property used to commit, 
or facilitate, a serious crime was included in the definition of ‗tainted property‘, 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1991
788
 and was liable for forfeiture under 
that Act.
789
 Forfeiture of ‗instruments of crime‘ is now dealt with as part of the 
sentencing process.
790
 
 
Civil based regime 
The weakness of the 1991 Proceeds of Crime Act was due to its inability to 
target those criminals, who are involved in organised criminal activity but, who 
do not ‗get their hands dirty‘. Often these criminals play a key part.791 
Therefore, the civil forfeiture regime in the CPRA seeks to ensure that 
criminal‘s who organise, facilitate, or in any other way aid, organised criminal 
activity are not exempt from forfeiture measures.
792
  Under the CPRA the 
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Commissioner of the Police is empowered to apply to the High Court for 
either; an assets forfeiture order or, a profit forfeiture order.
793
  
 
The assets forfeiture regime rests on the ability of the Court to order the 
forfeiture of ‗tainted property‘. Tainted property refers to794: 
(a)...property that has, wholly or in part, been— 
(i)  acquired as a result of significant criminal activity; or 
(ii) directly or indirectly derived from significant criminal activity; and 
(b) includes any property that has been acquired as a result of, or directly or indirectly   
derived from, more than 1 activity if at least 1 of those activities is a significant 
criminal activity.  
 
Assets forfeiture is aimed at property rather than people and requires the 
Crown to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the property is ‗tainted 
property‘.795 On application for an assets forfeiture order, if the High Court is 
satisfied on the ‗balance of probabilities‘ that specific property is ‗tainted 
property‘, the Court must make an assets forfeiture order in respect of that 
property.
796
  
 
In regards to a profit forfeiture order; if the Court is satisfied, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the respondent has unlawfully benefited from significant 
criminal activity, in the relevant period of criminal activity, and has interests in 
property, then a profit forfeiture order will be made.
797
 ‗The relevant period of 
criminal activity‘ refers to profit, for criminal activity, received not more than 7 
years prior to an application for forfeiture or restraint.
798
 The policy rationale, 
for the 7 year period, is to allow for confiscation of wealth, derived over a 
significant period, without going so far back in time as run the risk of 
unreliable assessments.
799
  
 
Before making a ‗profit forfeiture order‘, the Court must determine the 
maximum recoverable amount. The determined amount is recoverable, from 
the respondent, by the Official Assignee on behalf of the Crown, as a debt due 
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to the Crown.
800
 Once the Commissioner has established, on the balance of 
probabilities, the respondent has unlawfully benefited from significant criminal 
activity (within the relevant period of criminal activity) the value of that benefit 
is presumed to be the value stated in the application for the profit forfeiture 
order.
801
 Therefore the onus is on the respondent to prove, that on the balance 
of probabilities, the stated value is too great.
802
 The justification for the reverse 
onus is based on the belief that; requiring the Crown to establish the value of 
the profit, for significant criminal activity, is too onerous a test.
803
 It is a 
difficult task to obtain evidence showing the unlawful origins of property. On 
the other hand, if the property comes from lawful means, then the respondent 
should not have a significant difficulty proving its legitimate origins.
804
 
 
Restraining Orders 
Under a restraining order, property specified within the order may not be 
disposed of, or dealt with other than is provided for in the order.
805
 
Furthermore, the property will be under the Official Assignees custody and 
control. Under the CPRA the Court may make a restraining order for the 
following reasons: 
- The court is satisfied it has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
respondent has unlawfully benefited from significant criminal 
activity.
806
 
- If the court is satisfied it has reasonable grounds to believe that any 
property is ‗tainted property‘.807 
- The respondent has been charged with a qualifying instrument 
forfeiture offence and the court is satisfied it has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the property, referred to in the application, is an instrument 
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of crime used to facilitate that qualifying instrument forfeiture 
offence.
808
 
- The court is satisfied it has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
respondent will be charged with a qualifying instrument forfeiture 
offence within 48 hours and the property referred to in the application is 
an instrument of crime used to facilitate that qualifying instrument 
forfeiture offence.
809
 
 
Money laundering under the Crimes Act 1961 
Under s 243(2) of the Crimes Act every person who; in respect of any 
property
810
 that is the proceeds of a serious offence
811
, engages in a money 
laundering transaction is liable for an imprisonment term not exceeding 7 
years. In addition, every person is liable for an imprisonment term not 
exceeding 5 years who obtains, or has in there position, property that is the 
proceeds of a serious offence
812
; 
 a) With intent to engage in a money laundering transaction in respect of that property; 
and 
 b) Knowing or believing that all or part of the property is the proceeds of a serious 
offence, or being reckless as to whether or not the property is the proceeds of a serious 
offence. 
 
Under the Crimes Act a person engages in a money laundering transaction if, 
for the purposes of concealing
813
 any property, or enabling another to conceal 
any property, that person deals
814
 with the property or, assists another person to 
deal with the property.
815
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Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 
(AML/CFT Act) 
The AML/CFT Act represents New Zealand‘s efforts to come into line with 
international standards, for anti-money laundering and countering financing of 
terrorism (AML/CFT) measures, as set out by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF).
816
 The Act represents the first reforms on this area since 1996. It 
became clear, that to meet international standards, New Zealand‘s legal 
framework needed to be improved.
817
 This was particularly true in key areas 
such as customer due diligence, record keeping standards, and in the 
supervision of AML/CFT activity.
818
 As far as possible the measures, outlined 
in the AML/CFT Act, have been harmonised with the Australian anti-money 
laundering regime.
819
 The level of integration between New Zealand and 
Australia, moving towards a single market, requires that both countries 
legislation, on this issue, be closely aligned to be effective.
820
  
 
Purpose of the AML/CFT Act 
The AML/CFT Act has three primary objectives:
821
 
- Deter money laundering and the financing of terrorism 
- Maintain and enhance New Zealand‘s international reputation by 
adopting, where appropriate in the New Zealand context, 
recommendations issued by the FATF 
- Contribute to public confidence in the financial system. 
The Act seeks to facilitate co-operation amongst reporting entities, AML/CFT 
Act supervisors, and various government agencies, in particular law 
enforcement and regulatory agencies.
822
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Method for achieving objectives 
To bring New Zealand into line with international standards the AML/CFT Act 
provides the following innovations
823
: 
- A set of reporting requirements for reporting entities (financial service 
providers, casino‘s and any person (natural or legal) declared by 
regulations to be required to comply with the Act) 
- A risk based approach to tracking possible money laundering and 
terrorist financing activity. This approach is intended to minimise 
compliance costs. 
- A supervision, monitoring and enforcement regime. Three supervisors 
have been nominated namely; the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the 
Securities Commission and the Department of Internal Affairs.
824
 
- An enforcement regime which includes civil and criminal offences. 
 
The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee was critical of having 
three separate supervising entities; preferring the Australian approach which 
has just one supervisory agency, the Australian Transactions Reports and 
Analysis Centre.
825
 
 
Obligations for reporting entities
826
 
The AML/CFT Act requires reporting entities to provide a risk assessment, of 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism activity, that it may 
                                                                                                                                 
822
 Ibid at s 3(2). 
823
 Supra n. 816 at 2. Also see Ministry of Justice, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering 
Financing of Terrorism Act 2009 (October 16 2009). Online at 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy-and-consultation/crime/anti-money-laundering-and-
countering-the-financing-of-terrorism/aml-cft-act-2009>. Accessed 14 January 2010 and 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of 
Terrorism Act 2009. Online at <http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/aml/index.html>. Accessed 14 Jan 10. 
824
 Ibid. The Reserve Bank is responsible for supervision of banks, life insurers and non-bank 
deposit takers. The Securities Commission will be the supervisor f securities; trustee 
companies, futures dealers, collective investment schemes, brokers and financial advisers. The 
Department of Internal Affairs will supervise casinos, non-deposit taking lenders, money 
changers and other reporting entities that are not covered by the Reserve Bank or Securities 
Commission. 
825
 Supra n. 816 at 2. 
826
 Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of 
Terrorism Act 2009. Online at <http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/aml/index.html>. This link provides a 
useful overview and structure of these obligations. 
149 
 
reasonably expect to face in the course of its business.
827
 A reporting entity 
must also develop an AML/CFT compliance programme, based on the risk 
assessment, this includes; internal procedures, policies and controls to, detect, 
manage and mitigate money laundering activity.
828
  
 
Reporting entities are required, under Part 2(Subpart 1) of the AML/CFT Act, 
to undertake customer due diligence on any of the following:
829
 
- A customer 
- Any beneficial owner of the customer 
- Any person acting on behalf of the customer 
Under s 40 of the AML/CFT Act reporting entities are required to report 
suspicious transactions. This section will apply when
830
; 
...the reporting entity has reasonable grounds to suspect that the transaction or 
proposed transaction is or may be— 
(i) relevant to the investigation or prosecution of any person for a money laundering 
offence; or 
(ii) relevant to the enforcement of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; or 
(iii) relevant to the enforcement of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002; or 
(iv) relevant to the enforcement of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 or the Criminal 
Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009; or 
(v) relevant to the investigation or prosecution of a serious offence within the meaning 
of section243(1) of the Crimes Act 1961. 
 
The reporting entity is required to act as soon as practicable when it suspects a 
suspicious transaction, but no later than three days after forming the 
suspicion.
831
 Furthermore, reporting entities are required to keep transaction 
records
832
; identity and verification records
833
; and, in addition, the following 
miscellaneous records
834
: 
(a) records that are relevant to the establishment of the business relationship; and 
(b) records relating to risk assessments, AML/CFT programmes, and audits; and 
(c) any other records (for example, account files, business correspondence, and written 
findings) relating to, and obtained during the course of, a business relationship that are 
reasonably necessary to establish the nature and purpose of, and activities relating to, 
the business relationship. 
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Cross-border transportation of cash 
Section 68 of the AML/CFT Act states; a person shall not move cash into or 
out of New Zealand, if the total amount of cash is more than the applicable 
threshold value. Section 68 also applies if the movement of cash is not 
exempted under regulations, and the person has not given a report in respect of 
the cash movement. Furthermore, under s 69, a person is not allowed to receive 
cash moved from outside of New Zealand, if the same conditions exist as 
outlined in s 68.  
 
The ‗applicable threshold value‘ is defined in s 5 as the threshold value 
prescribed in regulations and applies to a particular person, class of persons, 
transaction, class of transactions, financial activity, or class of financial 
activities prescribed in regulations. At the time of writing this thesis, the 
applicable regulations, guidelines and codes of practise are still in development 
waiting on public consultation.
835
 
 
Enforcement Regime 
The enforcement regime under the AML/CFT Act includes both civil and 
criminal offences. 
 
Civil liability act 
A civil liability act occurs when a reporting entity fails to comply with any of 
the AML/CFT requirements set out in the act. This includes, without limitation, 
when a reporting entity;
836
 
(a) fails to conduct customer due diligence as required by subpart 1 of Part 2: 
(b) fails to adequately monitor accounts and transactions: 
(c) enters into or continues a business relationship with a person who does not produce 
or provide satisfactory evidence of the person‘s identity: 
(d) enters into or continues a correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank: 
(e) fails to keep records in accordance with the requirements of subpart 3 of Part 2 
(which relates to record keeping) 
(f) fails to establish, implement, or maintain an AML/CFT programme: 
(g) fails to ensure that its branches and subsidiaries comply with the relevant 
AML/CFT requirements. 
                                                 
835
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When a civil liability act occurs the relevant AML/CFT supervisor is 
empowered to take one or a combination of the following courses of action:
837
 
- issue a formal warning under s 80 
- accept an enforceable undertaking and seek in order in court if the 
undertaking is breached
838
 
- seek an injunction from the High Court under s 85 or 87; or apply to the 
Court for a pecuniary penalty under s 90.  
Offences 
Under s 91 a civil liability act is considered an offence, if the reporting entity 
engages in that conduct knowingly or recklessly. Furthermore ss 92-97 covers 
a number of other offences such as failing to report suspicious transactions, 
providing false or misleading information, in regards to a suspicious 
transactions report, and failing to adequately keep or retain records relating to 
suspicious transactions. The penalties for reporting entities who commit an 
offence under ss 91-97 include:
839
 
(a) in the case of an individual, either or both of the following: 
(i) a term of imprisonment of not more than 2 years: 
(ii) a fine of up to $300,000; and 
(b) in the case of a body corporate, a fine of up to $5 million. 
 
Conclusions 
The AML/CFT Act is a complex piece of legislation that, arguably, imposes 
onerous duties on reporting entities. However, the Act provides necessary, non-
traditional measures, to target organised crime. Profit is the primary motive of 
organised criminals. Hiding their illegal gains often requires a level of 
integration with legitimate private sector financial institutions and casino‘s.840 
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By building cooperation with the private sector on this matter, there is a far 
more realistic and long term potential, that criminals will find it harder to 
launder their illegal profits. Furthermore, if New Zealand was to lag behind 
international standards, relating to AML/CFT, it would become a weak link in 
international efforts to combat TNOC. Therefore the AML/CFT Act represents 
a step in the right direction. 
 
5.6 International Cooperation 
 
New Zealand is a signatory to many multilateral treaties, relevant to combating 
TNOC, including the Palermo Convention. Accordingly, New Zealand has 
undertaken steps to ensure it will provide the widest possible mutual assistance 
on criminal matters and extradition. New Zealand has relatively few bilateral 
agreements relating to extradition or mutual assistance. Rather New Zealand‘s 
domestic legislation provides for assistance on these matters. This section will 
focus on New Zealand‘s legislation relating to extradition, and mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters. 
 
5.6.1 Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992  
The object of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (Mutual 
Assistance Act) is to facilitate the provision and obtaining, by New Zealand, of 
international assistance in criminal matters including; 841 
(a) The identification and location of persons:
 
 
(b) The obtaining of evidence, documents, or other articles: 
(c) The production of documents and other articles: 
(d) The making of arrangements for persons to give evidence or assist investigations: 
(e) The service of documents: 
(f) The execution of requests for search and seizure: 
(g) The forfeiture or confiscation of tainted property: 
(h) The recovery of pecuniary penalties in respect of offences: 
(i) The restraining of dealings in property, or the freezing of assets, that may be 
forfeited or confiscated, or that may be needed to satisfy pecuniary penalties imposed, 
in respect of offences: 
(j) The location of property that may be forfeited, or that may be needed to satisfy 
pecuniary penalties imposed, in respect of offences. 
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The act has been designed to provide ‗wide ranging‘ mutual assistance and 
adheres to the, minimum, standards set out under the Palermo Convention.
842
 
 
Requests by New Zealand 
Part 2 of the Act makes provision for mutual assistance requests made by New 
Zealand. Section 8 designates responsibility to the Attorney-General for 
making mutual assistance requests. 
 
Section 11 refers to obtaining evidence for use in New Zealand Courts. Under 
this section the Attorney-General may make a request, to a foreign authority, 
when there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence or other 
information is relevant to any criminal proceedings in New Zealand.
843
 Any 
deposition or document received from the foreign authority, pursuant to a 
request, may be put forward as evidence in the relevant criminal proceedings, 
subject to the rules of law relating to admission of evidence.
844
 This section 
illustrates how a request for foreign assistance is, totally, reliant on the foreign 
authority producing the evidence promptly, in a manner that satisfies 
procedural matters and rules relating to admission of evidence. 
 
Requests made to New Zealand 
Requests for mutual assistance under the Mutual Assistance Act may be made 
by prescribed foreign countries
845
 and convention countries (including Palermo 
Convention countries).
846
 Section 25A also provides for ad hoc assistance with 
countries not included in the above two categories. Requests are to be made to 
the Attorney-General
847
 and should specify the purpose for, and type of, 
assistance required.
848
 The authority applying for assistance should include 
details of the procedures, which the foreign country wishes New Zealand to 
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follow, in giving effect to the request.
849
 This helps enable New Zealand to 
fulfil the request for assistance in a manner which will be acceptable for use in 
the requesting countries Courts. 
5.6.2 Extradition Act 1999 
 The Extradition Act consolidates the law relating to extradition of persons to 
and from New Zealand. The object of the Act, as outlined in s 12, is: 
The object of the Act is to provide for the surrender of an accused or convicted person 
from New Zealand to an extradition country or from an extradition country to New 
Zealand, and in particular— 
(a) To enable New Zealand to carry out its obligations under extradition treaties; and 
(b) To provide a means for New Zealand to give effect to requests for extradition from 
Commonwealth countries; and 
(c) To provide a means for New Zealand to give effect to requests for extradition from 
non-Commonwealth countries with which New Zealand does not have an extradition 
treaty; and 
(d) To provide a simplified procedure for New Zealand to give effect to requests for 
extradition from Australia and certain other countries; and 
(e) To facilitate the making of requests for the extradition of persons to New Zealand. 
 
Under the Act a person may be extradited to an ‗extradition country‘ for:850 
- Committing an offence against the law of that country or,  
-  They have been convicted for an offence against the law of that 
country.  
The extradition country must intend to impose a maximum imprisonment term 
of not less than 12 months and the offence must also be one that would incur 
the same penalty (i.e. imprisonment of 12 months or more) had it occurred in 
New Zealand.
851
 
 
Different Parts of the Extradition Act apply to different countries: 
- Part 4 applies to Australia and designated countries.852 
- Part 3 applies to any commonwealth country, regardless if a treaty 
exists with them.
853
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- Part 3 applies to countries with whom NZ has an extradition treaty and 
the Governor-General, by order of council, may apply this part to 
them.
854
  
- Part 3 also applies to other non-commonwealth countries whereby the 
Governor-General, on order of council, may apply part 3 to them, 
subject to limitations specified in the order.
855
 
- Section 60 allows for the extension of the Extradition Act to countries 
who do not fit into the above categories of countries or the offence does 
not meet the 12 month imprisonment test. If it is determined that the 
Act may apply, to a request under section 60, then it will be carried out 
in the manner prescribed under Part 3. 
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Chapter Six 
Ways forward 
 
 
6.1 International Community 
 
The international community has forged a remarkable, uniformed response to 
the perceived growing threat of organised crime. Conventions relating to 
specific offences, such as corruption and illicit drug trafficking, have created 
widespread international obligations in respect to those offences. The Palermo 
Convention, and its protocols, is the culmination of intense international effort 
to produce an accepted consensus, on how the international community will 
meet the challenge of transnational organised crime and its associated 
activities. It is the most important international convention in regards to 
organised crime, and has been widely accepted by the international community. 
 
The Palermo Convention has received 140 signatories and 137 ratifications,
856
 
representing a remarkable international consensus on what constitutes 
organised crime and the appropriate measures to combat it. It provides a 
mechanism for achieving uniformed minimum standards that States are 
expected to adhere to. The convention has delivered important uniformed 
obligations for States to implement in respect of; 
- criminalising participation in an organised criminal group;857 
- criminalising and taking measures against the laundering of proceeds of 
crime;858 
- criminalising and taking measures against corruption;859 
                                                 
856
 In addition, many other States have accepted or implemented the provisions of the 
convention thorough acceptance, approval, accession or succession. See ―Status of responses of 
States to the checklist/ questionnaires on the implementation of the United Nations Convention 
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- criminalising and taking measures against obstruction of justice;860 
- enhancing international cooperation, including extradition and mutual 
legal assistance861 
The Palermo Convention also seeks to encourage and provide mechanisms for 
technical cooperation and technical help, for the implementation of the 
convention.
862
 
 
Impact of international efforts to combat transnational organised crime 
The Implementation Review
863
 of the Palermo Convention acknowledges that; 
despite the appearance of significant improvements in the level of compliance, 
which provide a solid foundation to build on, the survey was only superficial 
and a more in depth study needs to be conducted to determine the efficacy and 
efficiency of the regimes already in place at the national and international 
levels.
864
 Stefano Betti believes the Palermo Convention needs a 
comprehensive monitoring system and notes that the use of normative criteria 
alone is not sufficient. State Parties need to provide the COTP with reports 
containing data on the impact of implementation.
865
 Although closer 
international conformity with the provisions of leading conventions is strongly 
encouraged; evidence of their ability to foster progress and success, in 
combating TNOC, cannot be conclusively determined without further inquiry 
into impacts. 
 
Giuseppe Di Gennaro writes, in his article titled ‗Strengthening the 
International Legal System in Order to Combat Transnational Crime‟, that the 
                                                                                                                                 
859
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international community has made little progress in combating organised 
crime.
866
 He notes that, despite the copious amount of initiatives undertaken by 
national governments and international bodies, particularly the UN, there has 
been little evidence to suggest significant successes; rather he suggests the 
situation has deteriorated.
867
 Di Gennaro describes how networks of criminals 
have invaded previously immune areas; and these criminal groups have 
increased in quantity and type around the world. However, he does 
acknowledge that if nothing had been done it could be a whole lot worse.
868
  
 
The tone of Di Gennaro‘s article reflects the findings in a UN report titled; “A 
more secure world: our shared responsibility Report of the High-level Panel 
on Threats” (Threats Report).869 This report outlines a number of serious 
threats facing the international community including TNOC. The report is 
critical, declaring:
870
 
States and international organizations have reacted too slowly to the threat of 
organized crime and corruption. Statements about the seriousness of the threat have 
rarely been matched by action. Three basic impediments stand in the way of more 
effective international responses: insufficient cooperation among States, weak 
coordination among international agencies and inadequate compliance by many States. 
 
The Threats Report also criticises international efforts to combat TNOC, which 
continue to suffer from a lack of commitment and understanding by many 
States, particularly in the area of corruption. Furthermore, national demand 
reduction initiatives have largely been a failure. This is glaringly evident in the 
area of illicit drugs where the availability and use of drugs, over the last 
decade, has either remained relatively stable or even grown in some areas of 
the world.
871
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6.1.2 Steps to strengthen the international system 
The Threats Report highlights that the fluid and agile nature of organised 
criminal networks, is in stark contrast to the cumbersome and weak 
international efforts to achieve cooperation.
872
 The report does suggest that if 
States widely ratify the Palermo Convention, and effectively implement its 
provisions, then there is the potential to level the playing field with criminal 
networks, by providing for swifter and closer international cooperation.
873
 
Criminal groups are extremely successful at crossing international borders to 
achieve their goals whereas legal cooperation is often impeded by them. For 
this reason the Panel stresses the necessity for States to set up a central 
authority to handle requests for assistance, which will facilitate the exchange of 
many types of assistance, as outlined in the Palermo Convention.
874
  
 
Achieving effective international cooperation continues to prove elusive, 
seriously impeding efforts to combat TNOC. Too many States have failed to 
bring their domestic legal regimes up to a level that will not hamper extradition 
and MLA.
875
 The Palermo Convention provides only minimum requirements to 
foster an effective global effort to combat TNOC. When States continue to fail 
to reach even this minimum level there is little chance of achieving a 
coordinated and uniform approach in dealing with the networks of criminal 
groups operating across the globe. Moreover, countries who fail to take 
effective measures against organised crime are at risk of being viewed as safe 
havens for criminals, or they provide an option for criminals to hide their 
proceeds from criminal activity.  
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Developing the capability of struggling States 
Many States do not have the level of expertise, or technical ability, needed to 
fully implement the Palermo Convention‘s provisions.876 Therefore, it is 
necessary that the UN through the services of the UNODC
877
, and in 
partnership with regional initiatives, continues to work to provide technical 
assistance and training to build the capacity of those States in need.
878
 
Furthermore, many States also suffer from a lack of resources and thus the UN 
needs to ensure such efforts are adequately funded.
879
  
 
The UNCOTP has an important job of monitoring and reviewing State Parties 
implementation, in relation to the Palermo Convention, and it has been 
suggested that this mandate be expanded to also review and analyse the 
effectiveness of the measures taken by States, in implementing the 
convention.
880
 States would need to collate and provide the UN with empirical 
data that illustrates the effectiveness of the measures they have implemented, in 
conjunction with the normative data outlining the measures they have taken.
881
 
This is important in analysing the effectiveness of prior measures and for 
building future strategies and to combat TNOC. 
 
Specific Money Laundering Convention 
The UN Threats Report indicates that anti-money laundering measures, and 
measures to take the profit out of crime, can be among the most effective in 
combating TNOC.
882
 Therefore, the report calls for the creation of a specific 
UN Convention relating to money laundering to increase the effectiveness and 
uniformity of measures to combat money laundering.
883
 A specific 
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international convention focusing on money laundering would be a valuable 
tool for developing international norms and a uniformed approach in this area.  
Uniformity in international measures to combat money laundering is absolutely 
necessary, to ensure that criminals cannot exploit countries with weaker laws 
and regulatory measures, to hide their illegal profits.
884
 
 
Developing non-traditional measures to combat organised crime 
The international community has achieved little in the way of encouraging 
States to address social and other conditions, which allow TNOC to flourish. 
Very few States reported non-traditional anti-organised crime measures, such 
as public awareness campaigns or promoting the participation of society in 
efforts to curb organised crime, which can be used to compliment traditional 
law enforcement approaches.
885
 Article 31 of the Palermo Convention, on 
prevention, contains only weakly worded suggestions and no concrete 
mandatory obligations. Essentially the Palermo Convention represents a re-
doubling of efforts using, more-or-less, traditional measures to combat 
organised crime.
886
  
 
The Palermo Convention is based on an understanding of transnational 
organised crime as an attack on national political-economies that are assumed 
to be satisfactory, and therefore, should be secured in their existing format.
887
 
Because of this portrayal of organised crime, the convention is primarily 
focused on criminalising ‗outsiders‘ who are deemed to be intent on corrupting 
institutions and otherwise morally sound citizens. By emphasising ‗outsiders‘ 
as the primary force driving TNOC, the convention focuses on traditional 
criminal justice measures and does not encourage an understanding of what is 
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driving participation in organised crime and the demand for illegal goods and 
services, at either an international, national or local level.
888
 
 
Understanding the factors and conditions that allow TNOC to flourish 
‗Intelligent action requires knowledge‘; Michael Woodiwiss laments the 
international community‘s lack of comprehensive and objective inquiry into 
criminal problems, associated with both legal and illegal markets.
889
 Rather, 
world leaders have, essentially, adopted uniformed, traditional criminal justice 
measures to combat organised crime and extended their application to TNOC, 
through the creation of the Palermo Convention.
890
 There has been a failure, 
generally, at the international level to instigate an objective inquiry into the 
factors that give rise to illicit markets and the factors that attract people to 
participate in TNOC.
891
 The mandatory provisions of the Palermo Convention, 
and the conventions against illicit drugs, are primarily focused on traditional 
crime suppression, encouraging measures directed at; enforcement, 
punishment, containment, disturbance and dismantling.
892
 While these 
measures are necessary, by themselves they are not sufficient to combat 
organised crime in a comprehensive manner.  
 
There is an assumption that closely implementing the Palermo Convention will 
result in a substantial reduction in organised crime and serious crime.
893
 
Subsequently, monitoring and review measures, relating to the Convention, are 
focused predominantly on issues such as; how closely have States implemented 
key provisions and what can be done to assist States to effectively implement 
provisions.
894
 No review or study has been undertaken to determine the 
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effectiveness of the measures promoted by the Palermo Convention in 
combating organised crime and serious crime generally.
895
 To assesses the 
ongoing effectiveness of the Palermo Convention a mechanism must be created 
that can accurately measure the impact of the convention on organised crime 
and levels of serious crime generally. 
 
Re-conceiving TNOC as an ‘internal challenge’ 
National governments cannot expect that carefully implementing the 
mandatory provisions of the Palermo Convention will be the sole answer to 
suppressing and reducing organised crime. Criminal networks have proved to 
be exceptionally adaptable to traditional criminal justice and law enforcement 
measures.
896
 The international community needs to re-think its preconception 
with TNOC as primarily an ‗external alien threat‘. The focus must shift to 
challenge States to view TNOC as an ‗internal challenge‘ in addition to the 
external threat narrative.
897
 States must, increasingly, focus on the prevention, 
or at least reduction, of opportunities for particular offences and find ways to 
reduce motivation for participation in organised crime.
898
 Reducing the 
opportunities for the exchange and consumption of illicit goods and services 
will help reduce the motivation for criminal groups to be involved in providing 
illicit goods and services.
899
  
 
Ratifying the Palermo Convention is an essential step, but national 
governments also need to implement specific programmes at a local 
community level, to understand and mitigate the factors, which allow illegal 
markets to flourish and which encourage participation in organised crime.
900
 In 
addition, at an international level and complementing the Palermo Convention, 
work needs to be done to persuade and assist States to take effective 
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community based action against organised crime.
901
 Viewing organised crime 
as an internal challenge to certain social formations, will provide the impetus 
for governments to address the social preconditions, which foster the formation 
and reproduction of criminal groups and networks.
902
 Without international 
pressure and assistance many States will not be willing or able to implement 
effective community and social based measures. As criminals are able to 
operate in and across multiple jurisdictions, community crime prevention, as a 
concept to assist measures to combat organised crime, will have limited 
effectiveness if some State‘s fail to take an interest in community based 
measures.
903
  
 
 
6.2. Ways forward for New Zealand 
 
Over the last few years New Zealand has developed a comprehensive 
Organised Crime Strategy and undertaken vigorous reforms to ensure its 
organised crime legislation, proceeds of crime legislation and anti-money 
laundering legislation adheres to international obligations. New Zealand has 
clearly been influenced by the United Kingdom and United States in its 
proceeds of crime legislation
904
, and the creation of OFCANZ mirrors, in many 
ways, the creation of SOCA, in the UK. While drawing on lessons from 
overseas experiences New Zealand has also been careful to avoid adopting 
measures that are inappropriate to its circumstances.  
 
NZ has developed a broad and flexible definition of organised crime, which 
encompasses the diverse groups operating in the country. A flexible conception 
of organised crime is important, as negative experiences in the US have shown, 
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to ensure that government policies, legal systems and law enforcement 
measures can continue to keep up with the evolving nature of organised crime. 
The US has retained a traditional, outdated conception of organised crime; 
which has caused confusion in US courts, led to law enforcement measures that 
specifically target ethnic groups, and failed to encompass the multifaceted 
nature of modern organised crime. 
 
The creation of OFCANZ signals an intelligence led approach to combating 
organised crime, and reflects developments and experiences in the UK. NZ has 
committed itself, through the development of the OCS, to continually 
developing an understanding of the nature of organised crime and knowledge 
of organised crime trends. The intelligence gathered, regarding organised 
crime, will be used to direct future measures to combat organised crime. 
 
Traditional measures to combat organised crime 
New Zealand has developed a robust criminal justice framework for combating 
organised crime. The s 98A of the Crimes Act 1961, criminalising participation 
in an organised criminal group, helps to ensure that involvement in organised 
crime is inherently risky for members, even when they may not be involved in 
the commission of an offence, but are integral in the organisation or facilitation 
of an offence. In comparison to The UK‘s sectorial approach, New Zealand‘s 
determination to criminalise participation provides a more unified and coherent 
base for targeting key organisers and facilitators of organised crime. Moreover, 
the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 provides more comprehensive 
measures, than previous legislation, to ensure criminals do not profit from their 
illegal activity, even when they have not been involved in the commission of a 
particular offence. As a signatory to the Palermo Convention, NZ has 
undertaken exemplary efforts to ensure that its provisions are fully 
implemented into domestic law, including ensuring that cooperation with 
foreign States is provided to a very wide extent. 
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Non-traditional measures to combat organised crime 
Perhaps one of the most encouraging aspects of the OCS is a commitment to 
introducing non-traditional measures to combat organised crime. The OCS has 
as one of its focus areas a dedication to community based engagement. Links 
between youth and organised criminal groups (particularly local and national 
level gangs) have been recognised in New Zealand prompting interventions at 
a youth level.
905
 
 
The OCS seeks to introduce measures that will reduce incentives to participate 
in organised crime and focuses on providing counter incentives, such as, 
employment and building strong family and community links. This indicates a 
willingness to develop an understanding of the social conditions that lead to the 
development and participation in organised crime. Furthermore, New Zealand 
has identified key activities, associated with organised crime, and is seeking to 
reduce demand for these goods and services and reduce opportunities and 
motivation for criminals and criminal networks to be involved in these markets. 
For instance, as part of the New Zealand Police Illicit Drug Strategy,
906
 the NZ 
government has introduced a number of initiatives to reduce supply and 
demand for illicit drugs. This includes engaging with communities to educate 
and equip people to resist drugs, and furthermore, to encourage communities to 
take ownership of illicit drug issues.
907
 
 
The OCS is intended to provide a coherent framework for all relevant NZ 
agencies to combat organised crime. The OCS is the first stage, in what is 
supposed to be an ongoing cycle of strategies and threat assessments that will 
guide responses to organised crime. Therefore the initial OCS is not overly 
specific in describing the measures needed to combat organised crime but 
provides a very encouraging framework to build on for the future. 
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Ministry of Justice, supra n. 691 and supra n. 724.  
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 New Zealand Police, New Zealand Police Illicit Drug Strategy to 2010, (February 2009). 
Online at: 
<http://www.police.govt.nz/resources/2009/NZ_Police_Illicit_Drug_Strategy_2009.pdf>. 
907
 Ibid at page 14. 
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The AML/CFT Act also represents a strong non-traditional approach to 
combating organised crime. It encourages engagement with the private sector 
and minimises opportunities for organised crime to infiltrate legitimate 
businesses in their attempts to launder money. New Zealand has pulled itself 
into line with recognised international standards, as outlined by the FATF and 
within the Palermo Convention. 
 
6.2.1 Looking to the future 
New Zealand has developed strong traditional criminal justice measures to 
combat organised crime, and has thoroughly implemented the provisions and 
spirit of the Palermo Convention into its domestic framework. New Zealand‘s 
strategy to combat TNOC is in its infancy. NZ has taken encouraging steps as 
it develops it‘s response to TNOC. The recently created OCS, AML/CFT Act 
and the Proceeds of Crime (Recovery) Act are innovative and important 
developments, but NZ needs to ensure that it builds on these initial measures.   
 
Developing intelligence led approach 
Learning from the UK, New Zealand needs to ensure that it continues to 
develop sound intelligence relating to organised crime. SOCA, in the UK, has 
played an important role in developing an accurate conception of organised 
crime and in the development of law enforcement strategies to combat TNOC. 
Furthermore, intelligence collected and analysed by SOCA and other key 
agencies, is vital for informing and shaping future policy decisions.
908
  
 
In New Zealand‘s context, OFCANZ is an important agency in this regard and 
will be instrumental, along side the Police NIC, in developing annual threat 
assessments and mapping out future trends relating to organised criminal 
activity. OFCANZ and the NIC have important roles in gathering and 
disseminating intelligence to other agencies. OFCANZ will drive the 
intelligence process. They are responsible, along with the NIC, for collecting 
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intelligence, and ensuring intelligence is disseminated efficiently, between law 
enforcement and other agencies. However, at this stage, OCANZ is still 
developing and is a very small agency with limited capabilities.
909
  
 
Developing the capabilities of OFCANZ will enable it to more effectively lead 
and coordinate NZ agencies, as they respond to instances of organised crime. 
Moreover, OFCANZ has a responsibility to raise public awareness regarding 
organised crime, but releases only limited publications and keeps threat 
assessments restricted.
910
 The threat assessments released to the public in 
countries like the UK, enable the public to understand how organised crime 
operates and the activities associated with it. If OFCANZ wishes to educate 
and inform the public on risks associated with organised crime it would be 
advisable to publically release, even modified, threat assessments. 
 
Avoiding the ‘ethnicity trap’ 
How the problem of organised crime is constructed will be a significant factor 
in how future laws are framed and how investigations and prosecutions are 
conducted.
911
 New Zealand agencies must ensure they do not fall into the 
‗ethnicity trap‘; focusing on and attributing organised crime problems to 
particular ethnicity. Despite the OCS portraying organised crime as a 
multifaceted problem that involves many ethnic groups, the New Zealand 
police continue to identify organised crime by ethnicity and OFCANZ, in 
establishing particular Focus Areas, is specifically targeting ‗Asian organised 
crime‘.912 The law enforcement response to organised crime in the US should 
serve as a reminder of how conceiving organised crime in terms of ethnicity 
                                                 
909
 Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand, Taskforce Operations (Organised 
Crime) at 10, online at <http://ofcanz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/taskforce-operations-
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leads to mistaking ethnicity as a necessary organising feature.
913
 This approach 
ignores the importance of other factors associated with the criminal network 
paradigm, such as ‗criminal contact brokers‘ and other key intermediaries who 
often ‗transcend‘ ethnicity.914 Furthermore, focusing on ethnically defined 
groups obscures the fact that criminal groups, even ethnically monolithic ones, 
must expand, operate and recruit beyond familiar contacts to effectively 
participate in the production, exchange and consumption of illicit goods and 
services.
915
 
 
New Zealand can learn valuable lessons from the contrasting approaches taken 
by the US and UK, in defining organised crime. The US has remained mired in 
traditional beliefs of organised crime, and accordingly, the legislative tools and 
law enforcement response to organised crime have been undermined by these 
inaccurate conceptions. The US continues to perceive organised crime as an 
ethnically defined ‗outsider‘ threat.916 In contrast the UK has taken a flexible, 
intelligence led approach towards defining organised crime. The UK has 
developed a broad concept of organised crime, allowing its definitions to 
encompass the wide variety of groups involved in organised crime. The UK 
has achieved this by constantly reviewing its concept or organised crime based 
on intelligence gathered by various agencies, in particular SOCA.
917
 To avoid 
the problems and inaccuracies associated with the US response to organised 
crime, NZ should seek to emulate the UK‘s determination to develop 
intelligence and knowledge, relating to organised crime, and how it operates in 
legal and illegal markets. 
 
Developing New Zealand’s Organised Crime Strategy and knowledge 
regarding organised crime  
An important factor for the UK in developing its knowledge and understanding 
of organised crime has been the development of annual threat assessments and 
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frequent reviews of strategies to combat organised crime. The UK has 
acknowledged that illicit markets and organised criminal groups are constantly 
changing, and therefore, has actively sought to build its intelligence and 
understanding of the threats posed by organised crime.
918
 
 
Building on the initial OCS, New Zealand must also develop its understanding 
of criminal problems associated with both legal and illegal markets.
919
 The 
OCS is designated as the building block for the development of future research, 
analysis and strategies to combat organised crime. Therefore, it is concerning 
that the new updated strategy has not been released as scheduled, and 
moreover, no exact timeframe has been given for its release. The OCS, and its 
successors, were designed to establish up-to-date processes for identifying and 
targeting new and developing patterns of criminal activity and will underpin 
policy responses to developing organised crime trends.
920
  
 
Organised crime is a constantly evolving phenomenon; the networks associated 
with it adapt quickly to legal and law enforcement measures. It is fluid and 
agile by nature, existing to provide illicit goods and services to illegal markets. 
Intelligence relating to developing illicit markets and organised crime trends is 
vital in facilitating responses to organised crime. Therefore, the OCS plays an 
important part, as it underpins responses to organised crime by government 
agencies. The OCS has an objective to guide and ensure the completion of 
regular and informed revisions of legislation, governing relevant investigative 
and prosecutorial procedures and tools.
921
 It plays a vital part in under pinning 
New Zealand‘s response to TNOC. If the OCS becomes out-dated or 
inaccurate, then New Zealand‘s response to organised crime will also become 
out-dated and ineffective. The NZ government needs to ensure that updating 
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919
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920
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the OCS remains a high priority, and furthermore, that it is up-dated in a timely 
matter in keeping with the schedule outlined in the initial OCS. 
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 Home Office <www.homeoffice.gov.uk>. 
 Ministry of Justice <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
 New Zealand Police <www.police.govt.nz>. 
 Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand <www.ofcanz.govt.nz>. 
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 U.S. Department of States <www.state.gov>. 
 
